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Thesis Abstract
This thesis consists of five self-contained essays on two central subjects. The first
subject is the relationship between infrastructure and private productivity. The
second subject is the determinants of regional infrastructure investment alloca-
tion. Whereas the first and the second essay in this thesis mainly focus on the
first subject, i.e. the contribution of infrastructure to private production; the es-
says three to five study besides the productivity effects also the determinants of
infrastructure investment allocation.
In the first essay, using time-series cross-section data from the manufactur-
ing sector of the 11 German ‘Bundesländer’ (federal states) from 1970 to 1996,
we examine the impact of public capital on private production. Our economet-
ric analysis explicitly takes into account four of the most frequent specification
issues in the context of time-series cross-section data analysis: serial correlation,
groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation and nonstationarity of
data. For all approaches and tested specifications, we find that public capital is a
significant input for production in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, we find
that differences in public capital endowment can explain long-term differences in
productivity across the Bundesländer.
The second essay uses a partial adjustment approach to measure the contri-
bution of public infrastructure to local private production. In the first step of the
empirical analysis we apply a principal component analysis in order to construct
2 new infrastructure indicators from an array of 7 measures of transport and hu-
man capital infrastructure. In the second step the output of different sectors is
regressed on private factor inputs and on these 2 infrastructure indicators. Our
main finding is that expected long-run equilibrium output in an area of local gov-
ernment will be higher, the better it is endowed with both transport and human
LIST OF FIGURES x
capital infrastructure. Moreover, transport and human capital infrastructure ap-
pear to be complementary, i.e. raising only transport infrastructure will not yield
an increase in private production at the local level.
The third essay proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation
of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth.
We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure invest-
ments; in doing so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in production-function
estimates and generate testable hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure
policy. Our empirical findings on a panel of France’s regions over 1984-91 sug-
gest that influence activities were, indeed, significant determinants of the cross-
regional allocation of transportation infrastructure investments. Moreover, we
find little evidence of concern for the maximisation of economic returns to infras-
tructure spending, even after controlling for pork-barrel and when imposing an
exogenous preference for convergence in regional productivity levels.
The fourth essay applies a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation
of the contribution of infrastructure accumulation to private production. A polit-
ical economy model for the allocation of public infrastructure investment grants
is formulated. Our empirical findings, using a panel of large German cities for
the years 1980, 1986, and 1988, suggest that cities ruled by a council sharing the
State (‘Bundesland’) government’s current political affiliation were particularly
successful in attracting infrastructure investment grants. With regard to the con-
tribution of infrastructure accumulation to growth, we find that public capital is
a significant factor for private production. Moreover, at least for the sample stud-
ied, we find that simultaneity between output and public capital is weak; thus,
feedback effects from output to infrastructure are negligible.
The fifth essay describes the different institutional frameworks for infrastruc-
ture policy in Germany and France. The economic effects of infrastructure are es-
timated econometrically for German and French regions. We find evidence that
regional road infrastructure has a significant impact on regional output. More-
over, we find evidence that for Germany the priority of promoting equal living
conditions throughout the regions is an important determinant of regional infras-
tructure policy.
LIST OF FIGURES xi
The bottom line of our research is that throughout the essays evidence of a
positive impact of infrastructure on private productivity is found. This finding
holds also for different levels of aggregation; the essays 1, 3 and 5 are based on
data at the regional level of the Bundesländer and the French regions respectively,
whereas essay 2 is based on data at the local level of the German counties and es-
say 4 is based on data at the local level of large self-administrated German cities.
Furthermore, we find only little evidence throughout the studies for a simultane-
ity between output and infrastructure investment. Thus, reverse causality run-
ning from output to infrastructure investment appears—at least for the various
samples studied here—not to be significant. Regarding the determinants of in-
frastructure investment, we find that lobbying and political affiliation matter for
the regional allocation of infrastructure investment, whereas expected returns to
infrastructure investment do not seem to have an impact.
Part I
Part I 1
1.1 Introduction
It is conventional wisdom that investment in infrastructure capital is a necessary
condition for long-run growth in industrial countries and, a fortiori, in developing
ones. How much infrastructure investment actually contributes to private produc-
tivity is still, in spite of a long-standing debate, a largely unsettled question.
Economists have long considered public capital to play an important role in
regional economic development. Hirschmann (1958), for instance, defined ‘so-
cial overhead capital’ (SOC) as comprising of those basic services without which
primary, secondary, and tertiary productive activities cannot function. Moreover,
according to Hirschmann’s definition the services are provided in practically all
countries by public agencies or by private agencies subject to some public control.
Similarly, Hansen (1965) divided public capital1 into two groups: ‘social’ over-
head capital (SOC) and ‘economic’ overhead capital (EOC).While SOC is devoted
to investment in human capital like eduction and health, EOC is primarily geared
toward promoting directly productive activities. Examples for EOC are highways
and streets, gas and electricity facility, water and sewer systems.
Hansen advanced the theory that the potential effectiveness of public cap-
ital investment will vary across types of regions: congested, intermediate and
lagging. While the potential benefits of investments in EOC are large in inter-
mediate regions, investment in EOC in lagging regions would have little im-
pact on economic activity. In congested regions, any marginal social benefit that
might accrue form further infrastructure investment would be outweighed by
the marginal social cost of pollution and congestion resulting from increased eco-
nomic activity.
During the 1970’s and 80’s, many OECD countries experienced a serious de-
cline in output and productivity growth. Rising unemployment, increasing social
transfers and public debt constrained public investment inmany countries.2 Con-
1Throughout this thesis we use the terms ‘infrastructure’ and ‘public capital’ interchangeably.
However, strictly speaking public capital refers to infrastructure services that are owned by the
public sector, whereas ’infrastructure’ applies also to services which are owned by the private
sector.
2For an excellent survey on this topic, see Sturm (1998).
Part I 2
sequently, public investment as a share of GDP has declined considerably in most
OECD countries during the last two decades.
Figure 1.1 shows, that the share of non-military public sector consumption
increased in Germany from 10.5 to 18.5 percent during the period from 1960 to
1997, while the share of public sector’s investment has declined from its peak of
about 5 percent in 1964 to about 1.5 percent in 1997. After the German Reunifica-
tion, public investment as a share of GDP increased for a short period from 2.0 to
2.5 percent, but afterwards has continued on a general decline since the mid 70’s.
This is even more surprising if one considers the still relatively high demand for
infrastructure projects in the new East German states (‘Neue Bundesländer)’.
A number of researchers such as Aschauer (1989a; 1989b; 1989c) or Munnell
(1990a; 1990c; 1992) have documented also empirical evidence for a strong cor-
relation between public capital and private sector performance. Furthermore,
these authors have hypothesised that the decrease of governmental investment
in the US and other countries may be crucial for explaining the observed decline
in productivity growth. This argumentation has been popularised as the ‘Public
Infrastructure Hypothesis’ in the literature.
If the ‘Public Infrastructure Hypothesis’ is of empirical relevance for Germany,
then at least a part of the productivity gap between East and West Germany can
be attributed to the still existing differences in infrastructure endowments be-
tween the East andWest German regions. In fact, recent studies (Komar, 2000; Sei-
del and Vesper, 2000) show that infrastructure endowment in the East German
federal states is still only two thirds of that in the West German federal states.
Turning to the hypothetical effects of infrastructure, Aschauer (1995), for ex-
ample, postulates that public capital can have both a direct and indirect effect on
private output. The direct effect arises because changes in public capital stock
alter the level of output by making private labour and capital inputs more or less
productive. The indirect effect arises because an increase in public capital stock
will affect the marginal products of labour and private capital, which in turn in-
fluence the chosen quantities of private inputs.
In Germany, the priority of transport infrastructure projects is evaluated on
the basis of cost-benefit studies, e.g. the federal transport infrastructure plan
P
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Figure 1.1: Public Sector Consumption and Investment in the Federal Republic of Germany from 1960-2000
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Part I 4
(‘Bundesverkehrswegeplanung’). If investment in transport infrastructure is ef-
ficiently allocated by governments on the basis of cost-benefit studies, then we
would expect it to have a positive and significant impact on private production.
Moreover, from the theoretical work of Arrow andKurz (1970) it is known that
if a government’s infrastructure investment program is optimal, then the rate of
return on infrastructure projects should equal the rate of return on private capital.
Otherwise it would be beneficial to increase investments in infrastructure even if
this would result in less investment in the private sector.3
Specifically, these cost-benefit studies do not solely rely on expected economic
returns from infrastructure projects, but on environmental impact evaluations as
well. However, since a project is not undertaken if it does not yield positive re-
turns, and if the ex-ante evaluations of the returns from transport infrastructure
projects are in most cases correct, then in principle it should be possible to find
from the ex-post perspective empirical evidence of an impact of infrastructure on
private output. This is particularly the case if the empirical analysis aggregates
over individual projects, i.e. focus on the average return of transport infrastruc-
ture projects.
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. The first aim is to analyse the contri-
bution of infrastructure to private production. The second aim is to examine the
politico-economic determinants of regional infrastructure investment allocation.
However, these two subjects are not independent but interrelated. By formulat-
ing political-economy models which explain the allocation of infrastructure in-
vestment to regions, we are able to estimate the productivity effects of infrastruc-
ture from structural models in which public capital investment is endogenised.
We employ this approach in essays 3 and 4.
Throughout the essays of this thesis we treat infrastructure according to
Meade (1952) as an unpaid factor of private production.4 Hence, infrastructure
capital, i.e. EOC, is modelled to enter the production function of private firms.
3This reasoning is, however, based on the assumption that capital is freely transferable be-
tween an economy’s private and public sectors.
4In contrast to pure public goods (or ‘atmosphere’ goods in the terminology of Meade) unpaid
factors of production such as roads or sewer systems are also characterised by congestion or
locational aspects (Duffy).
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On the other hand, the input factor ‘public capital’ is not purchased by the
firms at the market as are labour and private capital, but is supplied by govern-
mental institutions. Moreover, private firms can allocate resources to influence
the level of public capital provision by working through the political process. In
other words, firms can lobby in order to obtain the desired level of public capital
from the governmental institutions.
Consequently, ‘pork-barrel’ politics due to the influence of firms on the alloca-
tion of investment may determine the regional allocation of infrastructure invest-
ment. However, we also consider distortions in the allocation of infrastructure
due to the political affiliation of governments at different levels. These influences
can give rise to allocation outcomes that might depart substantially from an opti-
mal allocation as a result of maximising social welfare.
Our approach formeasuring the politico-economic determinants of infrastruc-
ture investment allocation in essays 3 and 4 is based on a general framework for
political-economy analysis which views economic policy decisions as being a re-
sult of the maximisation of objective functions by incumbent politicians under
constraints that are primarily political (e.g., Dixit, 1996). Thus, rather than treat-
ing policy as exogenous or chosen by the mythical ‘social planer’ public policy
is viewed as the result of some interaction between citizens-voters and policy-
makers within institutions having certain characteristics (Alt and Alesina, 1996).
Our approach is also related to the economics of rent-seeking, which is in-
terested in the rational behaviour of special interest groups and politicians. For
instance, early studies on this topic (e.g., Krueger, 1974) pointed out when in-
dividuals can gain from government policies, they have an incentive to expend
resources up to the expected value of that gain in order to get the benefits, thereby
creating substantial welfare losses in the process. The policy outcome depends on
the possibilities of the interest groups to influence the budget process according
to their wishes (Ekelund and Tollison, 2001).
The literature on the determinants of infrastructure policies so far has mainly
discussed optimal rules for the provision of infrastructure at different levels of
government in a federal system (e.g., Hulten and Schwab, 1997). However, it
remains an open question whether and how much infrastructure policies in real-
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ity are designed according to such efficiency considerations. To our knowledge,
only a few studies so far have discussed the politics of infrastructure (e.g. Crain
and Oakley, 1995). In this perspective, the thesis bridges the gap between the
infrastructure and political-economy literature.
In essays 3 and 4 we test the hypothesis that the number of manufacturing
firms in a given region is decisive for infrastructure spending. This prediction is
derived from a common-agency model whereby incumbent politicians sell in-
frastructure investments to local lobbies who bid for them through campaign
contributions. The underlying assumption is that firms have sunk investments
and therefore a vested interest in the quality and maintenance of the infrastruc-
ture where they are located. Politicians—on the other hand—are assumed to be
responsive to the lobbying efforts by business, for instance in anticipation of po-
tential campaign contributions from firms, or in anticipation of the expected loss
of tax revenues and/or employment opportunities if firms move to another loca-
tion.
Essays 3 and 4 also test the idea that party affiliation between higher and
lower-tier governments matters for the outcome of infrastructure policies. Gross-
man (1994), for example, argues that the ‘political capital’ of a region is of higher
value to a higher-tier government if the party affiliation is the same. Accord-
ingly, the distribution of infrastructure investments is driven by self-interests of
politicians with the purpose to enhance reelection chances. In essay 4, for the
specific case of large German cities our interpretation of the significance of party
affiliation is that the identity of political colour shortcuts the bargaining process
between lower and higher-tier governments and thereby favours certain munici-
palities by means of party loyalty.
Recently, it has also been suggested in the literature that redistributive pol-
itics are used as tactical (electoral politics) instruments for buying support of
marginal voters (‘swing voter’ approach, e.g. Dixit and Londregan, 1998). Us-
ing this framework, we furthermore test in essay 4 the hypothesis that cities will
receive more grants if they are politically powerful, i.e. if there is a large number
of voters who are indifferent between the two parties and therefore potentially
could be influenced by pork barrel politics.
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In essay 5 we consider further economic and institutional determinants for
the allocation of infrastructure investments in Germany and France. Following
the approaches of de la Fuente and Vives (1995) or Martin (1999b) we find that—
surprisingly—neither for France nor for Germany efficiency considerations mat-
ter for the allocation of infrastructure investment across regions. However, we
find that in Germany, in contrast with France, the priority of promoting the re-
gional convergence of living conditions is important for infrastructure policy in
Germany.
1.2 Literature survey on empirical infrastructure
studies based on production functions
In this section we provide a short overview of results of empirical infrastruc-
ture studies based on the production function approach, because throughout the
essays our analysis will be based on this approach. For more comprehensive sur-
veys including studies employing the dual cost or profit function approach see
for instance Gramlich (1994), Pfähler, Hofmann and Bönte (1997) or Sturm (1998).
Table 1.1 shows a summary of results of empirical infrastructure studies at the
regional level for the US. One study which is closely related to our own research in
essay 1 is that fromHulten and Schwab (1991). This study, like essay 1, focuses on
regional manufacturing. The main finding of Hulten and Schwab is that public
infrastructure does not have an effect on regional total factor productivity (TFP)
growth in U.S. manufacturing.
The picture emerging from Table 1.1 is that the results of the various studies
are rather diverse. While some studies find positive and significant effects of in-
frastructure, others find only negligible or insignificant effects. Furthermore, the
size of the estimated output elasticity of infrastructure capital YG differs consid-
erably.
Another interesting insight from Table 1.1 is that the degree of the estimation’s
econometric sophistication also varies substantially among these studies. While
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Table 1.1: Production Function Studies at the Regional Level for the US
Study Data Specification Results, output elasticity YG
Kelejian and Robinson
(1997)
US, panel, 48 states, 1970-1986, public capital
stock fromMunnell (1990a)a
Cobb-Douglas, spatial correlation,
AR(1), heterosc., spillover-effects
not significant, spatial correlation
model
Garcia-Milà, McGuire
and Porter (1996)
US, panel, 48 states, 1970-1983, public capital
stock fromMunnell (1990a)a
Cobb-Douglas, fixed and random
state effects, 1. diffs
not significant, revised estimation
from Garcia-Milà and McGuire (1992)
Moonaw, Mullen and
Williams (1995)
US, panel, 48 states, 1970, 1980, 1986, public
capital stock fromMunnell (1990a)a
translog YG=0.11, highways, water & sewer
systems significant, other types not
Baltagi and Pinnoi
(1995)
US, panel, 48 states, 1970-1986, public capital
stock fromMunnell (1990a)a
Cobb-Douglas, fixed and random
state effects, IV estimation
highways not significant, water &
sewer significant
Pinnoi (1994) US, panel, 48 states, 4 industries, 1970-1986,
public capital stock fromMunnell (1990a)a
translog, fixed and random state
effects
water & sewer systems, other types
negative, standard errors not reported
Evans and Karras
(1994a)
US, panel, 48 states, 1970-1986, public capital
stock fromMunnell (1990a)a
Cobb-Douglas, fixed and random
state effects, AR(1), heterosc.
not significant
Holtz-Eakin (1994) US, panel, 48 states, 1970-1986, revised
public capital from Munnell (1990a)
Cobb-Douglas, fixed & random
state, time effects, IV estim.
not significant
Munnell (1993) US, panel, 48 states, diff. industries,
1970-1990, revised dataa for public capital
Cobb-Douglas YG=0.14
a Three different types of public capital: 1. Highways, 2. Water and sewer systems, 3. Other types (primarily buildings)
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Table 1.1: (cont.) Production Function Studies at the Regional Level for the US
Study Data Specification Results, output elasticity YG
Garcia-Milà and
McGuire (1992)
US, panel, 48 states, 1969-83, highway
capital, education expenditures
Cobb-Douglas, time effects YG=0.04 for highways, education
significant
Carlino and Voith
(1992)
US, panel, 48 states, 1963-1986, highway
density, educational attainment
CES, fixed and random effects YG=0.22-1.00 for highways, education
significant
Moonaw and
Williams (1991)
US, panel, 48 states, manufacturing, 1959-76,
highway density
TFP growth YG=0.17
Hulten and Schwab
(1991)
US, panel, manufacturing, 9 regions, public
capital stock fromMunnell (1990a)a
TFP growth, time effects not significant
Munnell (1990a) US, panel, 48 states, 1970-1986, capital
outlays from Goverment Financesa
Cobb-Douglas, translog YG=0.16 for Cobb-Douglas, public
capital and private capital substitutes
Da Silva Costa, Ellson
and Martin (1987)
US, cross-section, 48 states, 1972, capital
outlays from Goverment Finances
translog YG=0.19-0.26, labor and public capital
complementary, diminishing returns
in public capital
Eberts (1986) US, panel, 38 SMSA, 1958-78, public capital
stock metropolitan area
translog 0.03
a Three different types of public capital: 1. Highways, 2. Water and sewer systems, 3. Other types (primarily buildings)
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most of the newer studies take the data’s panel structure explicitly into account
(by including fixed or random effects), some of the older studies have ignored
this potential source of bias. Additionally, more recent studies also consider the
data’s time series properties, for example by taking first differences or providing
unit root tests. It should also be noted that most of the newer studies use the
same data from Munnell (1992) for public capital stock. Considering this, similar
patterns of findings in different studies become less surprising, for example that
sewer and water systems are significant, but highways are not.
Table 1.2 shows an overview of studies at the regional level for countries other
than the US. Again, while some studies find positive and significant effects others
do not. However, these studies are only to a very limited extent comparable since
different definitions of public infrastructure or even different levels of regional
aggregation are used. For example, Hofmann (1996) has examined the impact of
infrastructure on Hamburg’s business sector. In this study, Hofmann specifies a
Cobb-Douglas production function, which is estimated as a dynamic error correc-
tion model. Utilising data from 1970 to 1992, Hofmann finds an output elasticity
of public capital that appears either to be insignificant or to be significant with a
negative sign. This result turns out to be rather robust with regards to variations
in the econometric specification. In another study at the regional level, utilising
data from 99 German cities from 1980 to 1989, Seitz (1995) finds a positive and
significant contribution from infrastructure to private output, with an estimated
output elasticity YG between 0.08 and 0.19.
Next, we discuss some studies at the national level. An overview of the results
of these studies is shown in Table 1.3. As mentioned above, the most promi-
nent study at the national level is from Aschauer (1989a). Aschauer estimates an
output elasticity of public capital with a value between 0.38 and 0.56, which im-
plies a marginal productivity of public capital of more than 100 percent. This is
in sharp contrast to more moderate finding in an earlier study by Ratner (1983),
who found the output elasticity of infrastructure capital to be 0.06.
It has been emphasised by several authors that the productivity effects from
infrastructure found at the national level might be larger than the effects found at
the regional level, because only at the national level all regional spill-overs from
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Table 1.2: Production Function Studies at the Regional Level for Other Countries
Study Data Specification Results, output elasticity YG
Prud’Homme (1996) France, panel, 21 regions, 1970-1990,
transportation infrastructure
Cobb-Douglas, TFP growth YG=0.08
Hofmann (1995),
(1996)
Germany, Hamburg, time-series, 1970-1992,
locally provided infrastructure services
Cobb-Douglas, 1. diffs., error
correction model
not significant or implausible
(negativ)
Seitz (1995) Germany, panel, 99 cities, 1980-89, public
capital
Cobb-Douglas, translog YG=0.08 to 0.19
de la Fuente and
Vives (1995)
Spain, panel, 17 regions, 1981, 1986, 1990,
transportation infrastructure, education
Cobb-Douglas, translog, time
effects
YG=0.21
Picci (1995) Italy, panel, 20 regions, 1970-1991, public
capital stock
Cobb-Douglas, fixed and random
effects, 1. diffs.
YG=0.08-0.43, short-run effects,
long-run effects not signif.
Merriman (1990) 48 US states, 1972, 9 Japanese regions,
1954-63, public capital from Da Silva Costa
et al. (1987) and Mera (1973)
translog, fixed-effects, SUR
estimation
YG=0.46-0.58 for Japan, YG=0.20 for
US
Mera (1973) Japan, panel, 9 regions, 1954-63, social
overhead capital
Cobb-Douglas YG=0.12-0.22
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Table 1.3: Production Function Studies at the National Level
Study Data Specification Results, output elasticity YG
Everaert and Heylen
(2001)
Belgium, time-series 1953-96, public capital
stock
multifactor productivity,
cointegration
significant, YG=0.29
Batina (1999) US, time-series, different proxies for public
infrastructure
aggregate production function,
dynamic OLS
significant
Duggal, Saltzman and
Klein (1999)
US, time-series, public infrastructure non-linear ‘S-shaped’ production
function, 2SLS
significant
Denny and Guiomard
(1997)
Irland, time-series, manufacturing,
1951-1994, stock of roads & highways
Cobb-Douglas, AR(1) YG=0.92
Fernald (1999) US, time-series, 35 sectors, 1948-1985, stock
of roads & highways
TFP growth significant, explains half of the
observed decline in productivity
growth
Christodoulakis
(1993)
Greece, time-series, manufacturing,
1963-1990, public infrastructure (roads,
railways, electricity, communication, etc.)
Cobb-Douglas, cointegration YG=0.27-0.42
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Table 1.3: (cont.) Production Function Studies at the National Level
Study Data Specification Results, output elasticity YG
Bajo-Rubio and
Sosvilla-Rivero (1993)
Spain, time-series, 1964-88, public capital Cobb-Douglas, cointegration,
Hausman exogeneity test
YG=0.18, public capital exogenous
Berndt and Hansson
(1992)
Sweden, time-series, 1964-88, public
infrastructure
Cobb-Douglas YG=-1.66-0.369, results implausible
Tatom (1991a) US, time series, 1949-85, public capital data
from Aschauer (1989a)
Cobb-Douglas, including energy
prices, 1. diffs.
not significant
Munnell (1990c) US, time series, 1948-87, public capital Cobb-Douglas YG=0.34-0.37
Aschauer (1989a) US, time series, 1949-85, non-military public
capital
Cobb-Douglas YG=0.38-0.56
Ratner (1983) US, time series, 1949-73, non-military public
capital
Cobb-Douglas YG=0.06
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Table 1.4: Production Function Studies at the International Level
Study Data Specification Results, output elasticity YG
Aschauer (1995) OECD, 12 countries, panel, infrastructure
capital from Ford and Poret (1991)
TFP growth, fixed country and
time effects, 4-year average
YG=0.33-0.55
Nourzad and Vrieze
(1995)
OECD, 7 countries, panel, 1963-88, public
investment (data sources not given)
Cobb-Douglas, energy input, 1.
diffs., random effects
YG=0.05
Evans and Karras
(1994b)
OECD, 7 countries, panel, 1963-88, public
capital
Cobb-Douglas, 1. diffs. not significant
Neusser (1993) G7 countries, manufacturing, 1970-87, public
capital from Ford and Poret (1991)
TFP growth, cointegration
techniques, long-run effects
unstable and unreliable results
Taylor-Lewis (1993) G7-countries, panel, sector specific, public
capital from Ford and Poret (1991),
indicators of physical infrastructure
Cobb-Douglas not significant
Ford and Poret (1991) OECD, 12 countries, time series, 1960-1988,
non-military public capital stock, broad
definition includes also privatly provided
infrastructure services
TFP growth, AR(1), AR(2) only significant for US, Germany,
Canada, Belgium and Sweden
Aschauer (1989c) G7-countries, panel data, 1966-85, public
investments from OECD national accounts
Cobb-Douglas YG=0.34-0.73
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infrastructure are fully captured (Munnell, 1993).
However, the result of Aschauer’s study has led to considerable sceptism in
literature (Gramlich, 1994; Jorgenson, 1991; Tatom, 1991a; Tatom, 1991b; Tatom,
1993a). It is argued that the elasticity found by Aschauer is too high to be plau-
sible. Tatom (1991a), for example, points out that the econometric analysis of
Aschauer is not appropriate since it neglects the data’s time series properties.
Specifically, Tatom shows that the times series used by Aschauer are nonstation-
ary. Rerunning the regression from Aschauer (1989a) with variables in first dif-
ferences and including an energy price variable to control for oil price shocks, it
turns out that infrastructure capital no longer appears to be significant.
Finally, Table 1.4 provides a summary of findings from studies at the inter-
national level. One of the earliest studies is from Aschauer (1989c), who finds
significant and positive effects from infrastructure for the G7 countries for the pe-
riod 1966-1985. Extending his study, Aschauer (1995) estimates the productivity
effects from infrastructure for 12 OECD countries. It turns out that the effects
are significant with an output elasticity between 0.33 and 0.55. Another study by
Ford and Poret (1991) on 12 OECD countries takes the data’s time series charac-
teristics explicitly into account and obtains mixed results. Only the estimates for
5 countries, that is the US, Germany, Canada, Belgium and Sweden are signifi-
cant. In a more recent study on 7 OECD countries, taking both the data’s time
series and panel data structure into account, Nourzad and Vrieze find a relatively
low, but significant output elasticity for infrastructure with a value of 0.05.
To summarise this short review, the published results on the productivity ef-
fects of infrastructure so far are rather ambiguous. Moreover, this literature sur-
vey has shown that early studies in general have used rather simplistic and in-
appropriate econometric techniques to study the productivity effects of infras-
tructure, and that these results turned out to be spurious when applying more
appropriate econometric techniques. However, a substantial number of studies
exist using appropriate econometric techniques and documenting positive and
significant effects from infrastructure.
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1.3 Outline of the thesis
Essay 1 examines the impact of public capital on private production in manu-
facturing at the regional of the 11 German ‘Bundesländer’ (federal states) in the
period from 1970 to 1996. Essay 2 uses a partial adjustment approach to measure
the contribution of public infrastructure to private production at the local level
of the 327 German counties (‘Kreise’). Public infrastructure endowment is mea-
sured by means of indicators and the analysis is carried out for 3 different sectors
of the local economy: service, trade & transport and manufacturing. Essay 3 em-
ploys a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of
transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. The model is based on
two equations. The first equation describes the regional production function and
the second consists of a policy function which determines the regional allocation
of infrastructure investment. In essay 4 we test the political-economy approach of
essay 3 with a data set of large self-administrated German cities. Essay 5 investi-
gates the productivity effects of infrastructure using a pooled data set of German
and French regions. Furthermore, essay 5 analyses the institutional determinants
of infrastructure policies in Germany and France.
Part II
Essays
Essay 1
Assessing the Contribution of Public Capital
to Private Production: Evidence from the
German Manufacturing Sector
Abstract
Using time-series cross-section data from the manufacturing sector of the 11 German
‘Bundesländer’ (federal states) from 1970 to 1996, we examine the impact of public cap-
ital on private production. Our econometric analysis explicitly takes into account four
of the most frequent specification issues in the context of time-series cross-section data
analysis: serial correlation, groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation and
nonstationarity of data. For all approaches and tested specifications, we find that pub-
lic capital is a significant input for production in the manufacturing sector. Moreover,
we find that differences in public capital endowment can explain long-term differences in
productivity across the ‘Bundesländer’.
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1.1 Introduction
Our study is motivated by the controversy that has developed recently about
the contribution of public capital—e.g. highways, mass transits, water and sewer
systems, etc.—to private production. This controversy has been stimulated by the
large elasticity of output with respect to public capital found in the pioneering
work of Aschauer (1989a; 1989b). Aschauer’s findings suggest that part of the
productivity slowdown observed in the 1970s and 80s in the United States and in
other OECD countries may be due to an underinvestment in public capital. This
has become known in the literature as the ‘public capital hypothesis’.
A number of follow-up studies have been spurred by this controversy some of
which have been supportive to the public capital hypothesis (Berndt and Hans-
son, 1992; Fernald, 1999; Morrison and Schwartz, 1996; Munnell, 1990b; Munnell,
1992; Otto and Voss, 1994; Ram and Ramsey, 1989) while others have not been
supportive (Baltagi and Pinnoi, 1995; Garcia-Milà et al., 1996; Erber, 1995; Evans
and Karras, 1994a; Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Hulten and Schwab, 1991; Tatom, 1991a;
Tatom, 1993a).1 The usual approach taken in these studies is to regress some
measure of output e.g. gross domestic product (GDP) or value added on an array
of factor inputs and a measure of public capital.2
The purpose of this essay is to examine the significance of the ‘public capital
hypothesis’ for Germany. One major finding that emerges from our empirical
investigation is that public capital appears to be a significant determinant for
private production in the manufacturing sector. Thus, our empirical results are in
line with other studies for Germany e.g. Seitz (1993), Licht and Seitz (1994), Seitz
(1994) or Schlag (1997). However, we stress that our study (i) uses a different
methodology which is not based on the cost but on the less restrictive production
function approach, (ii) focuses on the manufacturing sector at the regional level
of the Bundesländer and (iii) incorporates several important econometric issues
in the statistical analysis which have been neglected in previous studies.
1For comprehensive surveys on this literature, see for instance Gramlich (1994), Sturm, Kuper
and de Haan (1996) or Pfähler et al. (1997).
2Berndt and Hansson (1992), Erber (1995) and Morrison and Schwartz (1996) are based on a
dual cost function instead of a production function. Hulten and Schwab (1991) and Fernald (1999)
use total factor productivity (TFP) growth as the dependent variable in the analysis.
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Thus, our study addresses some important methodological concerns raised
about previous studies. For example, as pointed out by Aaron (1990), Jorgenson
(1991) and Tatom (1991a; 1993a) most of the time series employed for the exami-
nation of the relationship between public capital and private output are likely to
be nonstationary and thus they advise estimating the model in first differences
if the variables are not cointegrated. Following this advice, for instance, Tatom
(1991a) or Garcia-Milà et al. (1996) find the elasticity of output with respect to
public capital to be insignificant for the US. This highlights the importance of an
appropriate modelling of stochastic or deterministic trends in variables. In our
empirical analysis this matter is particularly considered.
Another important motivation of our study is that we intend to shed some
light onto the nature of the positive correlation between public capital and private
output. Thus, we analyse the underlying structure of the data that gives rise to
this correlation. The question is whether the correlation results from the variation
between cross-sections (Bundesländer) or from the variation over time, i.e. from
the ‘within’ variation. Moreover, we also investigate whether this correlation is
manifested in the short-run or in the long-run trends in the data.
The remainder of this essay is organised as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the
specification used in the empirical analysis. Section 1.3 presents the results and
considers several econometric specification issues. Section 1.4 summarises and
concludes the essay.
1.2 Specification
This section considers the specification for our econometric approach to assess
the contribution of public capital to private production.
Suppose that production of value-added output Qit in the manufacturing sec-
tor in Bundesland i = 1, . . . , B at time t = 1, . . . , T depends on inputs of private
capital Ki,t 1 and labour Li,t 1. Our assumption that output at time t is only pro-
duced using factor inputs which were already installed in period t   1 avoids a
potential simultaneity between output and factor inputs.
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We assume that output Qit also depends on the Hicks-neutral level of technol-
ogy Ai(), which is a function of time t and the level of the non-rival public input
Gi,t 1. Suppose Ai() takes the functional form Ai = Ai0G
βg
i,t 1 exp(λt), where A0i
is the initial level of technology at time t = 0 in Bundesland i and λ is the ex-
ogenous rate of technology growth. The exogenous technology growth rate λ is
therefore restricted to be the same for all Bundesländer whereas the initial level
of technology A0i can vary across the Bundesländer.
Now, specifying a Cobb-Douglas functional form we get the estimating equa-
tion in logarithms as
lnQit = ln Ai0 + λt+ βg lnGi,t 1 + βk lnKi,t 1 + βl ln Li,t 1 + εit, (1.1)
i = 1, ...., B, t = 1, ..., T,
where εit denotes an error term which reflects contemporaneous exogenous
shocks to logarithmic output lnQit. We assume that εit is an i.i.d. randomvariable
with variance σ2ε . Note that in (1.1) the estimate bβ j, j 2 fg, k, lg, gives the elastic-
ity of output with respect to factor j. Note also that in contrast to many previous
studies we refrain from including measures of capacity utilisation in (1.1). All
measures of capacity utilisation we are aware of (e.g. the quite often used unem-
ployment rate) incur the risk of simultaneity with output, since the actual level of
output directly or indirectly influences these measures. Instead we assume that
over- or underutilisation of factors in producing output Qit are reflected in the
error term εit.
Even if the Cobb-Douglas functional form is restrictive because the elastici-
ties of substitution of input factors are restricted to equal one, it is a first order
approximation to any arbitrary production function in the neighbourhood where
the factor input vector X = (G,K, L) is (1, 1, 1).3 It is worth stressing that (1.1)
does not put any restriction on the technology with respect to returns to scale.
3In order to capture the second order effects we also estimated flexible functional forms for the
production function e.g. translog (Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau, 1971; Christensen, Jorgenson
and Lau, 1973) in the empirical analysis. However, it turned out that the estimation of these spec-
ifications suffered from a strong multicollinearity problem. This problem arises from extremely
high correlations of the single factor inputs with the quadratic and the cross effect terms.
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It should be mentioned that instead of a production function it would have
been possible to specify a dual cost function approach with public capital enter-
ing as a quasi-fixed unpaid factor of production. However, at such a fairly high
level of aggregation the behavioural assumption of the cost function approach
that costs are endogenous and determined by choosing cost minimizing quan-
tities of factor inputs given a certain exogenous quantity of output seems to be
unrealistic (Berndt, 1991, p. 457). Furthermore, factor prices are quite often not
directly observed but have to be calculated using some (restrictive) assumptions
which are likely to introduce further sources of measurement error in the data.
The production function approach on the other hand does neither require a be-
havioural (minimizing or maximising) assumption nor does it require data on
factor prices (Chambers, 1988).
1.3 Econometric issues and results
The data used in the analysis cover the manufacturing sector of the 11 German
Bundesländer (B = 11) from 1970 to 1996 (T = 27). A comprehensive description
of the data is given in the Appendix.
Figure 1.1 graphs the aggregate series of Q, L, K and G over the period 1970-
1996. Growth of the aggregate public capital stock was particularly high during
the period from 1970 to 1981. After 1983 the growth rate of public capital slightly
declined compared to the previous period, but was still positive and relatively
constant.
On the other hand the aggregate private capital stock in manufacturing grew
with a relatively high rate from 1970 to 1975, but in the period 1976-1985 the
growth rate of the capital stock wore off. Note that changes in aggregate private
capital appear to follow changes in output with a lag of about 2 to 3 years. For
example the decrease in output during the years 1979 to 1982 seems to have had
an effect on the formation of private capital after 1982. Hence, at least at the
aggregate level there is some evidence that the private capital formation is likely
to follow the development in output and not vice versa. Similarly, from 1993
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Figure 1.1: Manufacturing Sectors’ Aggregate Series Q, L, K and G for West German Bundesländer from 1970-1996
13.1
13.2
13.3
13.4
13.5
13.6
13.7
13.8
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
(For data description and sources, see Appendix)
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Regression analysis: T=27, standard errors are given in parentheses
lncQt =  0.38+ 0.008t   0.063 lnKt 1 + 0.648 ln Lt 1+ 0.425 lnGt 1 R2 = 0.946
(3.21) (0.003) (0.201) (0.138) (0.137) DW = 1.767
LM = 2.337
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to 1996 we can observe a decline in the stock of private manufacturing capital
whereas a sharp decline in output occurred already from 1991 to 1993.
The aggregate labour series shows a clear downward trend over the total pe-
riod. This can be ascribed to the structural change in the German economy where
the share of the manufacturing sector’s employment in the total economy is de-
clining.
Note also that the series of output and labour show rather high annual fluc-
tuations due to the business cycles of the economy, whereas the series for capital,
and in particular for public capital, are more smooth. One reason for this is that
planning and decisions in public investment are long-term oriented, sometimes
with a horizon of 5 up to 15 years. Therefore, annual fluctuations in output,
i.e. fluctuations due to business cycles, do not appear to have an impact on the
short-run formation of public capital. However, in the long-run, business cycles
are likely to influence the formation of public capital due to the effects of the
business cycles on tax revenues.
In addition, Figure 1.1 also presents the results of a regression analysis where
output Q is regressed on inputs L, K, G and a linear trend t. The basic specifi-
cation for the estimation is an autoregressive model of order one (AR(1)), which
has been estimated by applying the iterated Prais-Winsten method (Greene, 2000,
p. 547). Note that the Durbin-Watson statistic (DW) as well as the Godfrey’s La-
grange multiplier statistic (LM) which is distributed chi-square with one degree
of freedom indicate that the AR(1) is the appropriate specification (against the
alternative of higher order ARMA specifications).
We find that the linear time trend t, as well as labour ln Lt 1 and public capital
lnGt 1 are statistically significant at a 5 percent level, whereas private capital
lnKt 1 is not. The fit of this preliminary regression with a R2 of about 0.95 is
remarkably high. It is worth mentioning that the estimate for labour with a value
of 0.648 is in line with the share of wages in value added of the manufacturing
sector in our sample, which is about 0.55.
To begin with the main part of the empirical analysis based on the time-series
cross-section data, we first present results for themodel where only private inputs
are included in (1.1), i.e. Ki,t 1 and Li,t 1. This preliminary step is undertaken in
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order to evaluate the changes in results due to the inclusion of the public capital
input Gi,t 1 in the production function (1.1). In the second step we therefore
present estimation results for the model with all inputs, including Gi,t 1.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of the Cobb-Douglas production
function as specified in (1.1) with private inputs Ki,t 1 and Li,t 1 using the pooled
time-series cross-section data yields the following estimates:4
[lnQit = Länder-effects
?
+0.014? t +0.151 lnKi,t 1 +0.645? ln Li,t 1
F(10j283)=142.7 (0.002) (0.084) (0.072)
(1.2)
N: 297 (G = 11, T = 27) R2 : 0.9931 ρˆ : 0.868
Diagnostic test
Test for serial correlation: DW : 0.262?, ρLM = 209.8?  χ2d f=1
Test for groupwise heteroscedasticity: LM = 181.4?  χ2d f=10
Test for cross-sectional correlations: λLM = 478.1?  χ2d f=55
Test for random walk of residual: Rp : 0.243
Hausman test: 2.30
Multicollinearity: condition number = 416.4
Notice that in (1.2) the included dummy variables for the Bundesländer (‘Län-
der’ effects) correspond to the term ln Ai0 in (1.1). The displayed F-test indicates
that these Bundesländer effects are highly significant. The value of 2.30 of the
Hausman test favours a random effects model against the fixed effects model.
Furthermore, labour is significant with a value of 0.645. However, the estimate of
private capital is not significant. Note, that the fit of the regression with R2 equal
to 0.9931 is remarkable high.
A frequent observation in the empirical analysis of time-series data is the pres-
ence of autocorrelation. Also, it is very likely that heteroscedasticity will be ob-
served as the Bundesländer in our sample have different sizes. Furthermore,
macroeconomic factors affecting one region will also affect other regions, thus
the errors across the Bundesländer are likely to be correlated.
4? denotes statistical significance at a 5 percent level. Robust panel corrected standard er-
rors (PCSEs) are given in parentheses. PCSEs are estimated by the square root of the diagonal
of (X0X) 1X (Σ
 IT)X(X0X) 1 where Σ is a N  N matrix of cross-sectional variances and co-
variances. A consistent estimate of Σ is given by E0E/T, where E denotes T  i matrix of OLS
residuals from equation (1.2) (Beck and Katz, 1995; Beck and Katz, 1996).
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In order to explore such econometric specification issues, several diagnostic
checks are shown in (1.2).5 First, to test for the presence of autocorrelation, the
value of the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic which is 0.262 has been calculated from
the residuals of the OLS estimation according to Bhargava, Franzini and Naren-
drananthan (1982) as
DW =
∑Gi=1∑
T
t=2(euit   eui,t 1)
2
∑Gi=1∑
T
t=1 eu
2
it
,
where euit are the residuals from the fixed effects model (1.2). The Durbin-Watson
statistic can be used to test the null hypothesis that the serial correlation is ρ = 0
against the alternative that jρj < 1. The exact critical value for the DW statistic is
1.810 and has been found by using the Imhof (1961) routine.6 Thus, the null that
the errors of the OLS estimation are serially independent is rejected.
This finding is also confirmed by the value of the Lagrange-Multiplier test
statistic ρLM = 209.8.7 This statistic is distributed χ2 with 1 degree of freedom
(χ2crit,0.05,d f=1 = 3.84), hence we can reject the null hypothesis of serial indepen-
dence at a 5 percent level by this test.
Second, in order to test for groupwise heteroscedasticity the following La-
grange multiplier (LM) test has been calculated as (Greene, 2000, p. 596)
LM = T/2
B
∑
1
"
s2i
s2
  1
#2
,
where s2 is the pooled OLS residual variance and s2i is the estimated unit-specific
residual variance from groupwise regressions. The LM statistic has a limiting
χ2 distribution with B  1 degrees of freedom. The reported value of 181.4 from
the LM statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis of no groupwise het-
eroscedasticity (χ2crit,0.05,d f=10 = 18.3).
Third, in order to test for cross-sectional correlations the residuals obtained
from (1.2) are used to compute the following Lagrange multiplier statistic
5In all these cases, OLS estimation still yields consistent parameter estimates. However, esti-
mates of standard errors will be biased and inconsistent.
6The Imhof routine is implemented in SHAZAM 8.0.
7The Lagrange multiplier statistic is found by regressing euit on eui,t 1 and the other regressors.
The statistic ρLM is then defined as the R2 obtained from this auxiliary regression multiplied with
the number of observations.
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Table 1.1: Cross-sectional Correlation and Variance/Covariance1 Matrix for the
11 Bundesländer Based on Residuals from Equation (1.3)
BaW Bay Ber Bre Ham Hes Nie NRW RhP Saa SHo
BaW 1.46 0.90 1.78 -0.22 -1.86 1.75 0.79 1.38 1.10 2.09 -0.89
Bay 0.68 1.19 1.37 0.77 -0.35 1.35 1.01 1.13 1.37 1.27 -0.31
Ber 0.74 0.63 3.91 -1.50 -4.30 2.27 1.00 2.02 1.63 2.43 -1.63
Bre -0.08 0.34 -0.36 4.45 3.73 0.10 0.94 0.06 1.15 -0.37 0.85
Ham -0.41 -0.09 -0.57 0.46 14.36 2.47 4.51 8.67 7.09 6.87 21.03
Hes 0.89 0.76 0.70 0.03 -0.46 2.64 1.45 1.99 1.83 2.86 -2.13
Nie 0.50 0.70 0.39 0.34 0.07 0.68 1.73 1.21 1.39 1.35 -1.16
NRW 0.86 0.78 0.77 0.02 -0.39 0.93 0.70 1.75 1.60 2.30 -1.71
RhP 0.63 0.87 0.57 0.38 -0.22 0.78 0.74 0.84 2.09 1.71 -1.51
Saa 0.87 0.59 0.62 -0.09 -0.43 0.90 0.52 0.89 0.60 3.87 -2.55
SHo -0.26 -0.10 -0.30 0.15 0.66 -0.47 -0.32 -0.47 -0.37 -0.47 7.64
BaW=Baden-Würtemberg, Bay=Bayern, Ber=Berlin, Bre=Bremen, Ham=Hamburg, Hes=
Hessen, Nie=Niedersachsen, NRW=Nordrhein-Westfalen, RhP=Rheinland-Pfalz, Saa=
Saarland, Sho=Schleswig-Holstein
1Variances / covariances [10 3], correlations are given below, variances on the diagonal
(Greene, 2000, p. 452)
λLM = T∑
i
∑
j<i
r2ij,
where r2ij is the squared ijth correlation coefficient of residuals between Bundes-
land i and j. The large-sample distribution of this statistic is chi-square with
B(B  1)/2 degrees of freedom. Hence, this statistic with a value of 478.1 is highly
significant, indicating the presence of substantial cross-sectional correlations be-
tween the Bundesländer (χ2crit,0.05,d f=55 = 73.3).
Table 1.1 shows the correlations rij and variances / covariances of residuals
between the Bundesländer. The variances of the residuals of the Bundesländer
are given in bold print on the diagonal of the matrix. Covariances are given in the
upper half of Table 1.1. The ratio of the largest variance with 14.36 (‘Hamburg’)
to the smallest with 1.19 (‘Baden-Württemberg’) is about 12, which confirms the
high degree of groupwise heteroscedasticity in the data. Similarly, some of the
correlations shown in the lower half of Table 1.1 are remarkably high, for instance
between ‘Baden-Württemberg’ and ‘Hessen’ with a value of about 0.9.
Fourth, since the first glance at Figure 1.1 revealed that the (aggregate) se-
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ries exhibit some (random or deterministic) trends, the Rp statistic8 according
to Bhargava et al. (1982) for testing the null that the residuals from (1.2) follow
a random walk, i.e. ρ = 0 against jρj > 0, is also presented. Small values of Rp
favour the null hypothesis. The exact critical value for this statistic again can be
found by using the Imhof routine. In our case the critical value for Rp at a 5 per-
cent level is 0.3369, therefore the null hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected.10
Since the error is nonstationary, the variables appear not to be cointegrated.
Finally, a recent paper by Ai and Cassou (1997) points out that the findings
of some studies for the US using fixed effects models in the analysis of produc-
tivity effects of public capital based on state level data, e.g. Holtz-Eakin (1994)
or Evans and Karras (1994a), should be interpreted with some caution because of
the high correlation between the public capital stocks and the fixed effects. This
multicollinearity problem arises because there is not enough variation in the pub-
lic capital series to disentangle the effect of public capital from the state specific
effect, i.e. the public capital series do not have enough ‘within’ variation. Thus,
to get some indication whether multicollinearity matters for our estimations we
also report the condition number11 which has a value of 416.4. Judge, Griffiths,
Hill, Lee and Lütkepohl (1985, p. 902) suggest that values exceeding 30 reveal
potential multicollinearity problems. Thus, the occurrence of poor or imprecise
estimates can be a result of the high degree of multicollinearity in the data.
Estimating (1.1) for all inputs, i.e. Kit, Lit and Git we obtain the following re-
sults:
dlnQit = Länder-effects

+0.001 t  0.139 lnKit +0.805 ln Lit +0.781 lnGit
F(10j282)=159.2 (0.002) (0.077) (0.062) (0.078)
(1.3)
8The Rp statistic is calculated as Rp = e0e/e0Fe, where e are the OLS residuals from estimating
(1.2) in first differences, F = (IG 
 F), and F is a (T   1)  (T   1) symmetric matrix with
elements of the form Fjk = (T   j)k/T if j = k and Fjk = Fkj.
9The 10 percent critical value is 0.307, the 1 percent critical value for Rp is 0.398 (B = 11, T =
27).
10For alternative approaches of testing for unit roots with panel data, see for instance Baltagi
and Kao (2000) or Maddala and Kim (1998).
11The condition number is defined as the square root of the ratio of the largest to the smallest
Eigenvalue of S(X0X)S, where S is a diagonal matrix with the kth diagonal element 1/
q
x0kxk.
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N: 297 (G = 11, T = 27) R2 : 0.9959 ρˆ : 0.783
Diagnostic tests
Test for serial correlation: DW : 0.432?, ρLM = 178.2?  χ2(d f = 1)
Test for groupwise heteroscedasticity: LM = 121.1  χ2(d f = 10)
Test for cross-sectional correlations: λLM = 496.3  χ2(d f = 55)
Test for random walk of residuals: Rp : 0.347
Hausman test: 21.64
Multicollinearity: condition number = 507.1
Again, we find that the coefficient of labour input is significant, whereas the
coefficient of private capital is not. In contrast to this, the estimate of the coeffi-
cient of public capital input is highly significant. Here, the value of 21.64 of the
Hausman test favours the fixed effects model against a random effects model.
Also, from the increase in the Hausman test statistic from 2.30 in (1.2) to 21.64 in
(1.3) we infer that public capital appears to be correlated with the Bundesländer
effects.
The displayed diagnostic tests reveal that all the specification issues for
estimation such as serial correlation, groupwise heteroscedasticity and cross-
sectional correlation are present as before. One difference is, however, that the
null hypothesis of a random walk of the residuals is rejected at a 5 percent, since
the Rp statistic exceeds the critical value of 0.336.
Our further estimation strategy is therefore as follows. From the reported Rp
statistics in (1.2) and (1.3) respectively it is difficult to judge whether a trend sta-
tionary or difference stationary model is more appropriate. In the former case the
estimation can be carried out in levels, whereas for the latter case the estimation
should be based on variables in first differences. The two presented regressions
in (1.2) and (1.3) seem to require different treatment of trends according to the
reported Rp statistics. For the model with only L and K as inputs the difference
stationary model seems to be the appropriate specification whereas for the model
with inputs L, K and G the trend stationary model appears to be adequate. There-
fore, we will present estimation results both for the specification in levels and for
the specification in first differences. This also allows us to check the robustness
of obtained results.
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Additionally, instead of calculating robust PCSEs as in (1.2) and (1.3) another
estimation strategy is to apply Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) in or-
der to take serial correlation, groupwise heteroscedasticity and/or cross-sectional
correlation properly into account. Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS)
estimation in the context of time-series cross-section models is also known as
‘Kmenta’ or ‘Parks’ method (Kmenta and Oberhofer, 1974; Kmenta, 1986; Parks,
1967). In two recent papers Beck and Katz (1995) have argued that one should be
aware of the fact that although FGLSmight be more efficient when cross-sectional
correlations or groupwise heteroscedasticity are very significant, the standard er-
rors obtained by the FGLS estimation do not correctly reflect the sampling vari-
ability of parameter estimates, because in samples of small size the cross-sectional
correlations or variances obtained in the first step of FGLS are likely to be very
poor estimates of the underlying ‘true’ variances. Thus, as Beck and Katz (1995)
have shown by Monte-Carlo simulations standard errors from FGLS estimation
in small samples have a tendency to be too small, they are ‘overconfident’. Beck
and Katz recommend applying OLS estimation with consistent and robust panel
corrected standard errors (PCSE) instead of FGLS if the ratio of number of time
periods to the number of cross-sections is smaller than 3. This is the case for our
sample, since the ratio of T to B is 2.45. Thus, there is a risk that standard errors
obtained from FGLS are ‘overconfident’. Therefore, we present results both for
FGLS estimation as well as for OLS with PCSEs.
For the AR(1) models a consistent estimate of the autocorrelation param-
eter ρ was obtained from residuals of equation (1.2) and (1.3) respectively as
bρ = 1 DW/2. Using this estimate, the first step AR(1) correction has been car-
ried out by employing the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation (Greene, 2000, p. 546).
As such, the first observation in each group is lost.12 In the second step, we
use two estimation variants. The first variant—which is due to the AR(1) cor-
rection in the first step also a FGLS estimation—is based on OLS estimation in
the second step with robust panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) of the trans-
12Note that in the fixed-effects model, the Prais-Winston transformation (Greene, 2000, p. 546)
is not an appropriate choice for an AR(1) correction, because the ‘within’ transformation, that
is forming deviation from group means, will not remove the heterogeneity if the Prais-Winston
transformation is used for the first observation.
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formed variables. The second variant is based on FGLS estimation in both steps
(‘Kmenta’ method)— in the first step an AR(1) correction is performed and in the
second step the FGLS estimation which takes groupwise heteroscedasticity and
cross-sectional correlation into account. Also, for the model in first differences we
apply both estimation methods, i.e. (i) OLS with PCSEs and (ii) FGLS (‘Kmenta’
method).
Table 1.2 summarises the results of the estimations. The upper half (I) con-
tain the results for inputs K and L, and in the lower half (II) the results for in-
puts K, L and G. Columns 1 and 2 present the results for the AR(1) models,
whereas columns 3 and 4 display the results for variables in first differences. Note
that only the AR(1) models includes the Bundesländer dummy variables (fixed
effects), since the dummy variables are removed when taking first-differences.
Similarly, only the AR(1) models includes a time trend t, because the time trend
becomes a constant when taking first-differences.
The usual F-test for OLS relies on homoscedasticity. If this is not an appropri-
ate assumption one can use a Wald test instead.13 Both the F-tests as well as the
Wald tests show that the Bundesländer effects are highly significant. Also, the
null hypothesis of constant returns to scale (CRS) is rejected in almost all specifi-
cations, but not in (II) for all inputs K, L and G.
By contrast with the low values for the DW statistics reported for the previ-
ous estimations (1.2) and (1.3), both the AR(1) and the model with variables in
first differences generate DW statistics of about 2, indicating that autocorrelation
and also stationarity of residuals are not problematic for the estimations. This is
further confirmed by the Lagrange-Multiplier statistic ρLM, which does not reject
the null hypothesis of serial independence for most specifications at a 5 percent
level. However, in (II) for the model in first differences we find a value for ρLM of
3.80, which corresponds to a p value of 0.051. This indicates that the observed
serial dependence may result from taking first differences of a trend stationary
model (‘overdifferencing’). Therefore, in (II) the trend stationary AR(1) model is
the preferred specification.
13The Wald statistic W is defined asW = (Rfi  q)0

R(Var(bfi)R0

 1
(Rfi  q), where Rfi = q
imposes a set of restrictions on the parameter vector fi (Greene, 2000, p. 361).
Essay 1. Assessing the Contribution of Public Capital to Private Production 32
Table 1.2: Production Function Estimates (G=11, T=27)
(I) Dependent variable lnQit, factors of production Ki,t 1, Li,t 1
AR(1), ρ = 0.869 first differences
FGLS FGLS (Kmenta) OLS FGLS (Kmenta)
(PCSE) (het., corr.) (PCSE) (het., corr.)
const Länder-dum.? Länder-dum.? 0.018? (0.007) 0.021? (0.004)
t 0.009 (0.005) 0.012? (0.004) — — — —
lnKi,t 1 -0.174 (0.181) -0.145? (0.060) -0.018 (0.185) -0.041 (0.067)
ln Li,t 1 0.664? (0.156) 0.678? (0.066) 0.635? (0.165) 0.698? (0.068)
R2 0.917 — 0.185 —
N 286 286 286 286
Diagnostic tests
F tests: Wald tests χ2: F tests: Wald tests χ2:
fixed effects 10.1? 463.9? — —
CRS K, L 18.4? 6.20? 11.7? 2.96
DW 2.056 — 2.073 —
LM test: ρLM 0.60 — 0.67 —
cond.-number 267.8 — 1.98 —
(II) Dependent variable lnQit, factors of production Ki,t 1, Li,t 1,Gi,t 1
AR(1), ρ = 0.783 first differences
FGLS FGLS (Kmenta) OLS FGLS (Kmenta)
(PCSE) (het., corr.) (PCSE) (het., corr.)
const Länder-dum.? Länder-dum.? 0.006 (0.004) 0.012 (0.008)
t 0.003 (0.005) 0.007 (0.004) — — — —
lnKi,t 1 -0.176 (0.162) -0.104 (0.067) -0.221 (0.183) -0.118 (0.076)
ln Li,t 1 0.663? (0.145) 0.698? (0.065) 0.669? (0.156) 0.741? (0.072)
lnGi,t 1 0.651? (0.257) 0.549? (0.120) 0.593? (0.273) 0.417? (0.161)
R2 0.967 — 0.227 —
N 286 286 286 286
Diagnostic tests
F tests: Wald tests χ2: F tests: Wald tests χ2:
fixed effects 15.8? 727.9? — —
CRS K, L 20.8? 7.88? 22.1? 6.7?
CRS K, L,G 0.43 0.27 0.07 0.02
DW 1.953 — 2.200 —
LM test: ρLM 0.01 — 3.80 —
cond.-number 571.1 — 3.84 —
? denotes statistical significance at a 5 % level, standard errors are given in parentheses
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The parameter estimate of private capital in the upper half (I) of Table 1.2
is neither in the first differences nor in the AR(1) models significant, except in
column 2 for the FGLS ‘Kmenta’ method. The labour input is significant in all
specification with values of about 0.65. This is a reasonable estimate considering
again that the average (wage) share of labour in output in our sample is about
0.55. Notice also the decrease of the condition number from the AR(1) to the
specification in first differences. Hence, for the specification in first differences
multicollinearity is not longer problematic for the estimations.
The results in (II) shows that in contrast to private capital the parameter for
public capital appears to be significant in all specifications with values ranging
between 0.42 and 0.65. Since the ratio of output Q to public capital G varies
between 1.12 in year 1970 and 0.69 in year 1996, these estimated elasticities imply
a marginal productivity of G between 47 and 73 percent in 1970 and between 29
and 45 percent in 1996.14 The differences in R2 between (I) and (II) are about 0.04.
Hence, in our model the public capital input can explain about 4 percent of the
differences in observed output across the Bundesländer.
Finally, we provide several tests on the stability of parameters both over (i)
cross-sections (‘testing for poolability of the data’) and (ii) over time (‘testing for
occurrence of structural breaks in the data’). In order to test (i) we perform a
Chow test (Baltagi, 1995, chap. 4.1) on the null hypothesis that the parameters
(including the intercept) across the Bundesländer are equal, i.e. H0 : βi = β,
i = 1 . . . B. To accomplish this, based on the model in first differences from table
1.1, an observed F value of 0.473 is obtained which is distributed as F(40, 242)
under the null. This does not reject poolability across the Bundesländer. Similarly,
for testing (ii), H0 : βt = β, t = 1 . . . T, an observed F-value of 3.845 is obtained.
Note, that a structural break, i.e. a change of the parameter vector over time,
can only be significant if at least one of the parameter vectors βt differ from β.
Based on the central F(100, 182) distribution, the null that the parameters across
time can be pooled is rejected at the 1 percent level. However, if we are willing
to trade some bias for a reduction in variance, some weaker criteria can be used
(Baltagi, 1995, p. 54). The null hypothesis is then that the restricted model is better
14The rate of return rG is obtained from the estimated elasticity as rG = βGQ/G.
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than the unrestricted model in terms of the trade-off between bias and variance.
As a criterion for this test we use the noncentrality parameter λ (Baltagi, 1995,
p. 55). From the observed λ value of 1.05, the null hypothesis is neither rejected
by the first and second ‘weak’ MSE criterion (Wallace, 1972) nor by the ‘strong’
MSE criterion (Toro-Vizcarrondo and Wallace, 1968).
As the final step of our empirical analysis, in order to shed some light on
the underlying structure of the positive correlation between public capital and
output, we consider a very simple regression where the growth rate of output
in the period 1970-1996, denoted by bq, is regressed on the growth rates of inputs
denoted by bk, bl, bg, over the same period.
The first regression with only inputs bk and bl yields the following result:
bqi = 0.584  0.423 bki +0.568 bli
(0.187) (0.378) (0.291) (1.4)
N: 11 R2 : 0.369 F : 2.34
The second regression with inputs bk, bl and bg gives:
bqi = 0.075  0.416 bki +0.768 bli +0.867 bgi
(0.196) (0.251) (0.202) (0.259) (1.5)
N: 11 R2 : 0.758 F : 7.29
The two regressions show that long-term changes in public capital and
labour (in the ‘between’ Bundesländer dimension) are associated with long-term
changes in manufacturing sector’s outputs. The coefficients of labour and public
capital are in line with the previous results, although the estimates are somewhat
higher. This regression also supports the view that the negative coefficient of pri-
vate capital is not due to the omission of capacity utilisation in (1.1), since over
such a long period capacity utilisation is negligible for realised output.
Figure 1.2 presents the partial leverage plots for regression (1.5). Two refer-
ence lines are displayed in the plots. One is the horizontal line where the par-
tial residual of bq = 0, and the other is the fitted regression of the partial resid-
ual of bq against the partial residual of the respective input.15 The latter has an
15The partial residual of bq is obtained by regressing bq on bk and bl. The partial residual of an
input is obtained by regressing this input on the other inputs.
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Figure 1.2: Partial Leverage Plots for bg, bk and bl
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intercept of 0 and a slope equal to the parameter estimate associated with the
explanatory variable in the model.16 The partial leverage plots reveal that the
results of the regression (1.5) are not driven by single influential observations.
Except for Schleswig-Holstein all observations contribute positively to the par-
tial correlation between bq and bg. Also, it can be seen from Figure 1.2 that the
insignificance of bk is not determined by single influential observations. Interest-
ingly, the Bundesländer Saarland and Nordrhein-Westfalen which experienced
the most intense structural change in the manufacturing sector with strongly de-
clining heavy industries during the last 2 decades as well as Hamburg do not fit
in a hypothetical positive partial correlation between private capital and output.
This hints that the insignificance of private capital could be driven by the struc-
tural change in the manufacturing sector which made large parts of the private
capital stock obsolete.
We performed also a further regression which is not reported here where the
average level of output was regressed on the average levels of the inputs over
the period 1970-1996. Thus, the number of observations for this ‘between’ regres-
sion is again 11. It turned out that parameters of all inputs were insignificant.
Hence, from this evidence we conclude that differences in levels of public capital
or in public capital intensity, defined as the ratio of public capital to labour, do
not matter for differences in productivity across the Bundesländer. This is not
a surprising finding considering that the level of public capital endowment for
each Bundesland also depends on the geographical characteristics of the Bundes-
land.17
From the econometric analysis of this section the following 3 key findings of
this study can be recorded. First, and most important, the stylised finding of
this study is that public capital is significant for production in the manufacturing
sector. This holds for all tested econometric models and specifications. For vari-
16The leverage plot also shows the changes in the residuals for the model with and without
the explanatory variable. For a given data point in the plot, its residual without the explanatory
variable is the vertical distance between the point and the horizontal line; its residual with the
explanatory variable is the vertical distance between the point and the fitted line.
17Note also that 3 of the Bundesländer, i.e. Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg, are agglomerated ur-
ban Bundesländer which have very different public capital intensities compared to the territorial
Bundesländer.
Essay 1. Assessing the Contribution of Public Capital to Private Production 37
ables in levels, this result is mainly driven by the ‘within’ variation whereas the
‘between’ variation does not contribute to it. Thus, differences in public capital
intensity can not explain differences in observed levels of output, but differences
in changes of public capital can explain differences in changes of output. Further-
more, this correlation between changes of public capital and output holds both in
the short-run and in the long-run dimension.
Second, differences in public capital growth can explain about 4 percent of
the differences in the manufacturing sector’s output growth across Bundesländer
over the period 1970 to 1996.
Third and finally, at least for the sample studied here the factor inputs and out-
put appear not to be cointegrated series. For the model with all inputs, i.e. labour
L, private capital K and public capital G, the trend stationary model seems to be
the appropriate specification.
1.4 Conclusions
The starting point of this essay has been Aschauer’s (1989a,1989b) public capital
hypothesis, which states that the decline in government’s infrastructure spending
in the US and other major OECD countries during the 1970s and 80s can explain a
major part of the observed decline in productivity growth over the same period.
Several methodological improvements to related studies have been incorpo-
rated into the analysis in this essay. We have explicitly taken into account four of
the most frequent specification issues in the context of time-series cross-section
analysis: serial correlation, groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correla-
tion and nonstationarity of the data. Furthermore, we have used a specification
in the analysis that has avoided a potential simultaneity problem between output
and factor inputs. Finally, we have provided tests on the poolability of data and
the stability of parameters over time.
In summary, we find a strong positive and significant correlation between
public capital and the manufacturing sector’s output at the regional level of the
‘Bundesländer’ in all of the tested specifications.
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One tentative conclusion that can be drawn from this finding is that differ-
ences in public capital endowment might also explain a part of the still exist-
ing productivity gap between manufacturing in East and West Germany. Recent
studies (Komar, 2000; Seidel and Vesper, 2000) report that the gap in public cap-
ital endowment on a per capita basis between East and West German regions is
still about 30 percent,18 while at the same time productivity of firms located in
East Germany is only about two-third of the productivity of firms located in the
West. Thus, at least a part of the productivity differences might be also attributed
to differences in public capital endowment.
Given the significance of public capital for private production, one potential
economic policy implication is whether the process of convergence in public cap-
ital endowment between East and West German regions should be accelerated
over the next years. At this point, however, we emphasise that the existence of
positive effects of public capital on private production is a necessary, but not a
sufficient condition for drawing the conclusion that public investment should be
boosted in the future. To make this inference, the costs of the public capital provi-
sion have to be included in the analysis as well. For instance an increase in public
investment may only be possible if tax revenues are also increased. This in turn
can give rise to distortions bearing additional costs for the economy. Similarly, if
higher public investment is financed by higher governmental debt this may also
imply other kinds of additional costs e.g. higher interest rates on capital markets.
In this respect, our study has focused only on the necessary condition for increas-
ing the supply of public capital, i.e. the existence of significant and positive effects
of public capital on private production.19
The obtained estimates of the output elasticity of public capital between 0.42
and 0.65 imply rate of returns between 29 (minimum) and 72 (maximum) percent
for our sample. Since these are measures for the return of public capital only for
18The public capital definition in this study excluded public capital funded by the federal gov-
ernment e.g. highways and waterways.
19In a more rigorous fashion, the sufficient condition for increasing public investment is that
the social net benefit—defined as the sum of social gross benefits (consumer and producer sur-
pluses, positive externalities e.g. spillover effects, etc.) minus the sum of social costs (costs of
provision, negative externalities e.g. environmental effects, etc.)—has to be positive.
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manufacturing, but do not capture the returns for other economic sectors, they
appear to be too high to be a plausible estimate of the ‘true’ returns of public cap-
ital for manufacturing. On the other hand these magnitudes are in line with other
studies which have been also conducted for the manufacturing sector e.g. Morri-
son and Schwartz (1996).
A fundamental problem of both our study and related ones is that there is
no certainty whether or not other factors that might also positively contribute to
the manufacturing sector’s output have been omitted from the analysis. If these
factors are positively correlated with public capital but excluded in the regres-
sion equation then the expected value of the parameter of public capital will be
upward biased. Such a factor could be for instance the stock of knowledge or of
the available technology in the manufacturing sector. However, it very difficult
to find plausible measures for these intangible stocks, since these stocks are not
directly observed.
One startling result of our study is that private capital turns out to be not sig-
nificant in most of the tested specifications. From the analysis we could exclude
the possibility that this finding is a result of a collinearity between the private
and the public capital stock, since the insignificance of private capital holds even
if only private capital is included in the regression. As the first glance at Figure
1.1 in section 1.3 revealed, it is very likely that the movements in private capital
follow the movements in output with a lag of 2 to 3 years, thus private capi-
tal at this aggregate level appears not to be exogenously given, but endogenous
determined by developments in output. Another potential explanation for the in-
significance of private capital is the intense structural change and technical shift
in the manufacturing sector during the last 3 decades which have made large
parts of the existing capital stock obsolete.
This puzzling insignificance of private capital in the German manufacturing
sector is an interesting starting point for future research. One possibility to ad-
dress this issuewould be to formulate a simultaneous equationmodel where both
private and public capital are endogenously determined. Another promising line
for future research is to compare the outcomes of the production, dual cost and
profit function approaches as in Vijverberg, Vijverberg and Gamble (1997) who
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use time-series data for the US and do not find much agreement between the
three approaches. The main advantage of this research strategy is that it opens
the avenue to study whether the obtained results are robust with respect to the
applied (dual) methodology.
Appendix Essay 1.
1A. Data
Output Q Output is measured as gross value-added at market prices of the
manufacturing sector in 1991 constant prices aggregated over industries in year
t. These data have been obtained from the series ‘National accounts for the Bun-
desländer’ (engl. transl.), issue 30: ‘Entstehung des Bruttoinlansprodukts in den
Ländern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1970 bis 1996’, which is provided by
the Statistical Office of Baden-Würtemberg. For years 1991-1996 we obtained
updated figures (in mid 2000) from the Statistical Office of Baden-Würtemberg.
These updated figures have not been published yet.20
Public capital (G) Public capital is measured as the public gross stock of
fixed assets at the ground level (‘Bruttoanlagevermögen öffentlicher Tiefbau’) at
the end of year t   1. It is given in 1991 constant prices. It includes capital for-
mation of all levels of government in Germany, i.e. the local governments, the
Federal States (‘Bundesländer’) governments and the Federal Government. The
main parts of this stock are roads and highways (about 50 percent), bridges and
railways, but also water and sewer systems, dikes and ports, etc. Note that these
stocks are measured according to international convention in gross terms because
of the very low depreciation rate for these types of fixed assets.
The figures for the public gross stock of fixed assets have been provided by
the Statistical Office of Baden-Würtemberg from the study group of the ‘National
accounts of the Bundesländer’ and have not been published yet.
20The data used in the analysis are available from the authors upon request.
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Private capital (K) Private capital is measured as the net stock of fixed as-
sets in the manufacturing sector at the end of year t   1 in constant prices of
1991. It includes machinery, equipment and construction, and is taken from ‘Na-
tional accounts for the Bundesländer’, issue 29: ‘Anlageinvestitionen, Anlagever-
mögen und Abschreibungen in den Ländern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
1970 bis 1995’. This statistical report is also provided by the Statistical Office of
Baden-Würtemberg from the study group of the ‘National accounts of the Bun-
desländer’. For years 1991-1996 we obtained revised and updated figures from
the Statistical Office of Baden-Würtemberg which have not been published by the
Statistical Office Baden-Württemberg until now (mid 2000).
Labour (L) Labour is measured as the number of employees in the manu-
facturing sector at the regional level of the Bundesländer. These data have been
drawn from the series ‘Statistical Yearbook for the Federal Republic of Germany’
published by the Federal Statistical Office in Wiesbaden. These figures are mea-
sured each year after the first quarter on 1st April, thus in contrast to private and
public capital they do not exactly measure the amount of labour at the end of
year t   1. Alternatively to this labour input measure, we have also estimated
the production function with the number of working hours (only of blue-collar
employees, also given for 1st April) as the labour input which we obtained from
the same publication mentioned above. The differences in the obtained param-
eter estimates are rather small, therefore we have refrained from reporting these
results.
Wages (L) Wages cover both blue- and white-collar employees in the manu-
facturing sector at the regional level of the Bundesländer. The date of reference is
the 1st of April for each year. These data have been obtained from the series ‘Sta-
tistical Yearbook for the Federal Republic of Germany’ published by the Federal
Statistical Office in Wiesbaden. In the empirical analysis, wages are only used to
compute the average share of labour in total income. For our sample, this share
is about 55 percent.
Essay 2
The Contribution of Transport and Human
Capital Infrastructure to Local Private
Production: A Partial Adjustment Approach
Abstract1
This essay uses a partial adjustment approach to measure the contribution of public in-
frastructure to local private production. In the first step of the empirical analysis we apply
a principal component analysis in order to construct 2 new infrastructure indicators from
an array of 7 measures of transport and human capital infrastructure. In the second step
the output of different sectors is regressed on private factor inputs and on these 2 infras-
tructure indicators. Our main finding is that expected long-run equilibrium output in
an area of local government will be higher, the better it is endowed with both transport
and human capital infrastructure. Moreover, transport and human capital infrastructure
appear to be complementary, i.e. raising only transport infrastructure will not yield an
increase in private production at the local level.
1A previous version of this essay was published in Review of Regional Science (2001), vol. 21,
91-108.
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2.1 Introduction
This study examines the role of publicly provided infrastructure for economic de-
velopment at the local level of the 327 German counties (‘Kreise’). Our essay aims
at testing empirically the following two ideas. The first postulates that because
the main part (about 60-70 percent) of infrastructure is provided by local gov-
ernments, the main benefits from infrastructure might emerge at the local rather
than at the regionally aggregated level (see also Seitz, 1995). Secondly, empirical
studies using infrastructure stock measures in monetary terms implicitly assume
that infrastructure stocks are homogenous across regions.
However, this assumption is quite often not particularly plausible. Consider,
for instance, two regions of the same geographical size, the same population,
economy, etc. Suppose both have accumulated a transport infrastructure stock
worth 1 billion Euro. However, should one region be geographically flat while
the other is mountainous then the productivity of a 1 billion infrastructure stock
might be higher in the flat region than in the mountainous one. Thus, in this
case public capital can not be regarded as homogenous and therefore compara-
ble across regions. In contrast to this, if transport infrastructure is measured in
terms of accessibility, e.g. travel distance to the nearest motorway from a given
region, such ameasure is comparable across regions even if regions have different
geographic characteristics.
Another contribution of this study to the existing empirical literature on the
effects of infrastructure is that we simultaneously consider both transport and
human capital infrastructure. The importance of the latter type of infrastructure
for economic development is stressed in models of ‘new growth theories’ (e.g.
Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995; Lucas, 1988).
Previous studies such as Bröcker (1989) which used similar data, i.e. infras-
tructure indicators at the local level, have either not been based on a local produc-
tion function or have omitted important factor inputs in the production function
such as private capital (e.g. Biehl, 1986). The latter approach is problematic due
to a potential omitted variable bias (Greene, 2000, p. 334).
In our empirical analysis we us an array of 7 infrastructure measures, de-
scribing the availability of transport and human capital infrastructure at the local
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level of the counties. From this set of 7 infrastructure measures, using Princi-
pal Component Analysis (PCA), we construct 2 new infrastructure indicators as
linear combinations of the original 7 infrastructure measures. These 2 new in-
dicators explain about 64 percent of the variation in infrastructure endowment
across the counties. Moreover, specifying a Cobb-Douglas production function
within a partial adjustment framework we regress output of different sectors, e.g.
manufacturing, services and trade & transport, on private factor inputs and on these
2 infrastructure indicators.
We find that differences in output across counties can be explained by differ-
ences in overall endowment with infrastructure. This finding is most pronounced
with regard to the trade & transport and the service sectors. Unexpectedly, we do
not find evidence of an effect of infrastructure on production in manufacturing.
Moreover, for regions well endowed with transport but with poor human capital
infrastructure we do not find significant effects of infrastructure on output. Thus,
it appears that transport infrastructure alone is not sufficient for higher output in
a given county. We interpret this finding as an indication that human capital and
transport infrastructure are complementary infrastructure components, at least
for the sample studied here.
Finally, tests for spatial independence of residuals in the empirical analysis
are performed. However, it turns out that spatial dependence of residuals is not
significant, thus the usual econometric techniques such Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) or Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) are applicable to our estimation
problem.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
partial adjustment model which builds the basis of our approach. Section 2.3
presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Partial Adjustment Model
To begin with, let us assume that production Qit in county i at time t can be
described as
Qit = f (A(t, INFRAit),Kit, Lit)), i = 1 . . .N, t = 1 . . . T, (2.1)
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where Qit denotes output, Kit private capital, Lit labour input and A(t, INFRAit)
denotes a technical efficiency parameter depending both on time t and an index of
the public infrastructure stock denoted by INFRAit. Specifying a Cobb-Douglas
functional form for the production function (2.1) and assuming a Hicks-neutral
form for A(. . .), we get
Qit = A(t, INFRAit)L
αL
it K
αK
it , (2.2)
where αL and αK denote the elasticities of output Q with respect to L and K.
Finally, assuming that A(t, INFRAit) has the following functional form
A(t, INFRAit) = A0 exp(αtt)INFRA
αINFRA
it , (2.3)
where A0 is the initial value of A(. . .) at time t0, and dividing (2.2) by Lit, we get
qit = A0 exp(αtt)INFRA
αINFRA
it k
αK
it L
α˜L
it , (2.4)
where small capitals denote variables in terms of the labour input L and α˜L is
defined as α˜L = αL + αK   1. Note that α˜L will equal zero if returns to scale are
constant with respect to inputs L and K. This approach has the advantage that it
a priori does not put on (2.2) any restriction with respect to returns to scale.
Our empirical approach is based on a partial adjustment model. Suppose that
long-run equilibrium output qit in county i is given by (2.4). Taking logarithms of
(2.4) we obtain
ln qit = α0 + αINFRAINFRAit + αK ln kit + αK ln Lit + it, (2.5)
where α0 = ln A0 and it is an i.i.d. random variable with variance σ.
The adjustment process can be described by the following equation (Greene,
2000, p. 722)
ln qit   ln qit0 = (1  λ)(ln q

it   ln qit0), (2.6)
where qit0 denotes initial output at time t0.
Solving (2.6) for ln qit and inserting (2.5) for qit we obtain the baseline model
for our empirical analysis
ln qit = λ ln qit0 + α0(1  λ) + αINFRA(1  λ)INFRAit + αK(1  λ) ln kit
+
eαL(1  λ) ln Lit + (1  λ)it. (2.7)
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This equation can also be estimated without restrictions as
ln qit = λqit0 + α0´ + αINFRA´INFRAit + αK´ ln kit + eαL´ ln Lit + it´. (2.8)
From (2.8), the short-run elasticities can be obtained from estimates of αINFRA´,
αK´, and αL´ (from eαL´   αK´ + 1), whereas long-run elasticities can be calculated ei-
ther from these estimates as αINFRA = αINFRA´/(1   λ), αK = αK´/(1   λ), and
αL = αL´/(1  λ) or can be obtained directly from (2.7) by using nonlinear meth-
ods.
This partial adjustment specification proves to be particularly useful for our
analysis. Suppose that there is some unobserved heterogeneity in output qit
across counties, for instance due to the particular locations of counties, or due
to different manufacturing technologies, etc. If panel data are available, one can
control for this unobserved heterogeneity by including fixed or random individ-
ual effects. In our case with cross-sectional data, however, we can presume that if
this unobserved individual county-specific attribute was already present at time
t0, then it might be reflected in output qit0 as well. Thus, including the lagged
dependent variable qit0 as a right-hand side variable allows us to control for such
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
2.3 Empirical Implementation
2.3.1 Description of the Data
Our sample comprises of the 327 counties (‘Kreise’) in West Germany. A county
itself usually contains several townships (‘Gemeinden’). The next higher regional
level above counties is the 166 ‘labour market regions’ (‘Arbeitsmarktregionen’).
Indicators we use in order to describe local public infrastructure endowment are
only available at the level of these ‘labour market regions’. Thus, on average, a
labour market region consists of about 2 counties. We have merged these two
data sets with different regional levels. In the final data set the observations for
the variables are at the county level. However, on average 2 counties will have
the same values for the infrastructure indicators.
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Table 2.1: Labels of Variables
Label Short Description
Transport Infrastructure
Motorway accessibility of motorways, 1989
FreightTr accessessibility of freight transfer railway stations, 1989
Airport accessibility of regional airports, 1989
ICTrain accessibility of inter-city express trains, 1988
Human Capital Infrastructure
VocTrain vocational training in future-oriented branches, 1988
Coll&Uni students at colleges & universities, 1988
ScienceP availability of science parks, 1988
Production Function Variables
Q Output measured as gross value added
at factor costs, different sectors, 1980, 1988
K private capital stock of manufacturing sector, 1988
L number of employees, different sectors, 1987
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Table 2.1 shows a list of variables used in the analysis. Output (Q) in counties
is measured as gross value added at factor costs in 1988 and has been drawn from
a publication of the Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg (1995). The dif-
ference between gross value added at market prices and at factor costs is, that the
latter is calculated from the former by subtracting the difference between indirect
production taxes and governmental subsidies. The difference is on average only
about 1-2 percent.
Table 2.2 displays some descriptive statistics of the infrastructure variables.
Note that for some of the variables, e.g. Highway, FreightTr or Airport, the me-
dian is substantially different from the mean, thus the distribution of these vari-
ables appears to be skewed.
We estimate the contribution of public infrastructure to local private produc-
tion also separately for 3 sectors, i.e. manufacturing, trade & transport, and services.
Note, that the output measure of all sectors also includes the agriculture, forestry
& fishing as well as the governmental sector.
Output for the 3 sectors manufacturing, trade & transport, and services is also
measured as gross value added at factor costs in 1988 prices. In the publication
mentioned above, however, only gross value added at market prices is reported
for the single sectors. Thus, we computed the difference between gross value
added at factor costs andmarket prices for each sector from the difference given for
total gross value added, and allocated this difference according to the share of
each sector in total gross value added.
Unfortunately, our measure for labour (L), given as numbers of employees, is
only available for the year 1987 and not for 1988. It has been drawn from the joint
publication of the Federal States Statistical Offices in Germany titled ‘Erwerb-
stätigenrechnung des Bundes und der Länder, Erwerbstätige in den kreisfreien
Städten und Landkreisen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1980, 1987, 1990-
1993’, Heft 2.
The private capital stock (K) of the manufacturing sector in 1988 at the county
level has been obtained from Deitmar (1993). We have measures neither for the
total capital stock in counties nor for the capital stocks of the trade & transport or
service sectors. However, sincemanufacturing is the main part of the total stock we
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Infrastructure Variables
Mean Std. C.V. Min Max Median
Motorway 90.49 22.767 25.16 0 100 0
FreightTr 81.67 27.905 34.17 0 100 4.8
Airport 56.55 43.385 76.71 0 100 19.4
ICTrain 65.36 27.723 42.42 0 100 75.6
VocTrain 105.13 13.275 12.63 73 133 105
Coll&Uni 145.4 123.4 84.86 0 568 168
ScienceP 4.60 5.52 119.78 0 20 2
presume that it is a reasonable approximation for the latter. We also approximate
the private capital stock of the trade & transport or service sectors with the capital
stock of manufacturing. This allows us to conclude whether or not output of
these sectors are related to the manufacturing sector.
The indicators for public infrastructure endowments of the labour market re-
gions are taken from Gatzweiler, Irmen and Janich (1991). As shown in Table 2.1,
our first 4 indicators describe counties’ endowment with transport infrastructure.
We employ these indicators in order to describe the accessibility of a county by
means of transport. A short description of the 4 indicators is also provided in
Table 2.1.
The variable Motorway measures the percentage of employees in a given
‘labour market region’, whose places of work are located in a county closer than
30 minutes travel by car to the nearest motorway (or similar long-distance road).
Variable FreightTrans measures the percentage of manufacturing sector firms in
a ‘labour market region’ located in a township closer than 45 minutes travel by
lorry to the nearest freight transfer railway station. Variable Airportmeasures the
percentage of firms in a given ‘labour market region’ which are located in a town-
ship closer than 45 minutes travel by car to the nearest regional airport. Variable
ICTrain gives the percentage of people in a labour market region which have ac-
cess to inter-city express train stations within a travel distance of 30 minutes by
car.
Furthermore, the data also contain measures of counties’ infrastructure with
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regard to human capital. Variable VocTrain is a combined indicator which is
based both on the availability of vocational training in general and on the number
of training opportunities in future-oriented industries such computing, biotech-
nology, etc. Variable Coll&Uni is a combined indicator both for the availability of
colleges & universities and for the percentage of students at colleges & universi-
ties in a given region studying engineering, computing, mathematics or natural
sciences. Finally, variable ScienceP is a combined indicator for the availability
of science parks and science & technology transfer service centres in a given re-
gion. For further details how these indicators are constructed, see Gatzweiler
et al. (1991).
2.3.2 Analysis
The structure of the empirical analysis is as follows. First, we analyse the relation-
ships between the various infrastructure indicators using principal component
analysis (PCA). In a second step, we apply the PCA to construct 2 new indicator
variables, i.e. we use the first two principal components as new indicators. Fi-
nally, in a third step we regress output of several sectors on private factor inputs
and on these 2 principal components.
Table 2.3: Correlations within Transport Infrastructure Variables
Motorway FreightTr Airport ICTrain
Motorway 1.000 0.495 0.308 0.442
FreightTrans 0.495 1.000 0.424 0.407
Airport 0.308 0.424 1.000 0.407
ICTrain 0.442 0.407 0.407 1.000
Table 2.4: Correlations within Human Capital Infrastructure Variables
VocTrain Coll&Uni ScienceP
VocTrain 1.000 0.417 0.573
Coll&Uni 0.417 1.000 0.572
ScienceP 0.573 0.572 1.000
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Table 2.5: Correlations between Transport and Human Capital Infrastructure
Variables
VocTrain Coll&Uni ScienceP
Motorway 0.349 0.330 0.294
FreightTrans 0.485 0.433 0.409
Airport 0.507 0.345 0.549
ICTrain 0.462 0.528 0.510
Table 2.3 displays the correlations between the various indicators for trans-
port infrastructure. It appears that all indicators are positively correlated.
The correlation is highest with about 0.5 between the variables Motorway and
Freightrans f er, and lowest with about 0.3 between the variables Motorway and
Airport.
Table 2.4 gives the correlations between the indicators for human capital in-
frastructure. Indicators VocTrain, Coll&Uni, and ScienceP are all positively corre-
lated. The correlation is highest with about 0.57 between VocTrain and ScienceP.
Table 2.5 presents the correlations between transport and human capital indica-
tors. Again, we find that all correlations are positive. We observe the lowest corre-
lations between transport and human capital indicators for the variable Motorway,
and the highest for the variable ICTrain.
Table 2.6: Eigenvalues of Principle Components Analysis of Infrastructure Vari-
ables
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
In f ra1 3.655 2.799 0.522 0.522
In f ra2 0.855 0.134 0.122 0.644
In f ra3 0.721 0.176 0.103 0.748
In f ra4 0.545 0.067 0.077 0.826
In f ra5 0.478 0.064 0.068 0.894
In f ra6 0.415 0.087 0.059 0.953
In f ra7 0.328 . 0.047 1
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Table 2.7: Eigenvectors of Principle Components Analysis of Infrastructure Vari-
ables
In f ra1 In f ra2 In f ra3 In f ra4 In f ra5 In f ra6 In f ra7
Motorway 0.322 0.732 0.050 0.303 0.045 0.513 0.036
FreightTr 0.376 0.380 0.255 -0.615 0.122 -0.432 -0.263
Airport 0.367 -0.297 0.532 0.315 0.538 -0.111 0.304
ICTrain 0.390 0.064 -0.411 0.532 -0.189 -0.585 -0.119
VocTrain 0.397 -0.193 0.305 -0.114 -0.767 0.109 0.316
Coll&Uni 0.377 -0.121 -0.617 -0.367 0.258 0.156 0.487
ScienceP 0.411 -0.419 -0.084 -0.014 0.056 0.400 -0.697
This particular pattern of correlations between the infrastructure indicators
lends itself to a principle component analysis in order to reduce the complexity
of information within the total set of indicators. Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 give the
results for the principal components analysis (PCA) of the correlation matrix for
all 7 indicators. In Table 2.6, the Eigenvalues (characteristic roots) of the PCA
are presented, and in 2.7 the associated Eigenvectors (characteristic vectors) are
displayed.
The PCA is based on the following decomposition (Greene, 2000, p. 36)
V0X0XV = ∆,
where V0 is a (k  k) matrix of the (v1, . . . , vk) Eigenvectors of X0X, where X is a
(n k) datamatrix (with n observations on k variables) and ∆ is a (k k) diagonal
matrix of associated Eigenvalues. The jth (n  1) principal component pj of the
(n k) matrix P = XV of principal components is thereby defined as
pj = Xv j, j = 1, ..., k.
It is worth noting, that the first Eigenvector in Table 2.7, associated with the
first Eigenvalue in Table 2.6, can already explain 52.2 percent of the variation
within the infrastructure variables. Moreover, the second Eigenvector can explain
12.2 percent of the total variation. Hence, the first two Eigenvectors together can
explain about 64 percent of the total variation within all infrastructure indicators.
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The coefficients of the Eigenvectors in Table 2.7 reflect the contribution of each
single indicator to a corresponding principal component. Thus, all indicators con-
tribute with a positive sign to the first component. Consequently, counties with
high values on these indicators will also have a high score for the first component.
With respect to the second principal component, the variables Motorway
and FreightTrans contribute with a positive sign, whereas the variables Airport,
VocTrain, CollTrain and in particular variable ScienceP contribute with a neg-
ative sign. Thus, counties with high values for the variables Motorway and
FreightTrans but with relatively low or close to zero values for the variables
Airport, VocTrain, CollTrain and ScienceP will have a high positive score on this
second principal component.
Table 2.8: Correlations of Infrastructure Variables and Principal Components
with Output
Correlations of Output1) qi
All Manufac- Trade & Servi-
sectors turing Transp. ces
with original infrastructure variables
Highway 0.241 0.105 0.197 0.160
FreightTr 0.308 0.183 0.218 0.140
Airport 0.368 0.162 0.196 0.210
ICTrain 0.459 0.328 0.210 0.155
VocTrain 0.452 0.184 0.322 0.330
Coll&Uni 0.322 0.228 0.186 0.142
ScienceP 0.459 0.249 0.328 0.255
with Principal Components
In f ra1 0.521 0.288 0.330 0.278
In f ra2 -0.114 -0.052 -0.043 -0.076
1) measured as gross value added.
significant  at 10 %,  at 5 %,  at 1 %.
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On the other hand, counties with high values for the variables Airport,
VocTrain, CollTrain and ScienceP but low values for the variables Motorway
and/or FreightTrans will have a high negative score for the second component.
We interpret this as an indication that the second component reflects the contrast
of counties with either good quality transport infrastructure (except airports) but
with a relatively low human capital infrastructure or vice versa.
Figure 2.1 graphs the first principal component versus the second. The sin-
gle observations in this graph are the labour market regions. Note, that by con-
struction the principal components are uncorrelated. Labour market regions well
endowed with infrastructure will have high values on the first component, thus
they are be located on the right-hand side of the graph. Observations with high
values on the second components are located in the upper-half of the graph.
Table 2.8 gives the correlations of the original indicator variables and the prin-
cipal components with output, measured for the different sectors. All infrastruc-
ture variables are significant and positively correlated with these output mea-
sures. This pattern also justifies the application of PCA in the regression analysis
because due to this collinearity between infrastructure variables it would be dif-
ficult to get precise estimates of the contribution of single variables. The first
principal component, which we label as In f ra1, is significantly correlated with
output measures for all sectors, whereas the second principal component, which
we label as In f ra2, is not.
Table 2.9 displays the results of the regression analysis. The estimations have
been carried out using LIMDEP 7.0. Equation (2.8) has been estimated both in the
unrestricted and the restricted form, where the long-run parameters are directly
estimated. The unrestricted specification has been estimatedwith linear OLS. The
restricted specification has been estimated both with nonlinear Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) and with nonlinear Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). The
correlations of the residuals across equations are shown in Table 2.10. Some of
these correlations, e.g., between equations total and manufacturing, and total and
services are positive and quite significant. Thus, we expect a gain in efficiency
from using SUR compared to OLS.
We have added both Länder dummy variables and a dummy variable indicat-
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Figure 2.1: Plot of Principal Components for Labour Market Regions
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Table 2.9: Regression Results for Different Sectors
nonlinear nonlinear
OLS1)3) OLS1)3) SUR1)
Dependent Variable: Output qi
All Sectors
Dummy var.2) La¨nder La¨nder La¨nder
DCity 0.023 (1.69) 0.062 (1.945) 0.013 (0.26)
Intercept 1.413 (6.69) 3.807 (22.62) 4.102 (14.21)
ln qit0 0.629 (10.63) 0.629 (10.63) 0.782 (28.98)
ln ki 0.047 (3.91) 0.120 (3.84) 0.184 (4.44)
ln Li 0.045 (4.80) 0.123 (4.63) 0.150 (3.67)
In f ra1 0.009 (3.47) 0.024 (3.05) 0.029 (2.42)
In f ra2 -0.005 (-0.96) -0.013 (-0.97) -0.013 (-0.56)
R2 0.759 0.759 0.750
White χ2 (76)2 91.5 91.5 94.0
Manufacturing Sector
Dummy var.2) La¨nder La¨nder La¨nder
DCity 0.041 (2.01) 0.093 (2.27) 0.080 (1.44)
Intercept 0.970 (3.92) 2.191 (6.58) 2.183 (6.27)
ln qit0 0.557 (8.75) 0.557 (8.75) 0.695 (23.74)
ln ki 0.169 (5.65) 0.382 (4.74) 0.376 (6.25)
ln Li 0.072 (4.66) 0.163 (4.51) 0.261 (5.64)
In f ra1 -0.009 (-1.92) -0.020 (-1.71) -0.041 (-2.79)
In f ra2 0.041 (0.32) 0.006 (0.32) 0.010 (0.38)
R2 0.705 0.709 0.699
White χ2 (76)2 136.8 136.8 124.1
Trade & Transport Sector
Dummy var.2) La¨nder La¨nder La¨nder
DCity 0.011 (0.54) 0.024 (0.56) 0.016 (0.35)
Intercept 1.948 (5.45) 4.210 (19.28) 4.224 (15.74)
ln qit0 0.537 (5.56) 0.537 (5.56) 0.601 (14.95)
ln ki -0.023 (-1.83) -0.050 (-1.74) -0.032 (-0.90)
ln Li 0.041 (3.08) 0.088 (2.83) 0.070 (2.11)
In f ra1 0.021 (3.56) 0.045 (2.95) 0.057 (4.27)
In f ra2 -0.007 (-0.95) -0.016 (-0.97) -0.017 (-0.87)
R2 0.534 0.534 0.530
White χ2 (76)2 146.2 146.2 145.8
Service Sector
Dummy var.2) La¨nder La¨nder La¨nder
DCity -0.080 (-4.88) -0.276 (-3.49) -0.264 (-3.77)
Intercept 1.679 (6.11) 5.829 (12.13) 5.613 (13.87)
ln qit0 0.712 (11.37) 0.712 (11.37) 0.724 (21.44)
ln ki 0.029 (2.48) 0.101 (2.30) 0.175 (3.54)
ln Li -0.007 (-0.57) -0.023 (-0.58) -0.087 (-1.92)
In f ra1 0.018 (4.20) 0.063 (3.96) 0.073 (4.48)
In f ra2 0.002 (0.21) 0.006 (0.21) 0.004 (0.15)
R2 0.603 0.603 0.596
White χ2 (76)2 57.4 57.4 58.7
Condition-num. 126.7 52.4 191.4
Number of observations: 327 for each equation
1)Asymp. t-values are given in parentheses.
2) significant at 10 %, at 5 %, at 1 %.
3) White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity robust t-values.
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Table 2.10: Cross Equation Correlations from OLS Table 2.9
All Manu- Trade Ser-
sectors facturing & Transp. vices
All sectors 1.000 0.703 0.339 0.529
Manufacturing 0.703 1.000 -0.075 0.006
Trade & Transport 0.339 -0.075 1.000 0.262
Services 0.529 0.006 0.262 1.000
ing whether or not a county is a self-administrated city to all equations. White’s
(1980) heteroscedasticity test has been applied to all regressions. Homoscedastic-
ity of residuals is rejected except for the trade & transport equation. Thus, White’s
(1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard errors have been used for calculating
the t values for the OLS estimations. The reported condition numbers with val-
ues greater than 20 may indicate a potential problem of multicollinearity for the
estimations (Judge et al., 1985, p. 902).
The fit as indicated by R2 is remarkably good for all equations. Several key
findings emerge from Table 2.9. First of all, In f ra1 is significant for all, the service
and trade & transport sectors, but surprisingly not for the manufacturing sector. In
contrast to this, In f ra2 is not significant for private production with regard to all
sectors. Second, the estimates of the adjustment parameter λ are positive and
significant for all equations. Values of λ of about 0.6 to 0.7 imply that the halfway
(λ = 0.5) between the actual value and the long-run equilibrium value of output
was reached within the 8 years of observation. Third, the Länder dummy vari-
ables are significant for all equations. Hence, there are systematic differences in
output of industries and branches across the Bundesländer. Fourth, it turns out
that our measure for private capital approximated as the private capital stock of
the manufacturing sector, is related to all, manufacturing and service sectors out-
put, but not to output of the trade & transport sector. Fifth, it is worth noting that
the city dummy variable is positive and significant for manufacturing, but nega-
tive and significant for the service sector. Sixth and finally, the positive and sig-
nificant coefficients for ln L show that economies of scale and/or agglomeration
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economics are important. However, this does not apply for the service sector.
Table 2.11: Tests on normality of residuals from OLS estimations, Table 2.9
All Manu- Trade Ser-
sectors facturing & Transp. vices
Shapiro-WilkW 0.982 0.976?? 0.935??? 0.929???
Jarque-Bera JB 98.1??? 86.1??? 2172.3??? 1014.3???
significant  at 10 %,  at 5 %,  at 1 % .
To conclude the empirical analysis, we finally examine whether or not the
residuals of the estimations exhibit evidence of spatial dependence. As outlined
in Schulze (1998), the first step in the analysis of spatial dependence should con-
sist of a test on the normality of residuals. Table 2.11 provides the results both
of the Shapiro-Wilk and the Jarque-Bera tests for all equations. The Jarque-Bera
JB statistic is distributed χ2 with 2 degrees of freedom, thus the critical value for
p=0.01 is 9.21. The null hypothesis of normality is rejected for all equations by the
Jarque-Bera test as well as by the Shapiro-Wilk statistic, except for the all sectors
equation.
Hence, in this case the test procedure for spatial dependence suggested by
Moran (1950), and extended by Cliff and Ord (1972), appears not to be appropri-
ate. However, as an alternative the KR test proposed by Kelejian and Robinson
(1992) is still applicable. In contrast to Moran’s I this test neither requires the
model to be linear nor the disturbance terms to be normally distributed.
Applying this test it turns out—as it would also be the case with Moran’s I—
that the outcome of the KR statistic depends on the specification of correlations
between regions, i.e. on the specification of the binary spatial weight matrix (see
also Cliff and Ord, 1973; Cliff and Ord, 1981).
This point is illustrated in Figure 2.2. It shows the outcome of the KR statistic
depending on the specification of threshold Euclidian distance between coun-
ties. If the distance between geographical midpoints of regions is larger than the
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Figure 2.2: Dependence of the KR χ2-statistic on the threshold distance
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threshold distance, then this corresponds to a zero in the spatial weight matrix.
Hence, in this case these 2 counties are not considered in the computation of the
KR statistic.
The lower axis in Figure 2.2 gives the threshold distance in kilometers, the
upper axis gives the number correlations between counties which are taken into
account in the computation of KR.
The KR statistic is distributed χ2 and in our case with 15 degrees of freedom.
Thus, the critical value at p=0.05 is 24.99 and at p=0.01 is 30.57. These two critical
values are plotted as lines in Figure 2.2.
It emerges that for all and the manufacturing sectors the KR statistic reaches a
maximum when the threshold distance is between 30 and 50 km. At this maxi-
mum, the total number of correlations between counties being considered in the
calculation of KR ranges between 500 and 1500. This means, that the maximum
of the KR statistic is reached when, for each county, between 2-5 correlations with
the nearest neighbouring counties are taken into account.
From this explorative analysis, we conclude that spatial dependence is not
significant in our case, since for no equation is the maximum of KR larger than
the given critical value from the χ2 distribution for p=0.01, which is 30.57. Hence,
the estimation and inference based on the usual econometric techniques e.g. OLS
or SUR remain valid.
2.4 Summary and conclusions
Overall, we find that long-run equilibrium output in a county will be higher, the
better it is endowed with infrastructure. Thus, our essay substantiates the find-
ings of other studies e.g. Aschauer (1989a), Biehl (1986), Munnell (1992) or Seitz
(1993; 1994; 1995) that infrastructure contributes positively to private production.
However, our approach is an extension of previous studies in several aspects.
The main difference to most studies in this field is that we focus on effects of in-
frastructure at the local level. This appears to be reasonable since the main part
of infrastructure is supplied at the local level, hence one can expect its benefits to
be seen particularly at a local level.
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Furthermore, in contrast to most previous studies we use indicators for in-
frastructure instead of public capital stocks measured in monetary terms. This
allows us to overcome the unrealistic assumption that infrastructure stocks can
be regarded as homogenous and thereby as comparable across regions.
Our main finding is that counties better endowed with both transport and
human capital infrastructure have also a higher level of expected long-run total
output. However, one surprising result of our study is that we do not find effects
of infrastructure endowment on long-run output of themanufacturing sector at the
local level. Hence, other factors than infrastructural endowment seem to deter-
mine the choice of location and production of manufacturing firms. On the other
hand, we find that the contribution of infrastructure to local private production
is most pronounced for the service and the trade & transport sectors. Moreover, we
find that both transport and human capital infrastructure are important for total
output, i.e. these two types of infrastructure appear to be complementary.
Essay 3
A Political Economy Model of Infrastructure
Allocation: An Empirical Assessment
with
Olivier Cadot
Lars-Hendrik Röller
Abstract
This essay proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribu-
tion of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly
the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we elim-
inate a potential source of bias in production-function estimates and generate testable
hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure policy. Our empirical findings on a
panel of France’s regions over 1984-91 suggest that influence activities were, indeed, sig-
nificant determinants of the cross-regional allocation of transportation infrastructure in-
vestments. Moreover, we find little evidence of concern for the maximisation of economic
returns to infrastructure spending, even after controlling for pork-barrel and when im-
posing an exogenous preference for convergence in regional productivity levels.
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3.1 Introduction
If there is little doubt that investment in public infrastructure capital is a neces-
sary condition for long-run growth in industrial countries and, a fortiori, in devel-
oping ones, how much infrastructure investment actually contributes to growth is
still, in spite of a long-standing debate, a largely unsettled question. Disagree-
ment over the magnitudes involved has persisted in spite of a massive amount
of research sparked by the influential work of Aschauer (1989a,1989b). Using ag-
gregate data for the US between 1949 and 1985, Aschauer found that the elasticity
of output to a broad measure of public infrastructure capital was significant and
quantitatively very large; other studies using aggregate data (Ram and Ramsey
(1989), 1988, and Munnell, 1990a) also found public capital to influence produc-
tivity significantly. At a time of widespread concern about the slowdown in US
productivity growth, these findings suggested that a decline in the rate of public-
capital accumulation was “a potential new culprit” (Munnell, 1990a, p. 3).
However, the early studies were fraught with logical and econometric dif-
ficulties, the most important of which are discussed in Gramlich’s 1994 review
essay. Among the econometric problems, it was pointed out that the direction
of causation was unclear (see Eisner, 1991; Tatom, 1993b; or Holtz-Eakin, 1994).
For instance, Holtz-Eakin remarked that “it is tempting to infer a causal relation-
ship from public-sector capital to productivity, but the evidence does not justify
this step. It is just as easy to imagine the reverse scenario in which deteriorating
economic conditions reduce capital-stock growth” (1994, p. 12). Disagreement
over the meaning of elasticity estimates was not limited to time-series studies.
Munnell (1990b) and Garcia-Milà and McGuire (1992) also found positive elastic-
ities of output to public capital using panel data at the state level, but state-level
evidence was vulnerable to similar criticism: quoting again Holtz-Eakin (1994,
p. 13), “[b]ecause more prosperous states are likely to spend more on public capi-
tal, there will be a positive correlation between the state-specific effects and pub-
lic sector capital. This should not be confused, however, with the notion that
greater public capital leads a state to be more productive”. Holtz-Eakin’s own
approach consisted of introducing fixed effects in the specification of the error
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structure in order to control for unobserved state characteristics. But, as he him-
self remarked (p. 13), “in doing so the investigator ignores the information from
cross-state variation in the variables”, which is of course unfortunate given that
in a panel of short duration a substantial part of the information comes, precisely,
from the data’s cross-sectional variation. Moreover, if the endogeneity of pub-
lic infrastructure investments is a serious problem, the best way to address it is
probably the most direct one, that is, to use simultaneous-equation methods (see
Hulten, 1995 for a discussion; see also Tatom, 1993). A few authors followed
this approach, e.g. Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1991) or de Frutos and Pereira (1993),
and nevertheless found significant elasticities of output to infrastructure capital.
But the key question, if one believes that the endogeneity issue matters, is how
infrastructure investment decisions should be modelled.
Clearly, the “second equation” should be grounded in a theory of how public
infrastructure investment decisions are made, i.e. on some explicit view about
what drives policy-making. Indeed, Gramlich (1994) rightly points out that the
primary interest of the infrastructure debate is not so much in the battle over
elasticity estimates as in the implied policy debate. In his words, “rather than
asking whether there is a shortage, it seems more helpful to ask what, if any,
policies should be changed” (p. 1190). What Gramlich suggests is to focus ex-
plicitly on policy choices and the institutional context in which they are made
in order to assess, from a normative perspective, whether they are socially opti-
mal or not. This presupposes that institutions and policy choices are designed
to maximise social welfare. But are they? A growing literature, at the frontier
of economics and political science, views economic-policy decisions as resulting
from the maximisation by incumbent politicians of objective functions that may
depart considerably from social welfare, under constraints that are primarily po-
litical (see Dixit, 1996, for a survey). This literature approaches from a positive
angle questions that used to be the realm of the normative, taking policy variables
to be endogenous rather than control variables. Ultimately, normative consider-
ations are likely to reappear, e.g. in the form of prescriptions in favour of rules or
institutions mitigating policy capture by special interests; but the literature’s key
message is that irrespective of what politicians ought to do, economists need to
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understand what they actually do and why. For instance, if public infrastructure
investment decisions are influenced by pork-barrel politics, pork-barrel politics
should be part of the model. We believe that this provides a useful starting point
for a discussion of what the “second equation” should be.
In this perspective, the present essay is a first attempt to formally bridge the
gap between the infrastructure and political-economy literature. More specifi-
cally, we apply a common-agency model to the allocation of infrastructure in-
vestment in France. In principle, there exist other political economy mechanisms
that may be able to explain how infrastructure investment is allocated in a par-
ticular country. However, the centralist institutional context in France lends itself
towards an analysis under the common-agency setup. To put it differently, an
empirical test of the common-agency model in political economy is ideally suited
for the French environment.
The initial assumption is that firms have sunk investments giving them vested
interests in the quality of the infrastructure in regions where they have produc-
tion units (henceforth called “establishments”). We also posit that a firm with a
large establishment in a given region should be expected to lobby harder than
other firms for the maintenance and upgrading of that region’s infrastructure, for
three reasons. First, large establishments produce, on average, for more distant
markets (as higher volumes must be absorbed by wider geographical areas); as
a result, they use highways and railways more intensively than others and are
consequently more concerned about their maintenance and upgrading. Second,
large establishments are typically owned by firms with headquarters in Paris;
those firms are likely to be in a better position to effectively reinforce local lob-
bying by direct access to national policy-makers. Third, although we do not deal
explicitly with collective-action problems in mobilising local political resources,
such problems are likely to be easier overcome by a few firms with large stakes,
such as Michelin in Auvergne or Citroën in Bretagne, than for a host of small or
medium-sized local firms. For all these reasons, we assume that the number of
large establishments in a region has a positive influence on the intensity of that
region’s lobbying for transport infrastructure investment.
The form of the lobbying is very simple: we suppose that firms offer campaign
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contributions to incumbent politicians in return for additional spending. At the
margin, these contributions reflect the firms’ willingness to pay for additional
infrastructure—that is, they reflect the infrastructure’s marginal contribution to
firm value, both on the supply side, through the infrastructure’s contribution to
productivity in all sectors, and on the demand side for the construction industry
itself.1 The political process is as follows. Local politicians (we focus on regional
presidents, whose power of influence has increased after administrative reforms
enacted in 1982) act as contribution-collectors, providing their affiliated parties’
headquarters with promises of locally-generated campaign contributions. Their
own role is to assemble credible public-works projects for their region (as per their
constituents’ demands) and submit them to Paris for approval. Final decisions
are made at the national level, either in the Ministry of Transport for relatively
minor projects, or at Cabinet meetings for larger ones; ceteris paribus, local politi-
cians who (i) share the national executive’s political obedience and (ii) generate
substantial campaign financing, are rewarded with a larger slice of the cake;
this is what we call “pork-barrel politics”. Thus, the process can be viewed as
an auction whereby incumbent politicians sell infrastructure investments to local
lobbies who bid for them through campaign contributions. Of course, in reality
the mechanism through which lobbying pressures are transmitted from the local
to the national level is neither as frictionless nor as transparent as it is portrayed
here. But the central idea that local politicians are more effective voices for their
constituents’ demands if they happen to share the national executive’s current
political obedience is a plausible one and is supported by the data.
In order to capture this idea, we approximate lobbying by two variables: the
number of large firms in each region and—perhaps more importantly—a dummy
variable equal to one when a regional council’s majority and the national govern-
ment are of the same obedience (left wing or right wing) and zero otherwise.
We find both measures of lobbying influence to be significant, statistically and
in magnitude. Since lobbying takes place over investment levels (i.e. flows) and
1Our panel covers a period (1985-91) immediately preceding a new law on political party
financing. Ample anecdotal evidence suggests that, prior to that reform, a substantial part of the
financing of mainstream parties came from contributions linked to public-works contracts.
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output is determined by stocks, one may suspect that the simultaneity bias in the
output equation, may not be very large. As it turns out, the simultaneity bias
from estimating a production function alone is negligible, as single equation elas-
ticity estimates are almost identical to those obtained by simultaneous estimation
of both equations. It appears that stocks are too large relative to investments for
feedback influences to be a real source of concern over a sample period of less
than a decade. We also find that over our sample period (during which left-wing
parties were in power for five years and right-wing ones for two), the French
government did not seem to be significantly concerned by the maximisation of
the economic returns to infrastructure spending. This result, which is robust to
changes in the functional form of the government’s objective function, reinforces
our conclusion that pork-barrel considerations were important—if not primary—
policy drivers in the sample period. Finally, we carry out an exercise in which we
compare the actual allocation of infrastructure investments across regions with
a simulated socially optimal value. Interestingly, we find that most of the cross-
regional variation in investment levels is attributable to pork barrel, suggesting
that uniform allocation would be a good rule of thumb to reduce policy capture
by lobbies.
The remainder of this essay is organised as follows. In section 2, we state
general conditions for the efficient provision of a public input and derive condi-
tions under which influence activities lead to inefficient provision in a political-
economy model. In section 3, we report the results of empirical testing of the
model’s structural equations on a French data set. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Theory
Basic results on the optimal provision of public inputs were derived by Kaizuka
(1965), Sandmo (1972), and Negishi (1973). We briefly review these results in the
following section in order to provide a benchmark against which inefficiencies
arising from influence activities can be assessed.
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3.2.1 Efficient provision of a public input
Consider an economy producing m final goods for consumption, with technolo-
gies Qi = Fi(Ki, Li,X), for i = 1, ...,m, where Ki and Li are respectively the
amounts of capital and labour used up in the production of good i and X is a
pure public input. Following Negishi (1973), we take the latter to be of the “un-
paid input” type, meaning that the function Fi is linearly homogenous in Ki, Li
and X.2 When such is the case, owners of capital, which are residual claimants,
appropriate the rents generated by the public input if the latter is not priced at
the value of its marginal product. This is a source of potential inefficiency in
capital-allocation decisions; but for simplicity (and for reasons that will become
clear in the empirical part of the essay) we will limit the analysis to a short-run
case where capital is fixed; the theory can be easily extended to a long-run case.
Let the public input be produced with labour only according to a technol-
ogy G(LX), and let L = ∑mi=1 Li + LX be the economy’s total endowment of
labour. For reasons that will become clear later on, we will assume that the so-
cial utility function is quasilinear (necessary conditions for the aggregation of
individual preferences into a social utility function are assumed to hold); thus,
U(Q1, ...,Qm) = Q1 + ∑mi=2 u(Qi) where the function u is increasing and concave.
Given this, the problem of a social planner is:3
max
L1,...,Lm,LX
Q1 +
m
∑
i=2
u(Qi)
s.t.
Qi = Fi(Ki, Li,X), i = 1, ...,m, (3.1)
X = G(LX),
L =
m
∑
i=1
Li + LX .
2The alternative formulation is to assume that the production function is linearly homoge-
nous in Ki and Li alone and has increasing returns in all factors including X. This alternative
formulation is generally seen as appropriate for publicly-provided R&D, whereas the classical
example of the former formulation is, according to Sandmo (1972) and Negishi (1973), transport
infrastructure.
3Transport infrastructure is used as an input not only by firms, but also by households; so
a complete statement of the problem should include a household production function. We will
abstract from such considerations and treat transport infrastructure as a “pure input”.
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Letting subscripts denote partial derivatives (so FiL = ∂F
i/∂Li and FiX = ∂F
i/∂X),
solving (3.1) and rearranging the resulting first-order conditions gives the basic
condition for the efficient provision of X; namely,
m
∑
i=1
FiX
FiL
=
1
G0
. (3.2)
Condition (3.2), which closely parallels Samuelson’s condition for the opti-
mal provision of public goods, was initially derived by Kaizuka (1965). It states
that the sum over industries (firm-level production functions can be aggregated
within each industry because the production function is homogenous) of the rates
of technical substitution between labour and the public input must be equated to
the marginal cost of the public input’s provision.
Whereas the maximisation of social utility under technology and factor en-
dowment constraints is the most natural way of deriving (3.2), this efficiency
condition can also be derived from the maximisation of firm profits. Let good
1 be the numeraire, pi the price of good i in terms of good 1, and w the wage
rate, and fix all prices and the wage rate at the levels obtained implicitly from the
solution of problem (3.1). Suppose that, at these exogenously given prices and
wage, firms make profit-maximising decisions contingent on X; let also H be the
inverse function of G so that LX = H(X). A government maximising firm profits
by choice of X will solve:
maxX F1(K1, L1,X) +∑mi=2 piF
i
(Ki, Li,X)  w∑mi=1 Li   wH(X)
s.t
F1L = p2F
2
L = ... = piF
i
L = w.
(3.3)
It is easily checked that the solution of (3.3) satisfies first-order condition (3.2) and
consequently yields the same level of provision of X. Although straightforward,
this result is very important for our purposes. To see why, consider a simple
influence-activity game in which firms offer monetary contributions to an incum-
bent politician in exchange for the public input’s provision, and suppose that the
incumbent maximises the sum of those contributions net of the input’s cost. If,
at the margin, contributions reflect the willingness of firms to pay for the input,
the influence-activity game’s unique equilibrium is the solution to (3.3). In other
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words, if Ci(X) is industry i’s offer of a monetary contribution to the government
and πi = piFi(Ki, Li,X)   wLi (with pi = 1 when i = 1) is its profits, whenever
∂Ci/∂X = ∂πi/∂X, a government maximising ∑i Ci(X)   wH(X) will maximise
(3.3) and consequently provide X according to (3.2). Thus, influence activities by
themselves do not imply inefficient provision of the public input.
This result—namely, that the existence of influence activities is not a suffi-
cient condition for an inefficient policy outcome—is simply a restatement of Bern-
heim andWhinston’s (1986a) result according to which, if influence activities can
be represented as a “menu auction” and if special-interest groups bid for pol-
icy according to their marginal valuation, the resulting “truthful” equilibrium is
Pareto-efficient (see also Bernheim and Whinston, (1986a), for parallel efficiency
results in a common-agency context). This result also appears in a trade-policy
context in Grossman and Helpman (1994) who show that in a small open econ-
omy, if all agents are represented in one lobby or another, the resulting equilib-
rium is free trade. We now turn to conditions under which influence activities do
lead to inefficient policy choices.
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3.2.2 Influence activities and inefficient policies
We have established that, in the case of a pure public input, a “policy auction-
eer” implements the same policies that a social planner would, provided that
all firms have access to the bidding process and bid according to their marginal
willingness to pay. It follows that inefficiencies can come from only two sources.
First, some firms may not have access to the bidding process, or may choose to
free-ride. For instance, small firms may keep out of lobbying because it entails
an entry fee that is prohibitive for them. This kind of incomplete coverage of the
bidding process may lead to under-provision of the public input, quite like a stan-
dard collective-action problem. If infrastructures are specific to geographical en-
tities, like regions or states, and the number of large firms varies across these enti-
ties, distortions will also appear in the spatial allocation of the public input.4 Sec-
ond, incumbent politicians may pursue an agenda of their own; that is, instead of
simply maximising the sum of the lobbies’ transfers as a pure auctioneer would,
they may maximise a composite function in which lobbying and non-lobbying
arguments enter as substitutes. Non-lobbying arguments—such as priority de-
velopment of some types of regional infrastructures—may entail choices which,
although desirable from the incumbent’s perspective, deviate from the first-best
allocation of the public input. But they may also reflect economic-efficiency con-
siderations, as opposed to pork barrel (this is the case considered by Grossman
and Helpman, 1994, in which the government maximises a linear combination of
social welfare and contributions from lobbies).
For instance, suppose that the incumbent government maximises a convex
combination of social utility U(.) and a monetary contribution Ck(X) from some
non-numeraire industry k. Again, the economy is in a competitive equilibrium as
far as consumption and the allocation of labour across industries are concerned,
the government’s only problem being the provision of public input X.
Suppose that the government nowmaximises a linear combination of industry
k’s contribution and social utility, the resource constraint being represented as
4Note that the existence of lobbying implies that collective-action problems are at least par-
tially overcome. If collective-action problems were so severe as to hamper any lobbying, there
would be no distortion in the state’s provision of the public input.
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in problem (3.3) by the term wH(X). Although we are aggregating money and
“utils”, this poses no particular problem as long as preferences are quasilinear.
Letting a be the weight on social utility the government now solves
maxX (1  a)Ck(X) + a [Q1 + ∑mi=2 u(Qi)]  wH(X)
s.t.
Qi = Fi(Ki, Li,X), i = 1, ...,m,
F1L = p2F
2
L = ... = pmF
m
L = w,
u0 = pi 8 i = 2, ...,m,
Ck0(X) = ∂πk/∂X = pkFkX ,
(3.4)
with first-order condition
(1  a)pkF
k
X + a
 
F1X + u
0
m
∑
i=2
FiX
!
  wH0 = 0,
after substitution of the relevant constraints, this becomes
FkX
FkL
+ a∑
i 6=k
FiX
FiL
= H0. (3.5)
Thus, efficiency condition (3.2) is now violated; as the left-hand side of (3.5) is
a decreasing function of X whereas its right-hand side is an increasing one, the
public input is underprovided in (3.5) compared to (3.2). However, underprovi-
sion follows from the choice of a convex combination of social utility and industry
k’s contribution in the objective function; non-convex linear combinations could
yield overprovision. In the empirical part of this essay, we will not impose con-
vexity.
Given that (3.5)’s departure from optimality comes from the fact that sector k
and only sector k lobbies, it can be eliminated in two ways. First, the distortion
shrinks as a increases; in the limit, when a = 1, (3.5) reduces to (3.2). That is,
the departure from optimality disappears if the government’s valuation of sector
k’s contribution goes to zero. Second, if all industries lobby, (3.5) reduces to (3.2)
irrespective of the value of a in [0, 1], because by maximising a convex combina-
tion of social utility and the profits of competitive firms, the government in effect
maximises twice the same thing.
Essay 3. A Political EconomyModel of Infrastructure Allocation 74
Although simple, this theoretical framework provides a useful starting point
for our empirical exploration of the effect of lobbying on the allocation of trans-
port infrastructure investments. Whether or not there is underprovision of the
public input as implied by (3.5) is a very important question because under-
investment in infrastructure is a subject of recurrent concern, in particular in the
US.5 A second important implication of (3.5) is that if the intensity or effective-
ness of influence activities varies across states or regions, distortions in the over-
all level of infrastructure investments will be compounded by distortions in their
spatial allocation. We now turn to an estimable model of regional infrastructure
allocation building on these foundations.
3.2.3 A model of regional infrastructure allocation
Production function
Let Qit be the aggregate output of region i at time t, Lit the level of regional em-
ployment, Kit the region’s aggregate (non-infrastructure) capital stock, and Xit
its stock of transport infrastructure.6 All regions have identical aggregate Cobb-
Douglas production functions F:
Qit = F(Ait, Lit,Kit,Xit) = At L
αL
it K
αK
it X
αX
it , (3.6)
where At is a technical-change parameter common to all regions. Note that this
formulation rules out cross-regional externalities in the productivity of transport
infrastructure; while this assumption is obviously an oversimplification, Gram-
lich (1990) and Holtz-Eakin (1994) argued on the basis of US data that such ex-
ternalities are unlikely to be a major problem, as most traffic, even on interstate
highways, is local. Moreover, relaxing it would require the estimation of a large
5It should be noted, however, that the political model implicit in (3.4) is a representative-
democracy one, whereas in the US about 20% of new state and local construction must be ap-
proved by referendum (see Gramlich, 1994). Peterson (1991) showed that under this partial direct-
democracy mechanism the political economy of infrastructure construction is also likely to lead
to underprovision of the infrastructure, as risk-averse politicians undertake projects only when
assured of an overwhelming majority (the average approval percentage in referenda was close to
70% over 1948-90).
6We abstract from non-transport infrastructure like schools, hospitals, and so on.
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number of parameters relative to our sample size. Dividing through by Lit, (3.6)
becomes
qit = Atk
αK
it x
αX
it L
α˜L
it , (3.7)
where qit is labour productivity, kit is the capital-labour ratio and xit is the stock
of transport infrastructure per worker (we will henceforth use lower-case letters
to designate per-worker variables),7 and α˜L = αL + αK + αX   1. Note that α˜L = 0
if returns to scale are constant.
As policy decisions are concerned with infrastructure investments rather than
stocks, for future purposes we need to establish the formal link between the two.
The law of motion of region i’s real transport infrastructure stock Xit is given as
Xit = γXi,t 1 + Zit, (3.8)
where Zit denotes real gross investment in transport infrastructure and 1  γ is
the rate of depreciation of the infrastructure stock, so that
∂Xit
∂Zit
= 1. (3.9)
Policy function
We model lobbying as a common agency game. Although the problem should
formally be treated in an explicit intertemporal context (see Bergemann and
Valimaki, 1998), for the sake of simplicity we will reduce it to a succession of
static games. In each period, region-specific lobbies indexed by i = 1, ..., n
(the principals) simultaneously face the government with monetary transfer of-
fers Cit(Zt) conditioned on the vector of transport infrastructure investments
Zt = (Z1t, ...,Znt). These transfers can be interpreted, depending on the con-
text, as political campaign contributions or outright bribes. The government then
chooses a value Zt of the policy vector Zt that maximises a suitably defined objec-
tive function V [Zt,∑i Cit(Zt)]. Finally, lobbies make transfers Ci(Zt ) as promised.
In order to be consistent with the framework of the previous section, keeping the
same notation let V [Zt,∑i Cit(Zt)] = au(Zt) + (1  a)∑i Cit(Zt)  H(Zt); the na-
ture of the functions u and H will be explained later on. Let also Πit(Zt) be the
7Using per-worker variables reduces heteroscedasticity due to unequal region sizes.
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value of Zt to lobby i. The game’s unique “truthful” equilibrium is characterised
by the following equations:
∂Cjt(Zt)
∂Zit




Zt
 
∂Πjt(Zt)
∂Zit




Zt
= 0, i, j = 1, ...n; (3.10)
a
∂u
∂Zit
+ (1  a)
n
∑
j=1
∂Cjt
∂Zit
 
∂H
∂Zit
= 0, i = 1, ...n. (3.11)
Equations (3.10) are “truthfulness” conditions whereas (3.11) is the government’s
first-order condition. Bernheim andWhinston (1986b, Theorem 2) state a number
of sufficient conditions under which the common-agency game’s unique equilib-
rium maximises the joint surplus of the agent and principals, i.e. under which it
collapses to a single principal-agent problem which, in the absence of hidden ac-
tion, generates no inefficiency. These conditions do not apply here, because small
firms do not lobby, whence transfer functions are distorted. Thus, efficiency does
not hold.
The first step in taking (3.10) and (3.11) to the data consists of parameteriz-
ing the u and H functions. We define u as a nested function of Zt; i.e. u is a
function of productivities qit, themselves functions of Zt through (3.7). Specif-
ically, let u(Zt) = 2∑i Litqit(Zt)1/2. This formulation reflects the twin assump-
tions that the government values convergence in per-capita incomes (hence the
concave form),8 and that a given departure from optimal productivity levels re-
ceives more weight, ceteris paribus, if it affects a more populous region (hence the
multiplicative term Lit).
The costs of these investments are captured by the function H. Some of the
spending is financed by corporate taxes whose impact is reflected in the firms’
willingness to lobby (see details below). The rest is financed by other taxes
which, although they do not directly affect the profits of local firms, affect lo-
cal welfare and are therefore of concern to the government. Accordingly, let
H(Zt) = ∑i Litz2it/2. The quadratic form reflects a rising marginal distortion
8Other functional forms, e.g. logarithmic, were tried in the estimation and found to yield
similar estimates.
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cost of individual tax burdens;9 in general, convexity (quadratic or other) of in-
frastructure investments costs can reflect non-financial considerations as well as
financial ones. For instance, in a pork-barrel context, it may be politically impor-
tant for the incumbent government to appear even-handed in the distribution of
favours. Using these functional forms and differentiating the non-lobbying terms
of (3.11) with respect to Zit gives
a
∂u
∂Zit
 
∂H
∂Zit
= aLitq
 1/2
it
1
Lit
∂Qit
∂Xit
∂Xit
∂Zit
  zit,
where zit = Zit/Lit. Using (3.6) and (3.9), this simplifies to
a
∂u
∂Zit
 
∂H
∂Zit
= aFXq
 1/2
it   zit, (3.12)
where FX = ∂F/∂Xit .
We now turn to the lobbying term. In a transport-infrastructure allocation
problem, it is natural to suppose that lobbying is organised along regional lines,
with industrial firms playing an important role in the process. As already dis-
cussed, we will treat transport infrastructure as a pure input, so that only firms
lobby for it, and we will assume, in addition, that firms do not lobby in regions
where they have only small production units (this is the “small-firms-out” as-
sumption). In the absence of cross-regional externalities (discussed in section
2.3.1), firms having establishments in multiple regions make separate lobbying
decisions for each one of their establishments, so we can treat the latter, without
loss of generality, as separate firms. Accordingly, suppose that in any region i,
Nit identical, large “firms” are active in lobbying. Although large, these firms
are price-takers, and we will assume that they all produce a single manufactured
good priced at pit; as all variables are measured in constant 1992 francs in the em-
pirical part, we set pit = 1 for all i and t. As transport infrastructure investments,
in particular on highway maintenance and construction, are typically financed
out of composite packages combining local and national budgets, we model their
impact on local taxes through a tax function T `it (Zit). On the other hand, we as-
sume that the use of transport infrastructure is free. In order to include regional
9The tax burden can alternatively be expressed as a percentage of regional GDP; however,
such a formulation turns out to yield awkward functional forms with difficult-to-interpret pa-
rameters.
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employment and private capital stocks as right-hand side variables in the pro-
duction function, we assume that they are taken by the representative firm as
fixed; finally, we denote by F` the production function of a representative large
firm. The profit of a representative large firm in region i at time t is then
π`it = pitF
`
(At,K`it, L
`
it,Xit)  witL
`
it   ritK
`
it   T
`
it (Zit), (3.13)
where wit and rit are the wage rate and the rental rate of capital in region i at time
t. Suppose that firms pay local taxes in proportion to their employment in the
region;10 then, letting L`it be the total number of employees in large establishments
in region i at time t, the tax function facing a representative large firm in region i
is
T
`
it (Zit) = λ
Zit
Nit
L`it
Lit
, (3.14)
for some (unknown) parameter λ. Substituting (3.14) into (3.13), aggregating over
Nit identical large firms (i.e. multiplying by Nit) and differentiating with respect
to Zit gives
∂Πit
∂Zit
= Nit
∂π`it
∂Zit
= Nit
h
F`X   T
`0
it (Zit)
i
= Nit
 
F`X   λ
l`it
Nit
!
, (3.15)
where F`X  ∂F
`/∂Xit and l`it = L
`
it/Lit. We will henceforth assume that (3.15) is
positive; that is, that the marginal local-tax burden does not swamp the marginal
benefit of infrastructure investments (since otherwise there would be no lobby-
ing). Finally, using (3.10) and making use of the no-externality assumption,
∂Cjt
∂Zit
=
∂Πjt
∂Zit
=
8
<
:
F`XNit   λl
`
it if j = i
0 otherwise.
(3.16)
The government’s first-order condition (3.11) is found by adding (3.16) to (3.12)
and setting their sum equal to zero. Finally, solving for zit yields
zit = aFXq
 1/2
it + (1  a)(F
`
XNit   λl
`
it). (3.17)
10The largest local tax in France is the taxe professionnellewhich is proportional to employment.
As a robustness check, we also tried empirically an alternative formulation whereby the tax bur-
den on local companies was proportional to their sales; it gave similar results.
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Together, (3.7) and (3.17) form a system of two equations which we will estimate
simultaneously, yielding consistent estimates of the contribution of transport in-
frastructure investments to GDP and of the extent of political interference with
these investment decisions.
3.3 Empirical Implementation
3.3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
We use a panel data set covering 21 of France’s 22 regions (we excluded Corsica
because of its poor data) from 1985-91. Table 3.1 provides a brief description of
the variables and a list of the relevant regions. All figures are in 1992 Francs.
Output Q is measured as value added at factor cost and has been obtained from
the Eurostat database ’New Cronos’ (June 1999). Regional employment L is also
taken from ’New Cronos’ and covers all private sectors of the economy. The pri-
vate capital stock K is constructed by the Laboratoire d’Observation Economique et
des Institutions Locales (OEIL) using national data from INSEE’s Compte de Patri-
moine and allocating the national stock to the regions on the basis of corporate tax
rates.
The transport infrastructure stock X is constructed as follows. As stock data
was not available at the regional level, we construct the stock from investment
data using the perpetual inventory method (PIM). In order to obtain a benchmark
stock level for the initial period, we allocate the national stock, for which data is
given by the Fédération Nationale des Travaux Publics (FNTP, see also Laguarrigue,
1994) across the 21 regions in proportion to their average investment share over
the first three years of the sample period. The relatively slow rate of depreciation
of infrastructure capital implies that our stock converges slowly to the true one.
In order to reduce possible biases in the calculation of the infrastructure stock we
use infrastructure investment data going back to 1975. Aggregating our regional
stock data to the national level and comparing it with national data obtained from
INSEE yields only marginal differences.
The transport infrastructure investment data come from several sources. Rail-
way figures were provided directly by SNCF, the national railway company.
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Table 3.1: Variable Description and Regions
Variable Description
Q Regional GDP, million 1992 Francs
L Regional employment, million individuals
K Non-residential private capital stock, million 1992 Francs
X Transport infrastructure stock, million 1992 Francs
Z Transport infrastructure net investments, million 1992 Francs
N Number of establishments with more than 500 employees
Dit Dummy variable equal to 1 when regional council and national
parliament have same political majority.
Regions
Alsace Champagne-Ardennes Midi-Pyrenées
Aquitaine Franche-Comté Nord-Pas de Calais
Auvergne Haute-Normandie Pays de Loire
Basse-Norm. Ile-de-France Picardie
Bourgogne Languedoc-Roussillon Poitou-Charentes
Bretagne Limousin Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur
Centre Lorraine Rhône-Alpes
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Highway figures, which are reported for the year in which the work is done
(rather than for the year of budget allocation—there is a delay between the two)
have been collected by the OEIL from data generated by the FNTP (see Fritsch
and Prud’homme, 1994, for details). The FNTP’s data are based on reports by
the Federation’s member companies. Finally, investment data for waterways was
taken directly from the FNTP’s statistical yearbook. Although airport construc-
tion data, which we had collected from the Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile
(DGAC), would have been a natural inclusion in the study, we found that they
were not sufficiently reliable and consequently eliminated them from this study.
The number of industrial establishments with more than 500 employees (Nit)
is taken from various issues of L’Industrie dans les Régions, a yearly statistical pub-
lication of the Ministry of Industry. From our model it is natural to suppose that
the region Paris plays a specific role in lobbying process for infrastructure invest-
ment, therefore we defined two new variables as Nit(1   DParis) and NitDParis,
i.e. for the former the observations from Paris are excluded whereas for latter all
other observations except from Paris are excluded. Finally, the partisan dummy
variable (Dit) is equal to 1 when the majority in a Regional Council (and hence
the affiliation of the region’s President) and that of the national parliament (and
hence of the current government) are either both right-wing or both left-wing,
and zero otherwise.11 As our sample includes one regional election (in 1986) and
two national legislative elections (in 1986 and 1988 respectively), Dit, which was
constructed using press sources, varies both across regions and across time. We
lagged it by one year to take account of budget delays.
Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics for these variables. In 1992 Francs, over
the sample period, average infrastructure investment amounted to 1396 Francs
per worker, or roughly 0.54 percent of GDP; the infrastructure stock amounted
to 50, 920 Francs per worker, or 19.8 percent of GDP. The value of the highway
infrastructure stock was about 5 times that of the railway stock and 70 times that
of the waterways infrastructure stock.
11“Right wing” was defined in the sample as RPR, UDF, Front National, and “Divers Droite”.
“Left wing” was defined as Parti Socialiste, Parti Communiste, Mouvement des Radicaux de
Gauche, various environmentalist parties, and “Divers Gauche”. The “Divers Gauche” and
“Divers Droite” categories classify independent individuals according to their voting patterns.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. C.V. Minimum Maximum
Q/L 256723 27380.40 0.106 195921 357617
K/L 298142 62624.98 0.210 188442 484980
X/L 50920 9412.91 0.185 35453 70935
Q/X 5.166 0.8416 0.163 3.849 7.405
Z/L 1396 628.15 0.450 412 4934
N  (1  DParis) 35.27 21.66 0.614 5 113
N DParis 7.19 32.42 4.505 0 170
Dit 0.435 0.50 1.143 0 1
XHIGHWAY/XRAIL 5.18 2.36 0.456 1.74 13.68
XHIGHWAY/XWATER 68.8 80.17 1.165 2.27 290
Total number of observations: 147
3.3.2 Baseline estimates
Several further adjustments are needed before (3.6) and (3.17) can be taken to
the data. First, we drop the assumption that the weights on lobbying and non-
lobbying terms in the government’s objective function (1  a and a respectively)
add up to one. As these weights are arbitrary, we will simply call them a1 and
a2. Second, we approximate the marginal product of infrastructure capital for the
representative large firm in one region by its aggregate value in that region; using
the fact that, under technology (3.6), F`X  αXQit/Xit = αXqit/xit and simplifying,
(3.17) becomes
zit = a1αX(qit/xit)q
 1/2
it + a2
h
αX(qit/xit)Nit   λl`it
i
= θPROD q
1/2
it /xit + θLOBBY qitNit/xit + θTAX l
`
it, (3.18)
where θPROD = αXa1, θLOBBY = αXa2, and θTAX = λa2. Third, as (3.18) is nonlin-
ear in xit, using (3.8) to substitute for xit does not yield a closed form for zit. There-
fore we take care of the endogeneity of xit by instrumenting it with its lagged
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value. Fourth, we include time dummies12 and regional dummies (for Ile-de-
France in the production function, and for Ile de France, Nord-Pas-de-Calais in
1991, and Centre between 1986 and 1990 in the policy function; the first because
it contains Paris and the last two because of large-scale Eurotunnel and TGV con-
struction). Fifth, in the policy function we include as a separate regressor the
“partisan” dummy Di,t 1. Finally, we assume an AR(1) structure for the error
term of both equations. Denoting fixed time-effects by αt and βt, t = 1 . . . T, the
system to be estimated is thus:
ln qit = αt + αK ln kit + αX ln(xi,t 1 + zit) + α˜L ln(Lit) + αPARIS DParis + ν1it,
(3.19)
zit = βt + θPRODq
1/2
it /xi,t 1 + θLOBBY qitNit/xi,t 1(1  DParis)
+ θLOBBY_PARIS qitNit/xi,t 1DParis + θTAXl`it + θPARTY Di,t 1
+ βNORD DNord + βPARIS DParis + βCENTRE DCentre + ν2it, (3.20)
where νkit = ρkνki,t 1 + εkit, k = 1, 2, and εkit are i.i.d normal variables with mean
zero and variance σk. The estimation procedure is as follows. We estimate (3.19)
and (3.20) simultaneously by non-linear Full-Information Maximum Likelihood
(FIML),13 using a Prais-Winston transformation which avoids omitting observa-
tions for t = 1, (Greene, 1997, p. 601). For the non-linear OLS estimation we
obtain the autocorrelation parameters ρk, k = 1, 2, by minimizing the Sums of
Squares Errors (SSE) for each equation, whereas for the non-linear FIML the au-
tocorrelation parameters ρk are jointly estimated with the other parameters. The
results are reported in Table 3.3.
Several specification tests are performed. In order to test the AR(1) specifi-
cation against the alternative of an AR(2) specification, we employ the Godfrey
12Instead of fixed time effects we could also use linear time trends both for the policy equation
and the production function, as supposed in (3.6). While estimating the model with linear time
trends does not change the main results, using time dummies stresses also the cross-sectional
variation between regions.
13Estimations have been carried out using PROC MODEL, SAS 6.12.
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Table 3.3: Estimation Results
(a) (b) (c) (d)
OLS FIML FIML FIML
Production Function Dependent Variable: ln qit
α85 11.24 (23.50) 11.18 (20.91) 11.19 (20.94) 11.18 (20.89)
α86 11.27 (23.52) 11.21 (20.93) 11.22 (20.96) 11.21 (20.92)
α87 11.28 (23.53) 11.22 (20.94) 11.23 (20.96) 11.23 (20.92)
α88 11.30 (23.54) 11.24 (20.95) 11.25 (20.98) 11.24 (20.94)
α89 11.32 (23.58) 11.26 (20.99) 11.27 (21.01) 11.26 (20.97)
α90 11.31 (23.55) 11.25 (20.95) 11.26 (20.98) 11.25 (20.94)
α91 11.31 (23.52) 11.25 (20.93) 11.26 (20.95) 11.25 (20.91)
αK 0.189 (5.44) 0.181 (4.77) 0.182 (4.80) 0.182 (4.82)
eαL 0.025 (1.60) 0.025 (1.43) 0.025 (1.44) 0.025 (1.44)
αX 0.097 (2.30) 0.101 (2.14) 0.100 (2.12) 0.101 (2.15)
αParis 0.218 (5.20) 0.219 (4.27) 0.219 (4.57) 0.219 (4.58)
AR(1) ρ1 0.867 0.904 0.904 0.904
Godfrey LM 1.764 3.366 3.293 3.278
Shapiro-WilkW 0.979 0.985 0.985 0.985
R2 0.9539 0.9537 0.9537 0.9537
Policy Function Dependent Variable: zit
β85 848.7 (2.59) 879.8 (2.52) 997.2 (2.85) 1043.6 (2.57)
β86 1159.8 (2.92) 1186.8 (3.40) 1304.4 (3.71) 1362.6 (3.36)
β87 1199.4 (3.02) 1226.1 (3.58) 1340.8 (3.90) 1392.8 (3.50)
β88 1539.4 (3.03) 1564.0 (4.56) 1730.1 (5.09) 1734.0 (4.37)
β89 1433.3 (3.64) 1457.2 (4.28) 1622.6 (4.82) 1632.5 (4.15)
β90 1949.9 (4.34) 1975.9 (6.03) 2039.6 (6.13) 2145.9 (5.61)
β91 1767.7 (4.36) 1794.6 (5.67) 1853.3 (5.77) 1955.9 (5.28)
θProd -28165 (-0.79) -31545 (-1.08) -33253 (-1.12) -31319 (-0.89)
θLobby 1.334 (2.07) 1.456 (2.79) 1.388 (2.61) — (—)
θLobby_Paris -1.775 (-0.89) -1.762 (-0.96) -1.914 (-1.03) — (—)
θParty 120.5 (1.98) 123.8 (2.11) — (—) 117.9 (2.01)
θTax -1126.8 (-0.44) -1473.5 (-0.71) -1906.4 (-0.91) 376.1 (0.16)
βParis 1971.0 (0.99) 1993.9 (1.07) 2100.6 (1.11) -30.7 (-0.11)
βNord91 2373.3 (9.85) 2422.1 (10.23) 2457.3 (10.19) 2373.3 (9.98)
βCentre86 90 708.5 (3.97) 779.1 (4.53) 771.4 (4.43) 636.9 (3.92)
AR(1) ρ2 0.783 0.718 0.720 0.785
Godfrey LM 1.250 0.661 0.647 0.985
Shapiro-WilkW 0.982 0.980 0.974 0.983
R2 0.8593 0.8586 0.8546 0.8483
System
Henze-Zirkler T 1.198 0.817 1.112 0.899
Estimated asymptotic t-values are given in parentheses
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Lagrange multiplier tests for non-linear regression models (Godfrey 1988, p. 117;
White, 1992). The test statistic has a critical value of 3.84 at a 5 percent level,
which implies acceptance of the AR(1) process for all our specifications (see Table
3.3). It is also comforting that normality of the error structure is accepted for both
single equation tests (Shapiro-Wilk) as well as for a system test (Henze-Zirkler)
for all specifications.
Table 3.3 reports three different specifications of the policy function, labelled
respectively (b), (c) and (d), depending on which lobbying variable is used. In
(b) both Nit and Di,t 1 are included together; in (c), only Nit, the number of large
establishments, is included; in (d), only Di,t 1, the partisan dummy, is included.
The estimated AR(1) parameters ρ1 and ρ2 are about 0.90 and 0.72 respectively.
Two preliminary remarks on Table 3.3’s results are in point. First, the pro-
portion of the variability in regional infrastructure investments explained by the
policy equation is high (the R2 is about 0.86), given that the equation includes
only Di,t 1 and three regional dummies as out-of-model explanatory variables.
Second, the reported parameter estimates turn out to be fairly robust across es-
timation procedures (OLS and FIML) as well as with respect to changes in the
lobbying variable. This remarkably good fit of the policy equation can also be
seen by a comparison of the actual values of transport infrastructure investment
from Table 3.4 with the predicted values from Table 3.5.
The results reported in Table 3.3 suggest that lobbying, as we proxy it, ex-
erts a statistically significant and quantitatively non-negligible influence on the
allocation of infrastructure investment across regions. Their primary interest
is qualitative—namely, that lobbying matters.14 Quantitative estimates are, of
course, sensitive to model specification (although the estimate of bθLOBBY proved
remarkably stable) but they nevertheless provide a rough estimate of the orders
of magnitude involved, and it is instructive to take a look at them, albeit a very
cautious one. Ceteris paribus, an additional “representative” large establishment
in a region brings that region 1.46 Francs of additional infrastructure investment
14We do not directly interpret θLOBBY, but the weight of lobbying by firms defined as a2 =
θLOBBY/αX . Statistical tests of the null hypothesis that a2 equals zero yield the following results:
Likelihood Ratio (LR) 5.86, Wald 2.90 and Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 4.90. These tests are dis-
tributed as χ2(1), thus at a 10 percent level the null hypothesis is rejected by all tests.
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Table 3.4: Infrastructure Investment Allocation Across Regions and Years
Actual Values of Transport Infrastructure Net Investment Per
Worker, 1985-1991, in 1992 Francs
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Alsace 1085 1454 1306 1708 1291 1685 1723
Aquitaine 688 1106 1090 1598 1533 1984 1496
Auvergne 613 1297 1543 2026 1949 2334 1358
Basse-Normandie 526 873 620 938 878 1402 1250
Bourgogne 529 944 1115 1665 1235 1697 1424
Bretagne 412 818 871 1432 1527 1904 1449
Centre 1357 2106 2613 3003 3492 3343 2373
Champagne-Ardenne 552 965 868 1281 1128 1892 2158
Charentes Franche-Comte 542 675 580 1052 836 1451 1074
Haute-Normandie 416 617 635 865 1127 1575 1662
Ile de France 455 834 1148 1621 1532 1730 1747
Languedoc-Roussilon 630 685 822 1391 1439 1735 1574
Limousin 981 1408 1515 1288 1407 1592 1432
Lorraine 1096 1086 860 1398 1232 1693 1681
Midi-Pyrenées 811 1074 1127 1342 1402 1864 1608
Nord-pas de Calais 863 1766 1367 1983 1790 2936 4934
Pays de la Loire 868 1017 1111 1560 1255 1243 995
Picardie 1504 1625 1896 1732 1433 1586 1499
Poitou 888 1294 1095 1500 1186 1693 1276
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 505 836 739 1189 1312 2077 2240
Rhône-Alpes 1086 1338 1602 2218 1739 2142 2486
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per worker each year; or, with an average of 1, 022, 000 workers, a total of 1.5
million francs for the representative region, a relatively small amount (the num-
ber of large establishments per region varies between 6 in Limousin and 113 in
Rhône-Alpes). A region with a president sharing the current national executive’s
political obedience will attract 123.8 Francs more of infrastructure investment per
worker than one having a president of the ’wrong’ obedience; for the average
region, this means an additional 126.5 million Francs, or 8.8 percent of average
infrastructure investment. Moreover, lobbying by firms having large establish-
ments in the region and the political orientation of the region’s president slightly
reinforce each other, as expected from our two-stage lobbying model whereby
firms first approach local politicians, who then take up their demands to the rel-
evant Ministry. Abundant anecdotal evidence15 suggests that our results do cap-
ture a phenomenon widely perceived as important. Several caveats are in point,
however. First, in the model of section 2, lobbying comes from users of transport
infrastructure, whereas in reality, the construction industry itself is one of the
most active lobbyists as far as new highway construction projects are concerned.
But the construction industry is composed of a few giants such as Bouygues for
whom location across regions is irrelevant, and a host of small firms many of
which are below our cutoff of 500 employees (a construction lobbyist recently
boasted that the industry association has “52,000members, practically one in each
commune”).16 This type of lobbying activity is not or only imperfectly picked up
in our framework. Second, region presidents are not the only local politicians in-
volved; members of parliament are also important relays of local lobbying pres-
sure.
If the positive results concerning lobbying activity were to be expected—
although perhaps not as clear-cut as they turned out to be—the insignificance
of the productivity term, which picks up the government’s concern to allocate in-
15See for instance the cover story of the magazine Capital (June 18, 1998) entitled “100 lobbies
qui font la loi en France”; in particular pp 92–ff. According to the magazine, the construction in-
dustry is a major political-campaign contributor and a powerful force behind highway construc-
tion projects, although lobbying by French firms is expected to decline as a result of a Brussels
directive imposing open bidding procedures (and therefore diluting the return to lobbying).
16Capital, 18 June 1998, p. 92.
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frastructure investments to where their marginal product is highest (and to foster
regional convergence, since the postulated functional form is concave), is more
puzzling.17 Although it is certainly possible that the government simply doesn’t
care about the efficient allocation of resources, this conclusion is probably a strong
one to draw from such limited evidence and given the scope for misspecification
in a simple political-economy model. Moreover, the variety of state-aid schemes
aimed at fostering stronger growth in backward regions suggests that European
governments, including the French one, do care about convergence—unless, of
course, these state-aid schemes are themselves driven by lobbying forces. An ob-
vious alternative for the square-root form used in the first term of the functionU,
namely a log form, gave very similar results. A convex form, being implausible
since implying preference for divergence, was also tried with inconclusive re-
sults. It is therefore fair to say that, as far as this study is concerned, government
objectives in the allocation of transport infrastructure investment are unclear once
lobbying is controlled for.
Production-function estimates are significant and have the expected sign.
Constant returns to scale are not rejected. The estimated elasticity bαK of private
capital is 0.181 and that of infrastructure bαX is 0.101; both estimates are signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level, and remarkably stable across estimation procedures:
the OLS infrastructure elasticity estimate is about 0.099, suggesting, as noted in
the introduction, that the simultaneous-equation bias from OLS estimation of
the production function is negligible. Our estimate of the infrastructure share
is much lower than Aschauer’s (1989) estimate on US aggregate data (0.39) but
the two are not directly comparable since Aschauer’s infrastructure variable was
a broad aggregate of public capital whereas ours is limited to transport infras-
tructure. Munnell’s (1990) estimate, which was more directly comparable to ours
in that she used state-level data, was 0.14, whereas de la Fuente and Vives’ (1995)
estimate on Spanish regional data was somewhat higher than ours. Although
plausible, our estimate should nevertheless be interpreted cautiously, as bαX, in all
17As before, we do not directly interpret θPROD, but the weight of productivity concerns by the
governments defined as a1 = θPROD/αX . Statistical tests of the null hypothesis that a1 equals zero
are not rejected at a 10 percent level by the Likelihood Ratio, Wald and Lagrange Multiplier tests.
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likelihood, picks up not only the supply-side effects of infrastructure investments
(what it is meant to measure) but also their demand-side or Keynesian effects; it is
in fact possible that the latter dominates the former. Moreover, a common draw-
back of the production-function approach is that it takes the private capital stock
as fixed, which can be a valid approximation of reality only in the short run (see
de la Fuente and Vives, 1995, for a discussion and alternative formulation); the
same is true of employment, although inter-regional labour mobility is arguably
a lesser problem than interregional capital mobility. Thus, our estimates are best
construed as short-term ones. Finally, we have not included human capital for
lack of reliable data; although this is, in general, a potentially serious omission,
systematic cross-regional variation in educational levels also may not be a serious
a problem given France’s relatively egalitarian education system.
As the rates of return on infrastructure capital implied by production-function
estimates have been a subject of intense debate in the US (see e.g. Office, 1988, or
Gramlich, 1994), it is instructive to calculate the rates of return implied by our
estimates for private and infrastructure capital. Let rK be the rate of return on
private capital; in a competitive environment the unconstrained demand for pri-
vate capital is given by rK = bαKQ/K. Assuming that the short-run stock of private
capital is at its long-run equilibrium level and using national aggregates of Q and
K averaged over our sample period, the implied rate of return is 0.156, which
is lower than estimates from US data (see e.g. Munnell, 1990b) but nevertheless
plausible. As for infrastructure, the implied rate of return, using again national
aggregates averaged time-wise, is rX = bαXQ/X = 0.522; this is slightly higher
than the upper bound of the range of values reported by the US Congressional
Budget Office, which vary between 0.35 for highway maintenance projects and
0.05 for new rural highway projects (see Gramlich, 1994, Table 4). Thus, the high
rate of return on infrastructure capital implied by our elasticity estimate suggests
that in France’s case there is some ground to the claim that, overall, transport
infrastructure is underprovided; in fact, using our elasticity estimates, the value
of the infrastructure stock that would bring its rate of return down to the rate of
return on private capital would be 115, 221 Francs per worker, or 2.3 times the
current one. However, the difference in rates of return between private and in-
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Table 3.5: Predicted Values
Predicted Values of Transport Infrastructure Allocation
from Table 3.3 (b), in 1992 Francs
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Alsace 772 1318 1410 1726 1549 1766 1566
Aquitaine 847 1042 1142 1451 1471 1886 1750
Auvergne 676 941 1254 1752 1743 2165 1987
Basse-Normandie 572 864 916 1182 981 1402 1317
Bourgogne 848 945 1030 1470 1537 1705 1551
Bretagne 595 791 867 1358 1343 1870 1676
Centre 808 2306 2073 2876 2757 3548 2188
Champagne-Ardenne 725 910 1026 1376 1246 1614 1684
Charentes Franche-Comte 471 839 756 1115 1033 1335 1320
Haute-Normandie 796 835 784 1223 953 1636 1461
Ile de France 504 810 930 1588 1521 1926 1754
Languedoc-Roussilon 770 971 828 1244 1292 1811 1552
Limousin 651 1201 1328 1592 1168 1979 1465
Lorraine 818 1333 1132 1426 1367 1706 1567
Midi-Pyrenées 784 1105 1133 1483 1261 1787 1645
Nord-pas de Calais 1116 1225 1702 1582 1762 2350 4934
Pays de la Loire 821 1188 1055 1593 1485 1735 1232
Picardie 935 1639 1550 2055 1586 1813 1487
Poitou 807 1171 1278 1453 1396 1620 1536
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 878 908 976 1210 1171 1740 1823
Rhône-Alpes 1216 1474 1354 2039 2101 2165 1944
Essay 3. A Political EconomyModel of Infrastructure Allocation 91
frastructure capital should not be overplayed, as rates of return are very sensitive
to elasticity estimates, which are themselves fairly imprecise.18 Moreover, France
was, during our sample period, in the middle of a major effort of transport infras-
tructure construction, both for highways and for high-speed railway lines. The
picture might be different a decade later.
Table 3.6: Simulated Solution Values
Actual, Predicted & Optimal Values of Transport
Infrastructure Net Investment Allocation,
Averages of Years 1985-1991, in 1992 Francs
Actual Predicted Method I Method II
Alsace 1465 1444 1299 2077
Aquitaine 1356 1370 1275 2492
Auvergne 1589 1503 1464 2783
Basse-Normandie 927 1034 983 2586
Bourgogne 1230 1298 1205 2535
Bretagne 1202 1214 1150 2831
Centre 2613 2365 2266 3564
Champagne-Ardenne 1264 1226 1168 2542
Charentes Franche-Comte 887 982 982 2688
Haute-Normandie 985 1098 1020 2354
Ile de France 1295 1290 1968 3744
Languedoc-Roussilon 1183 1210 1169 2587
Limousin 1375 1341 1299 3005
Lorraine 1292 1336 1244 2575
Midi-Pyrenées 1318 1314 1214 3269
Nord-pas de Calais 2234 2096 1933 3261
Pays de la Loire 1150 1301 1171 3088
Picardie 1611 1581 1480 2991
Poitou 1276 1323 1241 3045
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 1271 1244 1179 2452
Rhône-Alpes 1802 1756 1524 2949
18In fact, the difference between rX and rK is statistically not significant at a 10 percent level.
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Pork barrel (of which we found evidence) distorts not only the overall level of
infrastructure investments, but also their spatial allocation. In order to assess the
size of these distortions, we perform two experiments. In the first, we calculate
predicted optimal values of infrastructure investments, zˆ0it, using the estimated
coefficients of the policy function’s “non-lobbying” terms. That is,
zˆ0it = βˆt + θˆPRODq
1/2
it /xi,t 1 + βˆNORD DNord + βˆPARIS DParis + βˆCENTRE DCentre.
(3.21)
The resulting values of zˆ0it are reported in the second column of Table 3.6. The
major drawback of this approach is that θˆPROD is a very imprecise estimate (in-
deed, not significantly different from zero). Thus, in the second experiment, us-
ing the fact that the infrastructure stock is 0.43 times what it would take to bring
its rate of return down to the rate of return on private capital (15.6 percent),
we simply assume that the aggregate (nationwide) level of predicted invest-
ment is also 0.43 times its optimal value when averaged over the sample period;
i.e. ∑t ∑i zˆit = 0.43∑t∑i zit, and solve the equation
2.3∑
t
∑
i
zˆit = n∑
t
βˆt + θ∑
t
∑
i
(q1/2it /xi,t 1) (3.22)
+∑
t
(βˆNORD DNord + βˆPARIS DParis + βˆCENTRE DCentre),
for the unknown parameter θ. The solution θ˜ of (3.22) is then used in place of
θˆPROD in (3.21) to recalculate optimal regional investments. The resulting values
are reported in the third column of Table 3.6.
Whereas the coefficient of variation of actual investments (averaged over
time) is 45 percent , the coefficient of variation of optimal investments is 45.2 per-
cent according to method 1 but only 33.8 percent according to method 2. Thus,
our experiment suggests that a least a part of the observed cross-regional vari-
ability in infrastructure investments comes from pork-barrel terms. The reason
for this is apparent: the optimal investment rule calls for equalisation of the term
αXq1/2it /xit(after adjustment with regional dummies); as long as output per head
(qit) and the infrastructure stock per head (xit) do not vary too much, the optimal
allocation is nearly uniform. This result has an important practical consequence:
whenever political distortions to the allocation of infrastructure are a source of
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concern—as they are in our sample—the uniform rule, which is simple to admin-
ister and monitor, is a good rule of thumb. Of course, there is a caveat; namely
that if the ratio q1/2it /xit does not vary excessively in an industrial country with
a large existing infrastructure stock, the same is not necessarily true in develop-
ing countries with patchy infrastructure stocks, where the uniform rule could be
misleading.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
The primary interest of our results is that they highlight the importance of the
pork-barrel dimension of policy-making, suggesting that explicit modelling of the
political-economy processes driving economic-policy decisions is interesting in
its own right, irrespective of whether its omission would or would not introduce
a simultaneity bias in regressions where policy variables are treated as exoge-
nous. Commenting on the high rates of return on infrastructure investments esti-
mated by Aschauer, Gramlich (1994) remarked, “If public investment really were
as profitable as claimed, would not private investors be clamouring to have the
public sector impose taxes or float bonds to build roads, highways, and sewers to
generate these high net benefits? [...] Very little such pressure seems to have been
observed, even when the implied econometric rates of return were allegedly very
high” (p. 1187). We find that, in the absence of a loud clamour, the quiet whisper
of lobbies can, indeed, be heard. The interest of our political-economy approach
is that it can provide indications—however rough—both on the departure of pol-
icy from the social optimum and on the extent of special-interest influence. As
far as policy implications are concerned, our results contain good news and bad
news. The bad news is that influence activities appear to be significant drivers of
infrastructure-investment decisions, whereas non-lobbying governmental objec-
tives, if any, are unclear. The good news, however, is that the resulting distortions
appear to be relatively minor. First, feedback effects on production-function esti-
mates are weak, and the marginal product of infrastructure capital does not vary
tremendously across regions, so that departures from the first-best allocation of
infrastructure across regions are fairly inconsequential. Second, in rich industrial
Essay 3. A Political EconomyModel of Infrastructure Allocation 94
countries, transport infrastructure investments are small compared to the level of
the existing stocks, so that political distortions in the amounts and spatial alloca-
tion of investments are unlikely to make themselves felt on GDP before a while.
But one should not be excessively optimistic about this. First, if investment deci-
sion have always been made on the basis of pork-barrel politics, the stock levels
should themselves be severely distorted. So our results beg the question: when
did things start getting seriously bad? In France’s case, the answer seems to be
fairly recently. The conventional wisdom among political scientists is that corrup-
tion has vastly expanded in the 1980s, largely as a result of administrative reforms
enacted in 1982 (see e.g. Mény, 1992; Borraz and Worms, 1996; or Service Cen-
tral de Prevention de la Corruption, 1994).19 Second, if pork barrel is prevalent
in infrastructure-investment decisions (although de la Fuente and Vives (1995)
found little trace of political influence in Spanish infrastructure investment deci-
sions), developing countries are likely to be less robust to the ensuing distortions
simply because the stocks are so much smaller relative to the investments. Under
such conditions, political distortions in the allocation mechanisms are unlikely to
be innocuous.
If, as our positive analysis suggests, political distortions ought to be taken se-
riously, at least in the long run, one should be able to offer normative guidance
for the design of rules or institutions that could mitigate those distortions. The
second interesting aspect of our results is that they provide just such a rule. Given
our functional forms (alternative ones give similar rules) the first-best allocation
of infrastructure equalises the term αXq1/2it /xit across regions. Provided that nei-
ther productivity levels (qit) nor infrastructure stocks per worker (xit) vary too
much across regions (our data suggests that they don’t), uniform allocation is a
good enough rule of thumb. Even if the ratio varies, it is not a very difficult one
to compute, so the more sophisticated rule is itself not excessively demanding.
Of course, if the rule is clear, how it should be implemented is not as clear, since
rational politicians are unlikely to abide by a rule. What mixture of centralised
vs. decentralised decision-making is least conducive to pork barrel is a question
19We are grateful to Jean-Louis Briquet, from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, for a
useful conversation on this and for attracting our attention to the relevant political-science work.
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that we leave open; only careful international comparisons will shed light on it.
What is clear from our work is that France does not yet seem to have the answer.
Essay 4
Political Economy of Infrastructure
Investment Allocation: Evidence from a
Panel of Large German Cities
with
Achim Kemmerling
Abstract1
This essay applies a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribu-
tion of infrastructure accumulation to private production. A political economy model for
the allocation of public infrastructure investment grants is formulated. Our empirical
findings, using a panel of large German cities for the years 1980, 1986, and 1988, sug-
gest that cities ruled by a council sharing the State (‘Bundesland’) government’s current
political affiliation were particularly successful in attracting infrastructure investment
grants. With regard to the contribution of infrastructure accumulation to growth, we
find that public capital is a significant factor for private production. Moreover, at least for
the sample studied, we find that simultaneity between output and public capital is weak;
thus, feedback effects from output to infrastructure are negligible.
1A revised version of this essay is forthcoming in Public Choice, 2002
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4.1 Introduction
This essay examines the role of public capital in private production and pro-
vides empirical evidence on the political-economy determinants of the allocation
of public infrastructure investments. From this perspective, our study links the
literature on the productivity effects of infrastructure with the literature on the
political-economy of fiscal federalism.
Since Aschauer published an influential series of papers (1988; 1989a; 1989b;
1989c) about the effects of public infrastructure investment for long-run growth
and productivity in the U.S. and other major countries, there has been an on-
going debate about the role of public infrastructure in generating national wel-
fare. Aschauer (1989a), for example, using a production function approach with
aggregate time-series data for the U.S. from 1949 to 1985, found that the elasticity
of output with respect to a broad measure of public infrastructure was signifi-
cant and of a remarkable magnitude. At a time of widespread concern about the
slowdown of U.S. productivity growth in the 1970’s and 1980’s this finding sug-
gested that the general decline in public infrastructure spending in the U.S. since
the 1970’s could at least partly explain the observed slowdown in productivity
growth.
However, the magnitude of the estimated elasticity of infrastructure capital in
Aschauer (1989a; 1989b; 1995) and other studies (Garcia-Milà and McGuire, 1992;
Munnell, 1990a; Munnell, 1990c; Munnell, 1992; Munnell, 1993) is still a matter of
discussion (for an overview, see Gramlich, 1994). The main focus of the so-called
‘infrastructure’ debate is on the interpretation of results and the appropriate em-
pirical methodology (Aaron, 1990; Holtz-Eakin, 1994). For example, it is argued
that the direction of causation is unclear, i.e., whether causality runs from infras-
tructure to output or from output to infrastructure (Tatom, 1991a; Tatom, 1993a).
In order to address the problem of causality econometrically several studies have
suggested simultaneous-equation-approaches with public infrastructure invest-
ment as an endogenous variable (e.g., Cadot, Röller and Stephan, 1999; Duffy-
Deno and Eberts, 1991; de Frutos and Pereira, 1993).
Similar to Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1991) or Crihfield and Pangebean (1995)
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our study estimates the contribution of public capital to private production at the
local level. This approach seems to be justified by the fact that about 60 percent
of public infrastructure is provided by local governments and not by the federal
or states governments (Seitz, 1995).
Infrastructure investments at the municipal level in Germany usually con-
sists of two parts: autonomous investment and matching investment grants from
higher-tier governments. The increasing weight of investment grants for the re-
alisation of local investment projects in Germany suggests to model both parts
(grants and autonomous investments) separately within our simultaneous equa-
tion approach. Whereas the former is a matter of decision for the municipal coun-
cils the latter is predominantly provided by the federal states (‘Bundesländer’).
The literature on the role of fiscal federalism for infrastructure policies so far
has mainly discussed optimal rules for the provision of infrastructure at different
levels of government (e.g., Hulten and Schwab, 1997). However, it remains an
open question whether infrastructure policies in reality are designed according
to such efficiency considerations. Therefore, the main contribution of our essay is
that we empirically shed light on other potential determinants of infrastructure
policies and test them against traditional efficiency arguments.
In this essay we adopt the approaches of Cadot, Röller and Stephan (1999) and
Crain andOakley (1995) in that we analyse the politics of infrastructure. What we
suppose as politico-economic determinants of local infrastructure investment de-
cisions are (i) ‘pork-barrel’ infrastructure policies due to the influence of firms on
the allocation of investments or (ii) distortions in allocation of intergovernmental
infrastructure investment grants due to the political affiliation of governments at
different levels (iii) distortions in allocation of investment grants due to the strate-
gical advantage of heavily contested constituencies (‘swing voter’ approach). All
in all, these potential influences may give rise to outcomes of local infrastructure
investment decisions that might depart substantially from an optimal allocation
as a result of maximising social welfare.
With our empirical model we test these different ideas on a panel data set
consisting of 87 German cities for the years 1980, 1986 and 1988. We use a simul-
taneous-equations approach to estimate the relationship between infrastructure
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investments, investment grants, local manufacturing output, policy and lobby-
ing variables. The main findings of our analysis are (i) the contribution of lo-
cal public capital to private production in cities is positive and significant (ii)
political affiliation, measured by the coincidence of party colour between state
and local government, is decisive in explaining the distribution of investment
grants across cities (iii) cities with a prevalence of ‘marginal voters’ do neither
spend more on public infrastructure nor receive more investment grants from
higher-tier governments (v) the larger the majority of government in city council
the higher is local infrastructure spending (vi) investment grants do not induce
higher autonomous infrastructure spending of cities, i.e. there is no evidence of
a complementary relationship between matching investment grants and infras-
tructure spending (vii) efficiency considerations do not seem to determine the
observed intergovernmental grant allocation across cities whereas redistributive
concerns of higher-tier governments matter.
The remainder of this essay is organised as follows: In section 4.2, we discuss
the determinants of local infrastructure policies in Germany. Section 4.3 elabo-
rates the hypotheses and presents the structure of the empirical model. Section
4.4 describes the empirical implementation and reports estimation results. Sec-
tion 4.5 provides conclusions.
4.2 Determinants of Local infrastructure policies in
Germany
The resources for infrastructure investments in Germany are usually by means
of mixed financing between two or more levels of German governments. There
are two different financial sources for infrastructure investments: autonomous
investments by municipalities and investment grants2 provided by other insti-
tutions, the central government (‘Bund’), the states (‘Bundesländer’) the ERP or
horizontal fiscal exchange mechanisms.
2These grants or subsidies from higher levels are called ‘Finanzzuweisungen’ (financial as-
signments). One major example in the infrastructure context are GVFG-funds that were created
to promote transportation infrastructure.
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The majority of investment grants from states to municipalities takes the form
of matching funds. Nevertheless, fixedmatching ratios between state level grants
and local investments are rarely found as a result of planning problems and
changing investment costs (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1986).
The procedure of starting a new infrastructure investment project is a com-
plex arrangement between the local government, which makes proposal in the
first stage of the project planning, and the state administration that grants an
investment subsidy. Because of the growing fiscal tension in the local budgets
(e.g. Pohlan, 1997), the role of investment subsidies in Germany has risen all over
the 1980’s.3 In 1980 the ratio between investment subsidies from the federal gov-
ernment (‘Bund’), states and the ERP to total investment in transport infrastruc-
ture was about 24 percent whereas in 1988 this ratio had risen to 46 percent. The
municipalities’ dependency on investment grants makes it also difficult for them
to plan investment projects autonomously. A first reason is the overall increase
of insecurity in the planning process, as local decision-makers cannot anticipate
the correct amount of future transfer payments (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1986,
p. 913).
On the one hand, mixed financing of local infrastructure project is usually jus-
tified as ameans of internalising positive externalities from infrastructure projects
(e.g., Oates, 1999). On the other hand, the political cost of mixed financing of in-
frastructure projects is that local political autonomy is undermined. An example
might illustrate this point: Schmals and Siewert (1982) elaborates a case study
about public transportation in Munich in the 1970’s. Two alternative plans to im-
prove public transportation existed. The first plan proposed the construction of
a network of underground railways to alleviate inner-city traffic. The majority of
city council members favoured this project. The construction and improvement
of a municipal railway system, the second proposal, was backed by Bavarian
government. Because the Bavarian government linked an investment grant with
the realisation of the second project, the city council had to give in. Thus, in this
3There are, of course, alternative views which state that the growing dependence on invest-
ment grants is endogenous to institutional change (Inman, 1988, p. 56). But the overwhelming
part of literature on German fiscal federalism insists on the growing dependency of lower level
governments on grants.
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case investment grant prospects had a decisive impact on the bargaining power
between the two governmental levels.
The amount of investment subsidies granted to local infrastructure projects
formally depends on such external factors e.g. as length of the existing road in-
frastructure, expected impacts on the local economy, environmental effects, etc.
But as Garlichs (1986) shows for the case of infrastructure funds for highways,
the actual amount of money is a matter of intense bargaining between all lower
level governments and the higher level. An iron quotas system, which is more
than often in German politics the result of bargaining processes or of even legally
settled principles such as unanimity, is likely to create further distortions.
The assumption of a simple (Westminster) representative democracy is
severely violated in the German case. One of the reasons for this is the peculiar
nature of German federalism which has been characterised in the literature as
‘unitary federal state’. In Germany spheres of competence and control as well as
the financing of investments is not as separated as it is for example in the case of
the U.S. federalism but it is overlapping and mutually dependent. Therefore, al-
though the states (’Bundesländer’) and the municipalities and autonomous cities
are exclusively responsible for the main part of public infrastructure in a formal
sense, investment projects also depend on the amount of public subsidies that
either come from the federal government, the states or from the European Union.
Moreover, German federalism is constitutionally obliged to balance local au-
tonomy and the uniformity of living conditions throughout the German territory.
Humplick and Moini-Araghi (1996) argue that this often results in a less efficient
provision of public infrastructure. As they put it ‘the equity objective overrides
the efficiency objective’ (Humplick and Moini-Araghi, 1996, p. 32). These obli-
gations of German federalism create the need for a network of horizontal and
vertical bargaining institutions that are coordinating the interests of the several
governmental levels.
In our political-economy framework we explicitly test political variables that
might influence the allocation of investment subsidies. We argue that because
of the complex federal system which can be described by the notion of ‘inter-
twined politics’ it is likely that those local governments whose political ‘colour’
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corresponds to that of the state (‘Bundesland’) government get more investment
subsidies, because this lowers the transaction costs of information transmission
between governments. The identity of political colour shortcuts this bargaining
process and favours certain municipalities by means of party loyalty.
4.3 Hypotheses and structure of the model
Our simultaneous equation model is based on 3 equations, which we label as (i)
production function Qit = f (), (ii) infrastructure investment function INVit = f ()
and (iii) grant allocation function GRANTit = f ().
4.3.1 Production function
To begin with the specification of the production function, we assume that pro-
duction Qit of the manufacturing sector can be described as
Qit = f (t,Kit, Lit,Git), i = 1 . . .N, t = 1 . . . T, (4.1)
where t denotes time, Qit output, Kit private capital, Lit labour input and Git
denotes the infrastructure stock in city i. In addition, city i’s infrastructure stock
Git is defined as
Git = (1  γ)Gi,t 1 + INVit + GRANTit , (4.2)
where γ denotes the depreciation rate of public capital, INVit denotes infrastruc-
ture investment, and GRANTit denotes infrastructure investment grants given to
city i from higher-tier governments. Therefore, total infrastructure investment in
city i is defined as INVit + GRANTit.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas functional form for the manufacturing sector’s
production function in city i at time t we get
Qit = A0 exp(αtt) L
αL
it K
αK
it G
αG
it , (4.3)
where αX denotes the elasticity of output Q with respect to input X, and X 2
fL,K,Gg. Dividing by Lit, (4.3) becomes
qit = A0 exp(αtt) k
αK
it g
αG
it L
α˜L
it , (4.4)
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where lower-case capitals denote variables in terms of the labour input L and α˜L
is defined as α˜L = αL + αK + αG   1.
Note that α˜L will equal zero if returns to scale are constant with respect to all
inputs, i.e., L, K and G; and α˜L   αG will equal zero if returns to scale are constant
with respect to private inputs L and K.
4.3.2 Infrastructure investment function
The increasing weight of investment grants for the realisation of infrastructure
projects suggests to model both parts (grants and autonomous investments) sep-
arately within our simultaneous equation approach. Accordingly, to describe the
simultaneous determination of investments and grants properly, besides the local
production function our model is based on two additional equations: one which
describes autonomous investment decisions of the cities and one which describes
the level of investment grants the cities receive from higher-tier governments.
Furthermore, autonomous investments enter the grants equation and, vice versa,
grants enter the investment equation.
Our hypotheses regarding the determinants of city’s autonomous infrastruc-
ture spending can be summarised as follows. The first hypothesis we are able
to test with our model is with regard to the relationship between grants and
autonomous investments. Though the major part of grants a city in Germany
receives is matching funds it nevertheless is an open question whether these
matching grants have a complementary, substitutive or neutral relation to the
autonomously financed infrastructure investments of cities.
The reason is that even in the case of matching grants the relationship between
grants and investment is not necessarily positive and therefore complementary,
since the local government can reduce its own efforts on financing infrastructure
projects by taking into account the amount of grants it will receive for a project
from higher-tier governments.
Accordingly, grants and autonomous infrastructure spending is only comple-
mentary if grants do not lead to a reduction of financing efforts by local govern-
ments. Therefore, if the relationship between grants and investments is comple-
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mentary a local government which receives grants will autonomously financemore
infrastructure projects than a government which does not receive any grants.
On the other hand, if local governments plan their infrastructure projects irre-
spective on the amount of future matching grants, then the relationship between
autonomous spending and grants can be labelled as neutral. This implies that
the local government will neither reduce nor increase its own financing efforts
when anticipating the matching grants it receives. Consequently, the local gov-
ernment’s own financing efforts are independent from the amount of matching
grants.
The second hypothesis we test with our framework is that local infrastructure
spending should also reflect the preferences of a city’s residents. For instance
cities with relatively more cars are likely to spend more on transport infrastruc-
ture.
The third hypothesis we test is whether a local government’s spending on in-
frastructure is more responsive to increases in intergovernmental grant receipts
than it is to increases in own city’s tax revenues. The regularly finding of various
previous studies on this topic is that local government’s spending is more re-
sponsive to intergovernmental grant receipts has been dubbed in literature as the
‘flypaper effect’–money sticks where it hits (e.g. Oates, 1999; Oulasvirta, 1997).
Moreover, following an idea proposed by Cadot et al. (1999) we test the hy-
pothesis that the number of manufacturing firms is decisive for local infrastruc-
ture spending. The main motivation for this presumption is that particularly
manufacturing firms have sunk investments and therefore have a vested inter-
est in the quality and maintenance of the infrastructure where they have their
production located. Local politicians—on the other hand—are assumed to be
sensitive for the lobbying efforts by business, for instance in anticipation of po-
tential campaign contributions from firms, or in anticipation of the expected loss
of trade tax revenues and/or employment opportunities for their city if firms
move to another location.
The fifth hypothesis regarding determinants of local infrastructure investment
is the role of the stability of the government majority in the city council. If local
governments want to buy the support of the local swing voters, one would expect
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that the smaller its majority in the city council the larger is its spending on local
infrastructure projects.
Finally, the sixth hypothesis we test is the presumption that local governments
might take the expected productivity effects of infrastructure spending on the lo-
cal industry into account. Because of this, if local politicians indeed care about the
efficiency of infrastructure projects we would observe a positive effect from the
expected productivity effect of these infrastructure projects on actual the amount
of infrastructure spending. Hence if expected productivity effect is higher in a
given city spending of the local government should be higher as well.
4.3.3 Grant allocation function
The first hypothesis we can test with our model is the empirical relevance of
the traditional main topic on intergovernmental grant allocation, i.e. the ques-
tion whether or not grant allocation polices are based on efficiency and/or equity
criteria. Accordingly, we include in our model both a measure for expected pro-
ductivity effects from infrastructure projects (efficiency) as well as income as a
measure for redistributive concerns (equity).
However, a recent strand of literature discusses alternative politico-economic
influences on the intergovernmental grant distribution. For instance, Grossman
(1994) hypothesizes that the distribution of grants is driven by the self-interest of
grant givers. The assumption is that politicians from higher-level governments
are likely to allocate grants for the purpose of enhancing their reelection chances.
In the words of Grossman higher governmental level politicians uses grants to
‘purchase political capital’ to be used to influence the voting decisions of the local
residents.
Accordingly, the second hypothesis we test with our model is that party af-
filiation between higher and lower-tier governments matters for the outcome of
grant allocation. Grossman (1994) states that the political capital is of higher value
to grant-givers if the party affiliation with grant-receivers is the same. However,
in the specific case of German cities, our interpretation why party affiliation mat-
ters for grant-givers is that the identity of political colour shortcuts the bargaining
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process between lower and higher-tier governments and thereby favours certain
municipalities by means of party loyalty.
Recently, it has also been suggested in the literature that grants are used as tac-
tical (electoral politics) instruments for buying support of marginal voters (‘swing
voter’ approach, e.g. Dixit and Londregan, 1998; Johansson, 1999). Using this
framework, the third hypothesis we test is that cities will receive more grants if
they are politically powerful, i.e. if there is a large number of voters who are in-
different between the two parties and therefore potentially could be influenced
by pork barrel politics. Following Johansson we proxy political powerfulness as
closeness between the major two blocks, Social Democrats (SPD) and Christian
Democratic Union (CDU), in the last election for the city council. Hence, we ex-
pect that if there is evidence of political powerfulness as a determinant for the
distribution of grants, the closer the last election results between the two major
blocks, the larger the amount of grants a city receives from higher-tier govern-
ments.
Finally, the fourth hypothesis we test is that the number of manufacturing
firms is decisive for grant-givers when allocating grants across regions. The rea-
son is again the expectation that also higher-tier governments are sensitive to
business interests. If business interests indeed matter for the outcome of infras-
tructure policies, then a priori it is not clear at which level of government lobby-
ing by firms or business associations takes place. For this reason the number of
manufacturing firms is included both in the investment and the grant allocation
function.
4.4 Empirical implementation
4.4.1 Data
We use a panel data set consisting of 87 German cities and three years (1980, 1986,
1988). Table 4.1 provides a brief overview of the variables used in the analysis.
Most of the data is taken from the ‘Statistical Yearbook of German Cities
and Municipalities’.4 For reasons of data availability only 87 large cities are in-
4Original title: ‘Statistisches Jahrbuch der Städte und Gemeinden’.
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Table 4.1: Variable Description and Cities
Variable Description
Q Value added, manufacturing sector, million 1980 DM
L Hours worked in manufacturing sector, million hours
K Capital stock in manufacturing, million 1980 DM (from Deitmar, 1993)
G Public infrastructure stock, million 1980 DM, (from Seitz, 1995)
INV Public infrastructure investment, million 1980 DM
GRANT Infrastructure investment grants, million 1980 DM
DEBT Total debt of city, million 1980 DM
TAX Trade tax (‘Gewerbesteuer’) revenues of city i, million 1980 DM
CARS Number of registered motor verhicles (business and private)
NFIRMS Number of manufacturing firms in city i
DMIN Dummy variable equal to 1 when mining industry
is present in city i
PARTISAN Percentage of members in city council with the same political
affiliation as the federal state (‘Bundesland’) government
MAJORITY Percentage difference of the 2 large parties SPD (Social
Democrats ) and CDU (Christian Democratic Union) in last
city council election, values rank transformed from 1
(largest) to 261 (smallest difference)
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cluded in the sample. All of these cities are predominantly self-administered (au-
tonomous) at the local level (‘kreisfreie Städte’). Because of this, from the fiscal
federalism perspective, these cities are highly comparable. Table 4.2 displays the
names of cities in our sample.
Output (Q), measured as gross value added of a city’s manufacturing sector,5
is taken from a joint publication of several German federal states statistical of-
fices.6 These data are not available for each year, which restricts our sample to
three years, 1980, 1986, and 1988.
The private capital stock (K) of the manufacturing sector is taken from Deit-
mar (1993). It is measured in 1980 prices and has been corrected for the territorial
reforms that occurred in the 1970’s in Germany.7 The infrastructure capital stock
(G), which includes investments both for construction and equipments, is taken
from Seitz (1994) and is also measured in 1980 prices. Transport infrastructure
is the largest part (about 30 percent) of local infrastructure (Bach, Gorning, Stille
and Voigt, 1994).
Annual investment in infrastructure (INV) has been obtained from the statis-
tical yearbook mentioned above. From the same source we have also the follow-
ing variables: labour input (L), operationalised by the number of working hours
in the manufacturing sector; special grant-in-aids (‘Finanzzuweisungen’) for in-
vestments (GRANT) from ‘Bundesländer’, ‘Bund’ or ERP; several measures of
the financial situation of a city like the cumulated debt (DEBT) or trade taxes
revenues (TAX) which are levied at the local level of cities, the number of (four-
wheel) motor vehicles (private and business) (CARS), and the number of manu-
facturing firms (NFIRMS) in a city.
Furthermore, we constructed a political variable denoted as PARTISAN to
measure the congruence between the local city government and the state (‘Bun-
desland’) government. It gives the percentage of seats in the city council with
the same political affiliation as the ‘Bundesland’ government where the city is lo-
5This includes also the mining industries.
6‘Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder, Bruttowertschöpfung der kreisfreien
Städte, der Landkreise und der Arbeitsmarktregionen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, Heft
26, Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg, 1995.
7For further details, see Deitmar (1993).
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Table 4.2: Cities in Panel
Cities in Panel
1 Aachen 30 Hamm 59 Neustadt/Weinstraße
2 Amberg 31 Hannover 60 Nürnberg
3 Ansbach 32 Heidelberg 61 Oberhausen
4 Aschaffenburg 33 Heilbronn 62 Offenbach/Main
5 Augsburg 34 Herne 63 Oldenburg
6 Baden-Baden 35 Hof 64 Osnabrück
7 Bamberg 36 Ingolstadt 65 Passau
8 Bayreuth 37 Kaiserslautern 66 Pforzheim
9 Bielefeld 38 Karlsruhe 67 Pirmasens
10 Bochum 39 Kassel 68 Regensburg
11 Bonn 40 Kaufbeuren 69 Remscheid
12 Bottrop 41 Kempten/Allgäu 70 Rosenheim
13 Braunschweig 42 Kiel 71 Saarbrücken
14 Coburg 43 Koblenz 72 Salzgitter
15 Darmstadt 44 Köln 73 Schwabach
16 Delmenhorst 45 Krefeld 74 Schweinfurt
17 Dortmund 46 Landau/Pfalz 75 Solingen
18 Duisburg 47 Landshut 76 Speyer
19 Düsseldorf 48 Leverkusen 77 Straubing
20 Erlangen 49 Lübeck 78 Stuttgart
21 Essen 50 Ludwigshafen 79 Trier
22 Flensburg 51 Mainz 80 Ulm
23 Frankenthal/Pfalz 52 Mannheim 81 Weiden/Oberpfalz
24 Frankfurt/Main 53 Memmingen 82 Wiesbaden
25 Freiburg/Breisgau 54 Mönchengladbach 83 Wilhelmshaven
26 Fürth 55 Mülheim/Ruhr 84 Worms
27 Gelsenkirchen 56 München 85 Wuppertal
28 Göttingen 57 Münster/Westfalen 86 Würzburg
29 Hagen 58 Neumünster 87 Zweibrücken
Essay 4. Political Economy of Infrastructure: Evidence from Large German cities 110
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable Mean Std.Dev. C.V. Minimum Maximum
Q 2099.1 2500.3 119.1 144.3 15718.8
G 2468.8 2834.5 114.8 302.5 18176.1
K 4087.7 5007.6 122.5 252.0 25714.9
L 30.74 29.08 94.6 2.4 168.2
INV 93.6 123.8 132.3 8.1 1040.4
GRANT 32.8 44.7 136.3 0.8 266.1
DEBT 407.9 509.1 124.8 14.3 3066.7
TAX 135.6 210.4 155.2 7.1 1314.6
CARS 88921 91046 102.4 14845 635888
NFIRMS 124.0 101.1 81.5 21 637
DMINING 0.126 0.333 263.4 0 1
PARTISAN 45.9 8.0 17.5 29.0 68.2
MAJORITY 131 75.5 57.6 1 258.5
Total number of observations: 261
cated. All cities had at least one city council election during the period 1980 to
1987, some cities had also 2 city council elections in this period.
In a first step, the variable MAJORITY was constructed as percentage differ-
ence of the 2 major parties, which are parties SPD and CDU in Germany, from
the results of last city council election. In a second step, in order to smooth the
highly skewed distribution of this variable and also tomake it less correlated with
the variable PARTISAN 8 a simple monotonic rank transformation has been per-
formed which assigns the variable MAJORITY rank numbers from 1 for the ob-
servation with smallest to number 261 for the observation with largest difference
in majority.
Table 4.3 displays descriptive statistics of the variables. Note, for instance
that grants are on average about one-third of autonomous investments. Annual
infrastructure investment undertaken by cities is on average about 3.8 percent of
the existing infrastructure capital stock. The mining industry is present in about
13 percent of cities in our sample. The partisan variable is on average 45.9 percent,
8The correlation between MAJORITY without and MAJORITY with rank transformation is
-0.97. The correlation between MAJORITY without rank transformation and PARTY is 0.47, the
correlation between MAJORITY with rank transformation and PARTY is -0.40.
Essay 4. Political Economy of Infrastructure: Evidence from Large German cities 111
with a minimum of 29.0 and a maximum of 68.2 percent.
Our simultaneous model is based on the following 3 equations for city i, i =
1, . . . ,N, in year t, t = 1980, 1986, 1988.
Production function (4.5)
lnQit/Lit = α0 + αBL + αt (+) αG ln((Gi,t 1 + INVit + GRANTit)/Lit)
(+) αK ln(Kit/Lit) + α˜L ln(Lit) + αMININGDMINi + u1it,
Local autonomous investment function (4.6)
INVit/Lit = β0 + βBL + βt + βGRANTGRANTit/Lit + βNFIRMSNFIRMSit
(+) βMAJORMAJORITYit (+) βCARS/LCARSit/Lit
+ βG/LGi,t 1/Lit(+)βPRODαGQit/Gi,t 1 ( ) βDEBT/LDEBTit/Lit
(+) βTAX/LTAXit/Lit + βINCOMEQit/Lit + βMININGDMINi + u2it,
Grant allocation function (4.7)
GRANTit/Lit = γ0 + γBL + γt + γINV/L INVit/Lit (+) γSWINGVMAJORITYit
(+) γPARTISANPARTISANit ( ) γREDISTRIBQit/Lit
( ) βG/LGi,t 1/Lit (+) γPRODαGQit/Gi,t 1
(+) γNFIRMSNFIRMSit + γMININGDMINi + u3it.
Equation (4.5) refers to the production function of the manufacturing sector
in city i described in section 4.3.1. Equation (4.6) is derived from the hypothesis
discussed in section 4.3.2 and describes the autonomous infrastructure invest-
ments undertaken by city i. Equation (4.7) corresponds the hypotheses discussed
in section derived from the hypothesis discussed in section 4.3.3 and describes
investment grants from higher-tier governments which city i receives. We add
a dummy variable DMIN to all equations indicating whether or not the mining
industry is present in city. If a coefficient has an expected sign it is displayed in
parentheses.
From the Cobb-Douglas production function, marginal productivity of infras-
tructure capital is defined as ∂Qit/∂Git = αGQit/Git. We include this measure of
the expected productivity effects of infrastructure both in the investment and the
grant allocation function. Since Git also contains current investment INVit, we
replaced it with its lagged value Gi,t 1.
Parameters αBL, βBL and γBL, BL = 1, . . . , 8, refer to fixed effects for the states
(‘Bundesländer’) and αt, βt and γt, t = 1, 2, 3, refer to fixed effects for years.
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For disturbances we assume a one-way error-component model with ukit =
µki + υkit for equation k = 1, 2, 3, where µki v I ID(0, σ2kµ) reflects random individ-
ual effects of cities and υkit v I ID(0, σ2kυ) residual errors (Krishnakumar, 1995).
4.4.2 Results
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 4.4. Unobserved heterogene-
ity of cities is modelled as random error components (EC) for each equation. By
modelling the individual effects as random, it is possible to add fixed effects for
states and mining industry to the equations.9 In addition, the endogeneity of Qit,
INVit and GRANTit as right-hand side variables as well as the correlation of er-
rors across equations is taken into account by using Full-Maximum-Likelihood
(FIML) for the estimation of the simultaneous system.
Column 1 of Table 4.4 reports the results for the single equation estimation
with Error Components Generalised Least Squares (GLS) (e.g., (Baltagi, 1995),
1995). Columns 2 and 3 contain the results of simultaneous system estimations
with Error Components FIML.10 The specification of column 3 differ from column
2 in that NFIRMS is excluded from the investment equation and MAJORITY is
excluded from the grant equation.
Overall, the fit of the 3 equations is remarkable high with R2 ranging between
0.71 and 0.81. Turning first to the results for the production function, we find
that local public capital is a productive input for local manufacturing. The esti-
mated coefficient which is the elasticity of output with respect to infrastructure
is positive and statistically significant with a value of about 0.17. This coefficient
is remarkably stable with respect to the different estimation methods and spec-
ifications. As the estimates for the infrastructure coefficient do not vary much
between single equation and simultaneous equation estimation, the econometric
evidence for an endogeneity of infrastructure capital in the production function
9This would not be possible if the error components where modelled as fixed. The main rea-
son, however, why we model unobserved heterogeneity of cities as random is that (i) the random
effects model is more parsimonious in parameters (ii) more importantly, our sample does not
have sufficient ‘within’ variation, which is due to the fact that there are only 3 distinct years of
observation for each city.
10The estimations have been carried out using the PROC MODEL procedure in SAS V8.
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Table 4.4: Estimation Results
Nonlinear EC GLS(a) EC FIML(b) EC FIML(b)
Production function: ln(Q/L)it
αBL Fixed effects??? Fixed effects??? Fixed effects???
αt Fixed effects Fixed effects?? Fixed effects??
α0 0.784 (3.06) 0.828 (4.58) 0.829 (4.59)
αG 0.169 (3.23) 0.170 (4.63) 0.169 (4.60)
αK 0.569 (10.68) 0.555 (14.91) 0.558 (14.95)
α˜L 0.044 (1.55) 0.045 (2.25) 0.043 (2.16)
αMINING -0.497 (-7.12) -0.494 (-10.01) -0.495 (-10.01)
R2(c) 0.814 0.811 0.814
Infrastructure investment function: (INV/L)it
βBL Fixed effects??? Fixed effects??? Fixed effects???
βt Fixed effects??? Fixed effects??? Fixed effects???
β0 -10.77 (-4.40) -9.77 (-5.10) -10.88 (-5.25)
βGRANT/L 0.530 (5.38) -0.344 (-0.58) -0.422 (-0.96)
βNFIRMS -0.262 (-0.38) 0.223 (0.37) — (—)
βMAJOR -0.002 (-2.00) -0.004 (-2.60) -0.004 (-4.27)
βCARS/L 1.646 (5.36) 1.594 (6.67) 1.733 (6.52)
βG/L 0.014 (4.01) 0.025 (3.41) 0.025 (4.43)
β(d)PROD 3.081 (1.81) 2.252 (1.80) 2.475 (1.94)
βDEBT/L -0.048 (-4.04) -0.046 (-5.11) -0.047 (-4.91)
βTAX/L 0.025 (1.67) 0.026 (2.34) 0.029 (2.42)
βINCOME -6.199 (-1.76) -12.31 (-3.34) -12.80 (-3.73)
βMINING -1.643 (-7.29) -1.61 (-7.86) -1.55 (-7.00)
R2(c) 0.811 0.753 0.743
Grant allocation function: (GRANT/L)it
γBL Fixed effects??? Fixed effects??? Fixed effects???
γt Fixed effects Fixed effects? Fixed effects?
γ0 -0.709 (-1.62) -0.247 (-0.66) -1.047 (-3.44)
γINV/L 0.171 (5.24) 0.018 (0.27) 0.133 (2.23)
γSWINGV -0.001 (-2.30) -0.002 (-3.83) — (—)
γPARTISAN 0.014 (2.34) 0.013 (2.91) 0.020 (5.13)
γREDISTRIB -3.758 (-1.95) -4.707 (-2.97) -5.321 (-3.52)
γG/L 0.009 (6.25) 0.013 (7.29) 0.011 (6.73)
γ(d)PROD 0.236 (0.33) -0.121 (-0.22) 0.317 (0.61)
γ(d)NFIRMS 0.498 (1.25) 0.388 (1.28) 0.273 (0.97)
γMINING 0.293 (2.00) 0.064 (0.46) 0.281 (2.28)
R2(c) 0.738 0.715 0.730
Notes: t-values in parentheses, ???10 %, ??5 %, ??? 1 % significant.
EC=Error Components Model, (a) Single Equation, (b) Simultaneous System.
(c) Based on GLS residuals, not bounded [0,1],(d) [10-3].
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is weak. This can be attributed to the fact that infrastructure investment is rela-
tively small compared to the infrastructure stock, thus replacing investment with
predicted values from instrumental variables has therefore only a small impact
on the estimated parameter for Git. The ratio of output to public infrastructure
stock is on average about 0.95, which implies a rate of return of infrastructure of
about 16 percent.
In addition, private capital is significant with a value of about 0.55. The ratio
of output to private capital stock is on average about 0.6, which implies a rate of
return of private manufacturing capital of about 33 percent. From the value of t-
statistic for labour input L it can be infered that for the single-equation estimation
constant returns are not rejected at a 10 percent level, whereas for the simultane-
ous equation estimations constant returns to scale are rejected at a 5 percent level.
Cities where mining industry is located have a lower expected output.
Turning second to the results for the infrastructure investment function, we
find that from the positive and significant coefficient for GRANT/L in the first
column it appears as if grants and local public investments are complementary,
i.e. grants stimulate further infrastructure projects. However, if the endogeneity
of grants is taken into account by applying simultaneous system estimation meth-
ods, it turns out that the relationship between grants and local public investments
appear to be neutral. Thus, the receipt of future grants is not taken into account
by local governments when fixing their amount of autonomous spending. As-
sessing this result, the ‘good news’ is that cities do not reduce their own efforts in
anticipating the receipt of future matching grants from higher-tier governments.
The ‘bad news’ from this result is that cities do not increase their own spending
efforts even in the prospect of matching grants for infrastructure projects. Thus,
the incentive created by grants for expanding own infrastructure investments are
rather low.
With regard to the second hypothesis that local infrastructure spending
should also reflect preferences and demand of city’s residents and business we
find that the coefficient of CARS/L, which is measured as number of (four-wheel)
motor vehicles (business and private) per labour, is positive and highly signifi-
cant. Thus, cities with a high intensity of cars indeed invest more in infrastruc-
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ture.
Turning to economic factors that might determine a city’s infrastructure
spending, we find that the higher debt (DEBT/L) of a city is the lower is its
infrastructure spending. This corroborates our initial presumption that the finan-
cial room for manoeuvre is decisive for local infrastructure investments. On the
other hand, local infrastructure spending is higher the higher trade tax revenues
of a city. Thus, in our case there is no evidence of the ‘flypaper’ effect described
above.
Furthermore, we find that labour productivity (Q/L) from the manufacturing
sector is negatively related to infrastructure spending. Thus, cities where labour
productivity of manufacturing is lower spend more on infrastructure. This evi-
dence turns out to be even stronger if the endogeneity of output Q and GRANTS
is taken into account in columns 2 and 3. At a first glance this finding suggests
some kind of catching-up in infrastructure spending of economically underde-
veloped cities. We also conclude from this finding that the argument of reverse
causality meaning in our case that more prosperous cities are likely to spendmore
on infrastructure is empirically not supported.
However, we also find that the coefficient for infrastructure endowment (G/L)
is positive and significant. This does not support the expectation of catching-up
of economically weak cities, because cities which have already a good infrastruc-
ture endowment spend more than cities which a poor infrastructure endowment.
Hence, at least for our sample no convergence of cities’ infrastructure endow-
ments can be expected in the long-run.
In addition, expected productivity effects from infrastructure (βPROD) appear to
matter for local investments. However, the statistical reliability of this result is
relatively weak at a 10 percent significance level.
Finally, turning to the political-economy determinants of infrastructure in-
vestment we find that the number of manufacturing firms (βNFIRMS) is not decisive
for local infrastructure spending. However, this result should not be interpreted
as evidence of non-existence of lobbying efforts of business at the local level.11
11Numerous anecdotal evidence on this can be found in newspapers.
Essay 4. Political Economy of Infrastructure: Evidence from Large German cities 116
The reason is the difficulty to find plausible and observable measures for the lob-
bying efforts of firms. For instance, it can be argued that the number of manufac-
turing firms is not an adequate proxy for potential lobbying strength of business,
since one dominating big firm might have a stronger influence on policy deci-
sions than many small firms. For this reason, we also tried a dummy variable
in our regressions indicating whether one or more headquarters of large stock
companies are located in a city. However, this alternative measure of potential
lobbying power turned out to be insignificant as well.
On the other hand, we find that the size of majority of the government in the
city council is decisive for infrastructure spending. However, since the coeffi-
cient βMAJOR is negative it implies that spending is higher the bigger the majority
of the local government. As a consequence, this evidence does not support the
hypothesis that local governments spend more on infrastructure if the majority is
more unstable. One explanation for the positive coefficient βMAJOR is that contro-
versial infrastructure projects are likely to be prevented by the opposition in city
council if the majority of the government is only small. Furthermore, the larger
MAJORITY the less likely it is that a city’s government is formed on the basis of
a party coalition.
A similar finding holds also for the grant equation. The coefficient γSWINGV
is negative and significant but as before for the support of the swing voter hy-
pothesis a positive coefficient is expected. This result means that cities where
the majority of local government is small (i.e. more unstable) receive less grants
whereas the swing voter hypothesis predicts that these cities will receive more
grants in order to buy the support of swing voters. Thus, the negative coefficient
for γSWINGV corresponds to the findings for βMAJOR in the investment equation that
cities where government majority is more stable spend more on infrastructure
and receive more grants.
Moreover, the estimate for the partisan variable (PARTISAN) is significant,
which means that the expected level of grants is higher the larger the correspon-
dence of political affiliation between the local city council and the state (‘Bundes-
land’) government. At the mean data points, one percentage point increase in
political affiliation correspondence between city’s and state government gives on
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average 1.25 percent more investment grants. This is a considerable amount with
regard to the fact that political affiliation in our sample varies from 29.0 to 68.2
percent. This finding is as an indication that self-interests of grant-givers indeed
matter for the allocation of grants. Local governments which have a higher ‘po-
litical capital’ (in terms of votes) to sell, are rewarded ‘with a larger slice of the
cake’. Thus, party affiliation of government is used as a shortcut for ideology,
which allows politicians to target grants to those cities with the highest payoff.
Turning to the determinants of grant distribution that are not tactically but
benevolently motivated, the negative and significant coefficient γREDISTRIB indicates
that redistributive concerns are important. Hence, the lower the labour produc-
tivity (Q/L) of manufacturing in a city (i.e. the more economically underdevel-
oped it is) the more grants it gets. On the other hand in contrast to what is ex-
pected, cities which have already a good endowment with infrastructure (i.e. a
high infrastructure intensity G/L) get more grants. If infrastructure intensity
G/L is also related to economic development of a city, we would expect a nega-
tive sign.
Expected productivity effects (γPROD) of infrastructure investment appear not
to matter for the allocation of investment grants. This can be explained by the
fact that because investment grant decisions of state governments in Germany
are based on consensus with all local level governments, this approach is prone
to produce decisions that carefully skirt all areas of conflict. In terms of economic
efficiency, the bargaining process will often lead to outcomes which are from a
welfare perspective not optimal, so there is no guarantee that the money is being
put to its most productive use.
Finally, for the specification in column 3 of Table 4.4 we find that investments
have a positive impact on grants. The question arises whether this is a contradic-
tion to the finding for the investment function where no effect of grants on invest-
ments is found. Our explanation for this evidence is that local governments on
the one hand are not responsive to changes in the amount of grants from higher-
tier governments when fixing their level of autonomous investment spending,
but higher-tier governments on the other hand are responsive to increased au-
tonomous investment spending. This probably simply reflects the fact that the
Essay 4. Political Economy of Infrastructure: Evidence from Large German cities 118
relation between local investments and matching grants is relatively fixed, i.e. if
autonomous spending increases grants increase as well. The underlying mecha-
nism is that autonomous investments determine the amount of grants, but grants
do not determine the amount of autonomous investment spending. In addition,
it is also interesting to note that the coefficient γINV/L with a value of 0.133 is sig-
nificant lower than one could expect from the average relation between matching
grants and investments in our sample of 0.333. Once other factors that explain the
distribution of grants are taken into account, the coefficient of investments gets
significantly lower. Finally, cities where mining industry is present spend less on
infrastructure investment but receive on average more grants.
4.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this study we estimated a system of equations comprising of a production
function, an infrastructure investment function and an investment grant function
using a panel data set of large German cities. Overall, our empirical results high-
light the significance of political factors both for local infrastructure spending and
the intergovernmental distribution of grants.
Several key empirical findings emerge from our analysis (i) public capital is a
significant input for local production (ii) cities where the city council’s majority
has the same political affiliation as the state (‘Bundesland’) government receive
more grants (iii) cities where ‘marginal voters’ are decisive for the outcome of city
council elections neither spend more on public infrastructure nor receive more
investment grants from higher level governments but the larger majority of gov-
ernment the higher is spending (iv) redistributive concerns of higher-tier gov-
ernments matter for the allocation of grants, whereas efficiency considerations
(i.e. putting the money to its most productive use) appear to be less important.
From a normative perspective our findings support the view that pork bar-
rel politics are indeed important determinants for intergovernmental grant allo-
cation which might give rise to policy outcomes that depart substantially from
optimal policies that maximise social welfare.
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Finally, many studies on the productivity effects of public capital have treated
infrastructure as an exogenous factor of production and neglected the politico-
economic factors that shape infrastructure policy. However, the good news from
our study is that evidence of endogeneity bias of infrastructure capital estimates
in a production function framework as well as evidence of reverse causality run-
ning from output to infrastructure investments is weak.
Essay 5
Regional Infrastructure Policy and its Impact
on Productivity: A Comparison of Germany
and France
Abstract1
This essay describes the different institutional frameworks for infrastructure policy in
Germany and France. The economic effects of infrastructure are estimated econometri-
cally for German and French regions. We find evidence that regional road infrastructure
has a significant impact on regional output. Moreover, we find evidence that for Germany
the priority of promoting equal living conditions throughout the regions is an important
determinant of regional infrastructure policy.
1A previous version of this essay is forthcoming in Applied Economics Quarterly (2001),
vol. 47, 274-303.
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5.1 Introduction
At the end of the 1960’s, economic research began to deal increasingly with the
importance of infrastructure for economic development. Early studies e.g. Frey
(1970), Jochimsen (1966), Jochimsen and Simonis (1970) or Simonis (1977) dealt
especially with the theoretical aspects of infrastructure provision and infrastruc-
ture’s conceptual basis.
Since the end of the 1980’s, there has been greater interest also in empirical
infrastructure research. By using production function approaches, the direct and
indirect effect of improvements in infrastructure on private productivity have
been estimated. The studies by Aschauer (1988; 1989a; 1989b) have not only raised
the attention of scientists but have also had an effect on economic policy. As a
result, spending on public infrastructure in the US increased considerably during
President Clinton’s first term of office (Gramlich, 1994).
For the period 1949-1985, Aschauer (1989a) reports a significant elasticity of
output with respect to public non-military capital between 0.38 and 0.56 for the
US using aggregated time series data. Thus the estimated marginal productivity
of public capital in this study considerably exceeded that of private capital. This
finding implies that returns resulting from public investment were higher than
those arising from private investment projects.
Turning to the hypothetical effects of infrastructure, Aschauer (1995), for ex-
ample, postulates that public capital can have both a direct and indirect effect on
private output. The direct effect arises because changes in public capital stock
alter the level of output by making private labour and capital inputs more or less
productive. The indirect effect arises because an increase in public capital stock
will affect the marginal products of labour and private capital, which in turn in-
fluence the chosen quantities of private inputs.
Furthermore, Aschauer advances the theory that the up to 60 percent of the
decrease of productivity growth in the USA during the 1970’s and 1980’s can be
attributed to the cut-back in public infrastructure investment during this period.
However, some economists have voiced doubts about the plausibility of
the results of Aschauer’s studies (Aaron, 1990; Gramlich, 1994; Hulten and
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Schwab, 1991; Jorgenson, 1991; Tatom, 1991a). One criticism is the high degree
of aggregation of the data used by Aschauer. Therefore, more recent research
works have examined the effects of infrastructure on regionally more disaggre-
gated levels.
Yet the results of these studies are not unequivocal. Whereas for instance
Munnell (1990b; 1992; 1993) confirm the hypothesis formulated by Aschauer, the
studies by Baltagi and Pinnoi (1995), Garcia-Milà et al. (1996), Holtz-Eakin (1994),
or Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995) find no evidence of a significant influence of
infrastructure on productivity for the US.
Authors such as Baltagi and Pinnoi (1995) or Holtz-Eakin (1994) point out that
regional effects should be taken into consideration in econometric examinations
on a disaggregated level. Differences between the regions regarding the geo-
graphical location (centre versus periphery), climate or factor endowments can
be captured by econometric techniques using fixed or random cross-sectional ef-
fects. Our study takes this criticism into account in that the econometric methods
applied here are able to estimate such regional-specific influences.
In the literature, when referring to the differentiation of individual areas of
infrastructure,2 a distinction is made between household-related infrastructure
and business / or business-related infrastructure. Household infrastructure cov-
ers healthcare and educational, leisure and cultural institutions. Road infras-
tructure can be placed under the heading of business related infrastructure. Not
only transport belongs under this heading, also energy and water provision and
telecommunications infrastructure are business-related (Frey, 1978). This study
focuses on road infrastructure because comparable data for both the French and
German regions for this section of infrastructure are available.
The purpose of this essay is threefold. First, we survey the institutional frame-
work of infrastructure policy as an instrument of regional policy in Germany and
France. Second, we study the effects of infrastructure on private productivity.
2Throughout the essay we use the terms ’infrastructure’ and ’public capital’ interchangeable.
Note, however, that in a more rigorous fashion public capital refers to infrastructure services
that are solely publicly financed, whereas the more general term ’infrastructure’ applies also to
privately financed services.
Essay 5. Regional Infrastructure Policy and its Impact on Productivity 123
Third, we investigate the determinants of regional infrastructure investment al-
location.
One contribution of our study to the existing empirical infrastructure liter-
ature is that it simultaneously refers to both French and German regions. The
main advantage of pooling the data for Germany and France is that the database
is expanded and therefore we are able to obtain more reliable estimates of the
parameters of the model. A further contribution is that our study implements
some methodological improvements in comparison with previous investigations
in that the estimations of the effects of infrastructure on French regions are car-
ried out by taking regional-specific effects into account. Another important as-
pect of our study, which has seldom been dealt with in the existing literature, is
that it highlights the different institutional frameworks under which infrastruc-
ture policy is carried out in Germany and France. Finally, our study discusses
and implements a new framework for studying empirically the determinants of
regional infrastructure investment allocation.
The further development of this essay is as follows: In the next subsection,
we provide an overview on related studies. In the second section we compare
regional policies in Germany and France. In addition, some theoretical aspects of
the rationale of regional policies are collated and discussed. In the third section
we present the results of the empirical analysis of the effects of infrastructure on
productivity. Furthermore, an investigation on the empirical determinants of the
allocation of road infrastructure is carried out. In the fourth and final section, the
results of the study are summarised and discussed.
5.1.1 Related literature
Anumber of investigations into the effects of infrastructure on private production
in Germany have already been carried out (Conrad and Seitz, 1992; Conrad and
Seitz, 1994; Erber, 1995; Hofmann, 1996; Licht and Seitz, 1994; Schlag, 1997; Seitz,
1993; Seitz, 1994; Seitz, 1995; Stephan, 1997). However, as far as we know only
two studies have been undertaken with regard to the impact of infrastructure on
regional development in France (Fritsch, 1995; Prud’Homme, 1996).
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The majority of the previous studies with regards to Germany apply a cost
function approach, only a few studies are based on a production function ap-
proach. The regional and sectoral levels of reference of the respective studies are
sometimes very different, making a comparison of results very difficult. Further-
more, also different measures and definitions of infrastructure and public capital
respectively are used in these studies.
For example Licht and Seitz (1994) examine the economic importance of in-
frastructure at the level of the 11 West German federal states. The method of
investigation is based on a cost function approach. The estimated cost elasticity
for public capital is significant and ranges from -0.01 to -0.36. Also, the studies
by Conrad and Seitz (1992), Seitz (1993), and Conrad and Seitz (1994) confirm the
evidence of cost effects arising from infrastructure at the aggregated level of West
Germany. Erber’s study (1995), which performs the analysis for both Germany
and the US finds only for 4 of 26 branches an influence of the public capital stock
on costs.
In Seitz (1995), 85 self-administrated cities in Germany serve as the regional
level of reference. Significant effects on the cost of private production are found
in this infrastructure study. Hofmann (1996) analyses the effects of public infras-
tructure on productivity applying various econometric methods for Hamburg.
However, no plausible results are obtained so that it is not possible to make con-
clusions about the importance of public infrastructure for Hamburg.
In Stephan (1997), the influence of road infrastructure on production in the
manufacturing industry in the 11West German federal states for the period 1970-
1995 is examined based on a production approach. Using this method, significant
effects of infrastructure are found for almost all specifications.
Schlag (1997) studies the causality link between the public infrastructure cap-
ital and the output of the total business sector in Germany at an aggregate level.
Cointegration analysis is applied and error correction models for time series and
panel data results from Granger causality tests are presented. The results indicate
bi-directional causality (feedback) between the public infrastructure capital and
the output.
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Fritsch (1995) estimates a significant effect of infrastructure on productivity
in 21 French regions. Also Prud’Homme (1996), whose study is likewise based
on the 21 French regions, provides evidence of a significant effect. However,
regional specific effects are not specified in the econometric estimations in both
of these studies.
In sum, so far no clear-cut evidence of the effects of infrastructure on private
productivity emerges from empirical studies carried out for Germany or France.
Whereas a number of studies find significant effects of infrastructure others do
not. However, it is worth pointing out that the results of the different approaches
for testing the significance of infrastructure are hardly comparable due to the
different levels of regional or sectoral reference as well as due to the different def-
initions of infrastructure capital used in the studies. In the following section, we
highlight and discuss the differences between infrastructure policies in Germany
and France. Before that, we provide evidence on the development of regional
income disparities in Germany and France.
5.2 A comparison of infrastructure policies in
Germany and France
Infrastructure is often used as an instrument for regional economic policies in
order to reduce regional disparities in income. Proponents of active regional eco-
nomic policies maintain that without these state support, disparities in income
will increase between the regions.
Figure 5.1 shows the development of the regional differences in productivity
in Germany and in France. Regional productivity is measured as gross value
added per worker. For each year, we have calculated the coefficient of variation
for this variable. Note that the coefficient of variation is a unitless measure of
relative variability. It is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean
expressed as a percentage. If a convergence of regional productivities occurs, the
coefficient of variation will decrease over the course of time.
Figure 1 reveals that although regional differences in productivity decreased
during the period 1970-81, they increased slightly from 1982-86, and following a
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Figure 5.1: Regional Productivity Differences for 11 West German Bundesländer
1970-95, 21 French regions 1978-92
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Figure 5.2: Regional Differences of Value Added for 11 West German Bundeslän-
der 1970-95, 21 French regions 1978-92
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
10
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 o
f v
ar
ia
tio
n 
[%
]
o
f l
og
 (Q
)
Year
German Bundesländer
French regions
Essay 5. Regional Infrastructure Policy and its Impact on Productivity 128
further fall during the period 1987-88, have increased again since 1989. There-
fore, at least for the period 1976-95, it is not possible to determine a convergence
of regional productivity in Germany. Note, that this result for the 11 West Ger-
man states, which emerges from a rather descriptive analysis, is in line with the
findings of studies using more sophisticated analytical tools e.g. unit root tests
for panel data (Bohl, 1998; Funke and Strulik, 1999).
A similar picture is found for France. Although regional differences decreased
during the period 1979-84 and 1986-90, increases can be seen in the years 1984-85
as well as since 1991. This result that regional convergence can neither be found
for France nor for Germany is also confirmed by Figure 5.2. Here the coefficients
of variation are calculated based on the logarithms of regional value added. By
taking logarithms of the levels of output the regional absolut differences are trans-
formed into relative percentage differences. Again, we expect a decrease in the
coefficient of variation if a convergence in regional outputs occurs.
In contrast to Figure 5.1, where in the coefficient of variation the effects of the
development of regional labour force are also included, only the development
of the relative regional output differences is captured in Figure 5.2 independent
of the development in the labour force (for instance due to labour migration be-
tween regions). Apparently, in the period under investigation neither in France
nor in Germany convergence of regional income is observed.
As a result of this section we state that a decrease in regional disparity in
income can neither be observed in Germany nor in France during the period
1970-1995 and 1978-1991 for France respectively. However, when no regional
convergence can be found in the two countries the question arises whether re-
gional policies were efficient or whether the disparities would have been even
more marked without active regional policies. The following section describes
some important institutional differences in infrastructure and regional policy in
Germany and France.
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5.2.1 The different frameworks of infrastructure policy in
Germany and France
The geographical differences (density of population 104 inhabitants per square
km in France and 223 inhabitants per square km in Germany) highlight the differ-
ing conditions for the forming of infrastructure policy in Germany and in France.
In Germany in 1992 there were a total of 11,000 km of motorway (‘Bundesauto-
bahnen’), 42,000 km A roads (‘Bundesfernstraßen’), 170,140 km B roads (85,200
km ‘Landesstraßen’ and ‘84,940 Kreisstraßen’) and 413,000 km smaller roads and
streets (‘Gemeindestaßen’) (Source: German Ministry of Transport, Building and
Housing, 1995).
In France there are similarly 5 categories of road: ‘autoroutes’ (motorways),
‘routes nationales’ (A roads), ‘routes départementales’ and ‘voies communales’
(B roads) and ‘chemins ruraux’ (smaller roads and streets).
In 1992 the length of the French motorway network was 9,081 km and is there-
fore comparable with the extent of the German system. The length of the ‘routes
nationales’ consisting of 27,500 km is around half the length of the German A
roads. On the other hand, there are 365,600 km of B roads and in addition a net-
work of smaller roads and streets (‘voies communales’) which, with its 579,000
km is clearly longer than in Germany. This can be attributed to the larger geo-
graphical area of France (Centre National de Documentation Pédagogique, 1998).
However, not only the geographical differences but also history and politics
have contributed to forming differing infrastructure policies. French infrastruc-
ture policy is on the one hand marked by strong regional policy considerations
and on the other by the emphasis given to individual large infrastructure projects
(Kistenmacher, Marcou and Clev, 1994).
Due to its tradition of political centralism in the first years of the post sec-
ond world war, a markedly interventionist regional policy was approved. For
a long time Paris and the greater Paris area (Ile-de-France) stood in the fore-
ground of regional development. However, in the following years a policy of
de-concentration and the development of industrial centres outside of the area
around Paris was increasingly pursued. The central regional planing institution
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DATAR (=Délégation à l’aménagement du territoire et à l’action régionale), set
up in 1963 for this purpose, has wide-reaching decision making powers. In or-
der to improve the carrying out of proactive centrally controlled regional policy
DATAR was put directly under the control of the Prime Minister.
Since the beginning of the 1980’s it has also been possible to observe an in-
creasing tendency towards the decentralisation of planning in France. The hi-
erarchical control of the 1960’s and 1970’s has been superseded in the form of a
contractual agreement between the central state and the regions (Neumann and
Uterwedde, 1994).
Furthermore, the private building and management of motorways plays an
important role. Private or non-profit making firms manage the majority of the
motorway network (6,490 km of a total of 9,081 km) and charge the road users
tolls. Through concessions, the public authorities grant the private firms spe-
cific rights. Not only the maintenance and management of the motorways are
financed by tolls, but the building of further motorways is also financed this way
(Ministère de L’Equipement, des Transports et du Logement, 1998).
The ‘Direction des Routes’ is responsible for the financing and planning of the
‘routes nationales’ and the state motorways. This is subordinate to the ministry
responsible (Ministère de l’Equipement, des Transports et du Logement). On the
one hand, the ‘Direction des Routes’ sets the targets for road and motorway con-
struction according to a certain scheme (Schéma directeur routier national). On
the other hand the ‘Direction des Routes’ enacts laws which determine building,
maintenance and management. Additionally, the determination of the necessary
means for finance is undertaken by the ‘Direction des Routes’. The 22 regions
are therefore represented by the ‘Ministère de l’Equipement, des Transports et du
Logement’ (DRE) and are subordinate to the ‘Direction des Routes’.
In Germany, in contrast to France, several regional metropolitan areas of equal
rank have developed over the years (polycentric development). The principle of
federalism played an important role in the forming of regional policy in Germany
during the post-war period. The constitutional law promoting the convergence of
living conditions throughout the regions above all represents an important target
of regional policy.
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As a result of the federal structure, the states have legislative competence for
B roads and smaller roads and streets. On the other hand the federal government
is the owner of and responsible for motorways and A roads; these are built and
administered upon commission from the federal government by the federal states
(German Ministry of Transport, Building and Housing, 1995).
In the immediate post-war period, the intention was that the federal govern-
ment would only play a role in setting out the conditions in the planning of re-
gional policies. With the passing of the regional planning law (‘Raumordnungs-
gesetz’) in 1965, the importance of the federal government within the federal sys-
tem was strengthened. Through the federal transport infrastructure plan (‘Bun-
desverkehrswegeplanung’), a transport policy program was introduced which
was supposed to co-ordinate all federal transport (federal roads, federal rail and
federal waterways). Federal transport infrastructure plans were drawn up by the
Federal Cabinet and regularly reformulated. Similar long term transport plan-
ning did not exist in France at the time.
To sum up, we can determine that infrastructure and regional policy in Ger-
many was accompanied by the aim of having similar living standards through-
out the regions, whereas in France during the last few decades, importance was
placed, above all, on decentralisation and the relief of the concentrated area
around Paris. The differences which still exist between infrastructure policy in
Germany and France will, in the future, become less prominent due to the Euro-
pean integration (Kistenmacher, Marcou and Clev, 1996). In the next section some
theoretical considerations regarding the efficiency of regional infrastructure poli-
cies are collated and discussed.
5.2.2 Can regional policies work in principle? Some
preliminary considerations
The following reflections should serve as a compilation of several arguments
based on economic theory for or against an active role of regional policy. Re-
gional disparities in income often prompt governments to make efforts in order
to achieve a more evenly balanced regional economic development. Tradition-
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ally, public infrastructure policy has been an instrument for regional economic
support. The intention of this policy is to minimise competitive disadvantages
in the regions, and promote private investment through the improvement of re-
gional infrastructure.
According to standard neoclassical growth theory built on the assumption
of decreasing returns to reproducible factors on the other hand, income dispari-
ties arising from differences in regional capital/labour ratios will diminish over
time: both trade and factor flows tend to equalise factor prices. A convergence
of income in the regions would therefore also take place without active regional
policy. Similarly, also the so-called ‘rule of thumb’ of a 2 percent convergence
rate according to empirical studies based on neoclassical growth theory leaves no
scope for an active role of regional policy (for an overview, see Barro and Sala-I-
Martin, 1995).
Apparently, the presence of externalities (spill-over effects) can give objective
reasons for regional economic support. For instance, if negative ‘crowding’ ex-
ternalities exist in economically better developed regions, these can be mitigated
by regional policies which provide infrastructure to economically less developed
regions, so that labour migration from the less to the better developed regions is
prevented and externalities thus reduced.
However, according to Homburg (1993) even in the absence of externalities
active regional distribution policies can be justified. To analyse the consequences
of regional distribution policies, Homburg’s model assumes a neoclassical pro-
duction function Qi = f (Gi,Ki,Li), i = 1 . . .N, linear homogenous of degree one,
where Qi is region i’s output, Gi is the stock of public capital in region i, Ki is the
stock of private capital in region i, and Li is an immobile factor of production in
region i, e.g. land endowment, geographical characteristics etc.
The steady state of themodel is described by the two conditions: (i) τQi = δGi,
where τ denotes the tax rate, δ denotes the depreciation rate of public capital,
and (ii) (1  τ)FiK = r + δ, where F
i
K denotes the marginal productivity of private
capital for region i and r the exogenous rate of interest. Condition (i) states that
in steady state taxes are only used to finance replacement of Gi, and condition (ii)
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states that the marginal after-tax productivity of private capital equals the rental
price of private capital r + δ.
Homburg (1993) shows that a spatial efficient allocation of infrastructure can
be regarded as a maximisation of the joint total output ∑Qi given the sum of
stocks of private capital ∑Ki and given the sum of endowments with infrastruc-
ture ∑Gi. The spatial efficient allocation of infrastructure solves the following
maximisation problem
max!∑Qi, given ∑Ki = K and ∑Gi = G. (5.1)
It can be shown that the condition for the spatial efficient allocation applies ex-
actly when the marginal productivities of infrastructure FiG and private capital F
i
K
in all regions are given as
FiG = µ and F
i
K = θ for all i.
This means that the marginal productivities of private and public capital are
equal for all regions. If public and private capital is also homogeneous in a neo-
classical sense, then furthermore µ = θ should also apply. From this result we can
state that under neoclassical assumptions it would be optimal to allocate infras-
tructure investment in such a way across regions that the marginal productivity
of infrastructure is equal in all regions.
An important result of this model is that the spatial efficiency criterion is valid
whether the total endowment with infrastructure is optimal or sub-optimal. If
the assumptions of the model apply, then an efficient spatial allocation of infras-
tructure is observed in the steady-state equilibrium even without governmental
subsidies. However, as Homburg shows in his further analysis, the adjustment
processes to this efficient steady state equilibrium is characterised by an ineffi-
cient spatial allocation. This implies that the adjustment path can be improved
upon by means of using intergovernmental grants.
As the main result therefore we can state that if the initial allocation of infras-
tructure stocks of infrastructure across the regions is unbalanced, the joint na-
tional product can be increased by a regional infrastructure policy. The target of
such a policy should be to balance the ratio of output Qi to infrastructure stock Gi
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in all regions, i.e. to equalise the marginal productivities of infrastructure across
regions.
However, it should be noted that studies such as Martin (1998; 1999a) or Ot-
taviano and Thisse (1999) arrive at different results regarding the possible effects
of regional infrastructure policy. These models of the ‘New Economic Geogra-
phy’ predict that the consequences of a policy which targets at the achievement
of a balanced spatial allocation of economic activity can result even in greater
regional disparities. The mechanism behind this result is that the reduction of
transport costs, for example by means of improved transport infrastructure, can
have negative effects on the economic development of poorer regions. This will
happen if companies from the poorer regions move to take advantage of the ag-
glomeration and scale economics in centrally located regions while at the same
time, however, they can maintain their sales outlets in the poorer regions due to
the reduced transport costs.
In the next section we analyse empirically whether investment in road infras-
tructure has a positive effect on economic development. For this purpose, an
econometric analysis is carried out based on a production function with panel
data for the French regions and the German federal states.
5.3 Empirical analysis
The first part of the empirical analysis deals with the productivity effects of in-
frastructure. In the second part, we investigate the determinants of the regional
allocation of infrastructure investment.
5.3.1 Productivity effects of regional road infrastructure in
Germany and France
The central hypothesis to be examined empirically is that infrastructure increases
private output or reduces respectively the costs for a given unit of output. From
a theoretical point of view, this can be the case when infrastructure either directly
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exerts a positive effect on private factor productivities or indirectly exerts a posi-
tive influence on private factor productivities which in turn increases the demand
for private factor inputs (Aschauer, 1995).
In the following section, the effects of road infrastructure on productivity are
examined using two different approaches
1. Cobb-Douglas production function
2. Transcendental logarithmic (translog) production function according to
Christensen et al. (1971; 1973).
For the estimations, we employ econometric methods from panel data anal-
ysis by specifying fixed cross-sectional effects (Baltagi, 1995; Hsiao, 1986). For
the first approach, our empirical model is based on the production function for
region i, i = 1 . . .N, in year t, t = 1 . . . T,
Qit = Ait(t)F(t,X1it , . . . ,XMit), (5.2)
where Qit describes output, Ait(t) technical efficiency (or the Hicks-neutral tech-
nical progress) and X1it, . . . ,XMit describe theM factors of production. Assuming
a Cobb-Douglas production technology and with factor inputs labour Lit, private
capital Kit and road infrastructure Git and after taking logarithms and dividing
by Lit, we obtain the following empirical model is obtained which forms the basis
of our empirical assessment
ln qit = ln A0i + αtt+ αk ln kit + αg ln git + eαL ln Lit + uit, (5.3)
uit = ρui,t 1 + it   γit 1,
and eαL = αk + αg + αL   1,
where uit follows an autoregressive moving average process ARMA(1,1) and it
denotes normal i.i.d. distributed random innovations. In addition, we assume
that Ait(t) = A0iexp(αtt). Note that variables in lower-case letters in (5.3) are
defined as x = X/L. The parameters αk, αg, αL describe the elasticity of the output
Qit with respect to inputs Kit, Git and Lit.
The advantage of this specification for the production function is that by di-
viding (5.2) by Lit the problem of heteroscedasticity for the empirical estimation
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is reduced. Notice also that no ‘a priori’ restrictions are placed on (5.3) regarding
returns to scale. If the parameter eαL is significantly different from zero, then the
null hypothesis of constant returns to scale is rejected.
Table 5.1 contains the results for the Cobb-Douglas production function which
has been estimated by using the procedure PROC MIXED in SAS V8. A detailed
description of the data used in this analysis can be found in the Appendix.
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is applied to all specifications based
on a total of 596 observations (281 for Germany and 315 for France). The main
benefit of pooling the data for France and Germany is that the analysis can be
based on a larger data set and therefore more reliable estimates of the parameters
of the model are obtained.
In column (1), the model is estimated assuming heterogenous parameters for
German and French regions. Note, that in contrast to Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) estimation the parameters in column (1) are different due to the specified
covariance structure from parameters that would be obtained by running two
separate regressions for German and French regions.
In column (2), we assume parameter homogeneity for German and French
regions except for the covariance parameters ρ and γ. That means that the spec-
ification in column (2) can be deduced from column (1) by imposing restrictions
with respect to parameter homogeneity on the specification of column (1). Fur-
thermore, in column (3), except for labour and the covariance parameters ρ and
γ, parameter homogeneity across German and French regions is assumed.
Note, that fixed cross-section effects are added to all specifications (1)-(3) of
Table 5.1. The results of likelihood ratio (LR) tests not reported here imply that
these fixed cross-section effects are significantly different from zero. Also, be-
cause a linear time trend t is included in eq. (5.3), it is not possible to estimate
additional time effects due to the resulting singularity.
The ARMA(1,1) parameters ρ and γ for both Germany and France are signif-
icantly different from zero for all specifications. The model selection criteria AIC
and SBC, which we describe below indicate that these specifications are preferred
compared with AR(1) alternatives not reported here. The displayed ‘null model
likelihood ratio test’ checks the model without covariance parameters against
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Table 5.1: Regression Results for the Productivity Effects of Road Infrastructure
Maximum-Likelihood Estimations (MLE)
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept fixed effects??? fixed effects??? fixed effects???
0.01141 (6.88)???
t
0.01412 (7.74)???
0.0151 (12.93)??? 0.0133 (10.67)???
0.23101 (3.03)???
ln k
0.12542 (3.36)???
0.1162 (3.55)??? 0.1457 (4.28)???
0.08281 (1.32)
ln g
0.12822 (2.13)??
0.0837 (2.12)?? 0.1120 (2.79)???
0.34551 (3.56)??? 0.27841 (3.18)???
ln L
-0.29322 (-3.39)???
-0.0588 (-0.94)
-0.33372 (-4.14)???
0.78571 (16.79)??? 0.83701 (20.96)??? 0.81721 (18.99)???
AR(1) ρ
0.58882 (7.08)??? 0.52572 (6.15)??? 0.63032 (8.29)???
0.84771 (29.35)??? 0.88231 (34.55)??? 0.86781 (31.59)???
MA(1) γ
0.64312 (12.89)??? 0.59772 (12.08)??? 0.66862 (13.69)???
Null Model
LR Test χ2
447.9??? 504.1??? 506.4???
Log-
Likelihood
1531.2 1514.8 1528.7
AIC 1485.2 1472.8 1485.7
SBC 1451.5 1442.0 1454.2
2811 2811 2811
Observ.
3152 3152 3152
Parameters for 1German regions, 2French regions, otherwise for both regions (homogenous).
Approx. t-statistics are given in parentheses. Significance levels: ?10 %, ??5 %, ???1 %.
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of (regional value added / labour).
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the alternative of the specified ARMA(1,1) covariance structure. Thus, the ‘null
model’ without covariance structure parameters is rejected for each of the three
specifications (1)-(3).
In column (1) of Table 5.1, the estimates of the parameters of the input factors
k, g and L are statistically significant for the French regions. For the German
‘Bundesländer’ (federal states), estimates of the parameters of input factors k and
L are statistically significant, however not for g. Note, that constant returns to
scale are rejected both for German as well as for French regions.
In column (2), a decrease in the value of the log likelihood from 1531.2 in
column (1) to 1514.8 in (2) can be observed. Indeed, the LR test for the restric-
tion of parameter homogeneity,  2[1514.8   1531.2] = 32.8 v χ2(4), is highly
significant, thus the null hypothesis of parameter homogeneity across German
and French regions is rejected. This is also reflected in the decrease of the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974), which has been computed
as AIC= l(bθ)  d, where l(bθ) is the maximised log likelihood and d is the effective
number of parameters (fixed effects and covariance parameters). It can be used to
compare different models; the model with the largest AIC is deemed best. Simi-
larly, Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (SBC) (Schwarz, 1978) has been computed as
SBC= l(bθ)  12d logN, where N equals the number of valid observations for max-
imum likelihood estimation. Again, models with larger SBC are preferred, but
note also that SBC penalises models with a greater number of parameters more
than AIC does, that means it will lean toward a simpler model. Therefore, the
specification of column (1) is preferred compared to (2) by both criteria.
However, the rejection of specification (2) is mainly driven by the heterogene-
ity of the parameter for labour betweenGerman and French regions. Therefore, in
column (3) we allow for this heterogeneity, whereas the other parameters (except
the covariance parameters) are restricted to be equal across German and French
regions. In contrast to column (2), this specification is not rejected by the LR test,
 2[1528.7   1531.2] = 5 v χ2(3). Furthermore, also the AIC and SBC criteria
are higher than for column (1). Thus, we conclude that column (3) contains the
results of the preferred specification of the empirical model. We find that the
time trend t with a value of 0.0133 is significant, and private and public capital is
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significant with values of 0.1457 and 0.1120 respectively. In sum, the main find-
ing of the performed analysis is that road infrastructure is significant for private
production at the regional level.
However, the Cobb-Douglas production function approach restricts the elas-
ticities of input substitution to equal one. In order to overcome this limitation,
our second approach is based on a translog production function
lnQit = ln A0it + αtt+ αk lnKit + αg lnGit + αL ln Lit
+αkg lnKit lnGit + αkl lnKit ln Lit + αgl lnGit ln Lit
0.5
h
αkk ln 2Kit + αgg ln 2Git + αll ln 2Lit
i
+ it, (5.4)
uit = ρui,t 1 + it   γit 1.
Again, we assume that uit follows an autoregressive moving average pro-
cess ARMA(1,1). The effect from public input G on private factor productivities,
i.e. ∂2Q/∂K∂G and ∂2Q/∂L∂G, can be derived from the estimates of equation (5.4)
as
bαkg =
∂2 lnQ
∂ lnQ∂ lnK
, and bαgl =
∂2 lnQ
∂ lnG∂ ln L
, (5.5)
from which ∂2Q/∂K∂G and ∂2Q/∂L∂G can be computed as
∂2Q
∂K∂G
=
bαkg
Q
KG
, and
∂2Q
∂G L
=
bαgl
Q
G L
. (5.6)
Since the ratios Q/KG and Q/GL are positive, we can infer from the signs of
bαkg and bαgl whether the effect of G on private factor productivities is positive or
negative respectively.
Furthermore, several restrictions on the production technology can be tested
within a translog function framework. If technology is homogeneous, then the
sum of the coefficients of the squared terms and the cross-effects will be zero
m
∑
p
m
∑
l
bαpl = 0, (5.7)
where p, l 2 fK,G, Lg, m = 3. In addition, linear homogeneity requires the above
condition plus that the sum of the linear terms equals one (Chambers, 1988)
m
∑
p
bαp = 1. (5.8)
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We obtain the following results for the translog production function approach
dlnQit = fixed effects
???
+0.014 t  0.445 lnKit +0.740 lnGit  0.659 ln Lit
(11.70)??? ( 1.16) (2.20)??? ( 1.53)
 0.106 lnKit lnGit  0.362 lnKit ln Lit  0.143 lnGit ln Lit
( 1.19) (5.29)??? ( 2.31)???
+0.096 ln 2Kit +0.176 ln 2Git  0.198 ln 2Lit
( 0.83) (2.00)??? ( 2.16)???
N : 596 Log-Likelihood: 1536.9 AIC: 1488.9 SBC: 1453.8
The value of the LR statistic,  2[1514.8   1536.9] = 44.2 v χ2(6), which is
highly significant, shows that due to the addition of cross and quadratic terms
the translog model is preferred compared with the Cobb-Douglas specification in
column (2) of table 5.1 (however, it is not preferred according to the SBC criterion).
Again, we find that infrastructure Git is significant. Moreover, with respect to
marginal productivities inputs Git and Lit are substitutes (αgl =  0.143), whereas
Git and Kit appear not to affect each other (αkg is insignificant).
However, it should be mentioned that the results of the translog specification
should be interpreted with some caution due to the high correlation of the single
with the quadratic and the cross terms. The correlations not reported here be-
tween the single and the cross and quadratic terms are greater than 0.8 for most
of the cross and quadratic terms. Due to this high degree of multicollinearity
between the explanatory variables, imprecise or even estimates with implausible
signs can result (Judge et al., 1985, chap. 22). Finally, note that by applying LR
tests, linear homogeneity is rejected for the estimated translog production func-
tion.
It can be summarised that our empirical analysis finds evidence that regional
road infrastructure has a significant impact on regional output. The specification
with heterogenous parameters between German and French regions appears to
indicate that the effect of road infrastructure on productivity is significant only for
France. However, by pooling the data for Germany and France we obtain more
efficient and reliable parameter estimates. Thus, the model with heterogenous
parameters is rejected and the specification where only for labour heterogeneity
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of parameters is assumed is deemed best. In the following section, the determi-
nants of the regional allocation of road infrastructure in Germany and France are
analysed.
5.3.2 Empirical determinants of the regional allocation of road
infrastructure investment
Figure 5.3 shows the variation in the allocation of regional road infrastructure
investment in Germany and in France. Again, the development of the variation
is expressed in terms of the coefficient of variation calculated for each year. For
Germany, the variation increased relatively constant in the period 1972-89, but
decreased after 1990. This is probably a result of the German reunification af-
ter which priority was given to improvements of infrastructure in East German
regions, whereas differences of infrastructure investment in the West German re-
gions are levelled out due to budget constraints.
With regards to France, neither a constant increase nor decrease can be ob-
served. This means that the variation of the investment allocation remains rela-
tively constant with the course of time. Considered on the whole, no decrease in
the variation of the allocation can be identified for both countries.
According to expectations from neoclassical theory this finding is surprising
since in the long-run infrastructure endowments across regions should become
more balanced and therefore the variation in the regional allocation of infrastruc-
ture should decrease in the course of time. However, this only applies if the gov-
ernment actually aims at equalising the marginal productivities of infrastructure
across regions. Therefore, in the following we examine the empirical determi-
nants of the allocation of infrastructure investment across regions.
de la Fuente and Vives (1995) identify three criteria which could be of rele-
vance for the regional allocation of public investment in road infrastructure. If the
government strives for equal living standards in all regions, then according to the
first criterion, labelled equality, investment in infrastructure should be directed to
where the regional per capita income or productivity respectively is below aver-
age. The aim of such a policy would be to reduce competitive disadvantage in
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Figure 5.3: Regional Differences of Road Infrastructure Investment in Germany
and France
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a region by improving the public infrastructure and thereby to attracting private
investment. In order to operationalise the equality criterion empirically, we use
the labour productivity Qi/Li as a measure for regional income differences.
According to the second criterion, which is labelled as efficiency criterion, in-
frastructure investment should flow where the marginal productivity of invest-
ment is highest. Thus the objective of this criterion would be to maximise the sum
of regional incomes. In order to obtain an empirical measure for this criterion, by
assuming a linear homogenous production function F of degree one the marginal
productivity ∂F/∂Gi of the infrastructure capital stock in region i is proportional
to the ratio of the output Qi to the infrastructure stock Gi, i.e.
∂F
∂Gi

Qi
Gi
.
Thus, we use the ratio Qi/Gi as an operational measure for a regional infrastruc-
ture policy criterion according to the efficiency criterion.
A third criterion for the allocation of investment in infrastructure can be la-
belled as neutrality. The rationale for this criterion is that the state should ensure
that differences in public capital stocks do not give an unfair advantage or disad-
vantage to any region. The goal of this policy would be to equalise the infrastruc-
ture endowments across regions. In practice, this criterion would be met when
for example Gi/Li , i.e. the capital intensity of infrastructure (or any other region-
ally comparable measure for infrastructure endowment), is equal in all regions.
If a government intends to apply these criteria to the decision process of re-
gional investment allocation, in most cases these three criteria cannot be fulfilled
simultaneously. On the contrary, they will quite often lead to conflicting priori-
ties regarding the ranking of infrastructure investment projects. For the Spanish
regions, for example, de la Fuente and Vives (1995) find a conflict between the ef-
ficiency criterion on the one hand, and the neutrality criterion and equality criterion
on the other hand.
Table 5.2 shows the results of a regression of Iit/Lit, i.e. investment per labour
as a measure for the regional allocation of infrastructure investment, on the mea-
sures for the three criteria equality, efficiency and neutrality described above. Fur-
thermore, we have also added a measure for private capital intensity, i.e. Kit/Lit,
which is another potential determinant of regional infrastructure investment.
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Note, that infrastructure investment is measured in net figures in order to re-
duce the size effect in the allocation of investment, due to the fact that higher
stocks also require higher maintenance investment which is reflected in higher
gross investment figures.
One important issue for the implementation is that at least for Germany, in-
vestment of different levels of governments, i.e. the Federal government, the gov-
ernments of the federal states and the local governments of the counties, are in-
cluded. One could argue that the autonomous investment decisions at lower
governmental levels are unlikely to reflect especially the equality and neutrality
criteria, whereas the efficiency criterion should be also relevant for investment un-
dertaken by lower levels of government. However, investment by the federal
government is not only the main part of total infrastructure investment, but the
federal government can also influence investment decisions at lower government
levels via its investment grant policy. Thus, we argue that this investment figures
including all levels of government are appropriate for the problem of regional
investment allocation we study here.
In case the government pursues a regional infrastructure policy according to
the neutrality criterion, we expect a negative correlation between the investment
per person in work (Iit/Lit) and the infrastructure intensity (Git/Lit). A negative
correlation between (Iit/Lit) and (Qit/Lit) is expected if the government allocates
investment according to the criterion of equality. Hence, regions with lower in-
come will receive more investment. Finally, if the government pursues a regional
infrastructure policy according to the criterion of efficiency, then we expect the
correlation between (Iit/Lit) and (Qit/Git) to be positive. Thus, regions where
the expected returns of infrastructure investments are higher would obtain more
investment.
The estimation of the regression in Table 5.2 has been carried out separately for
the German and the French regions by again usingMLEwith an ARMA(1,1) spec-
ification for the covariance structure. Also, fixed cross-section and time-effects
were added to the specification, which turned out to be highly significant.
From the results reported in Table 5.2, we find that only the criterion of neutral-
ity can explain differences in the amount of infrastructure investment the regions
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Table 5.2: Determinants of Regional Infrastructure Investment Allocation in Ger-
many and France
Results of the regression analysis:
Dependent variable: I/L
(1) Germany (2) France
Independent variables:
Equity Y/L (0) (0)
Efficiency Q/G (0) (0)
Neutrality G/L ( )??? (+)??
Private Capital K/L (0) (0)
Significance levels: ???1%,??5%,?10%
(0) not significant, (+) with positive sign, (-) with negative sign
receive, but only for Germany it has the expected sign. This finding fits well
into the institutional framework of infrastructure policy in Germany we have de-
scribed in section 5.2.1 where priority is given to the convergence of living condi-
tions throughout all regions in Germany. For France, a potential explanation for
the positive sign of the criterion of neutrality is that in the process of deconcentra-
tion of the Paris region, political priorities are given to the development of certain
regions, but not to the development of all regions with equal priority.
On the other hand, surprisingly neither the criterion of efficiency nor the pri-
vate capital intensity are significant for Germany or France. Thus, governments
do not seem to anticipate the expected returns of infrastructure investments in
the decision process. Moreover, the equity criterion is not significant. As a by-
product of this result we can also infer that—contrary to what is often presumed
in the literature—simultaneity between infrastructure investment and output is
negligible, i.e. Qit/Lit does not determine Iit/Lit. It is worth noting that if simul-
taneity matters we expect a positive sign for Qit/Lit, because prosperous states
are financially more capable of infrastructure spending than poorer ones.
As a result of this section we can determine on balance that, contrary to
France, the criterion of neutrality does appear to play a role in the allocation of
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public infrastructure investment in Germany. Public investment in Germany has
flowed above all into regions with a below average initial endowment of road
infrastructure, thus in Germany infrastructure policy is used as an instrument of
regional policy to minimise the competitive disadvantages of economically un-
derdeveloped regions.
5.4 Summary and conclusions
In the first part of this study, we described the differences in infrastructure and
regional planning policies between Germany and France. In France, for exam-
ple, a dominance of Paris and the surrounding region compared to the other
French regions can be observed. A further basic difference is that regional plan-
ning in Germany is divided hierarchically between the regional authorities and
is conceived in the medium to long-term. In contrast to this, regional planning
in France is based on so called ‘planning contracts’ between the state and the
regions, in which the individual regional authorities have equal rights and plan-
ning is conceived rather in the medium to short-term.
Following the description of the institutional concepts of regional infrastruc-
ture policy in Germany and France, the effects of road infrastructure on produc-
tivity were examined for the German and French regions in the second part of this
study. For that purpose, production functions were estimated using the data of
an ‘unbalanced panel’ consisting of the 21 French regions for the period 1978-92
and the 11 West German federal states for the period 1970-95.
On the whole it can be concluded that regional road infrastructure has a sig-
nificant impact on regional output. In addition, we find evidence that the direct
effect arising from infrastructure, i.e. increasing the marginal productivities of
private factors, is more important than the indirect effects, i.e. the positive effects
on the demand for private factor inputs. As a caveat, however, the results regard-
ing the indirect effects of infrastructure should be interpreted with some caution
due to the strong correlation between the explanatory variables in the translog
model.
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In addition, we cannot observe a decrease in income disparities in the pe-
riod of investigation either in Germany or France. This finding is at odds with
the predictions of neoclassical economic theories. On the contrary, economic
counter-effects could have emanated that worked against regional convergence
as assumed by models of the ‘New Economic Geography’ due to the removal
of transport barriers. The explanation of this puzzling evidence is a challenging
issue for future research.
Finally, the determinants of the allocation of infrastructure investment in Ger-
many and France were examined empirically by applying a new approach. Sur-
prisingly, neither in France or Germany do efficiency considerations matter for
the allocation of infrastructure investment across regions. However, it could be
shown that in Germany, in contrast with France, the criterion of neutrality plays
a role in the allocation of public investment in infrastructure, which means that
public investment flows above all to those regions which have a below average
endowment with public capital. Despite the principal difficulty to link the in-
stitutional differences in infrastructure policies in Germany and France with this
evidence of the determinants of infrastructure investment allocation, we interpret
this finding as a reflection of the priority of promoting the regional convergence
of living conditions for infrastructure policy in Germany.
Appendix Essay 5.
5A. Data
The German-French regional data include 21 of the 22 French regions (Corsica
was not included due to incomplete statistical information) for the period 1978-
1992 and 11 West German federal states for the period 1970-1995, although in the
case of West Berlin, data is only available for the period 1970-1990.3 All values
have been converted into ECU at constant 1991 prices. For investment in trans-
port infrastructure, we are able to differentiate in France between roads, rail and
inland waterways. The infrastructure data for France are also described in Fritsch
(1995) and Cadot et al. (1999). Note, that road infrastructure investment in France
includes both public investment for all road categories and private investment for
licensed motorways.
In case of Germany, with respect to transport infrastructure only investment
data for road infrastructure are available at the regional level of the Bundesländer.
Therefore, the empirical analysis focused on road infrastructure in order to allow
a comparison of the infrastructure data between Germany and France.
For Germany, we are able to differentiate investment between categories of
road (A roads, B roads and smaller roads and streets). An internal report of the
GermanMinistry of Transport, Building andHousingwas used as a source for the
investment made by the Federal Government and the Federal States (‘Straßen-
baubericht 1996’). Thus, this report gives the allocation of Federal investment for
motorways and A roads across the Bundesländer in the period 1970-1995.
The information regarding investment made by the State and local govern-
ments in B and smaller roads was taken from a publication issued by the Federal
3The data used in this analysis are available from the authors upon request.
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Statistical Office Wiesbaden ‘Rechnungsergebnisse des öffentlichen Gesamthaushalts’,
series 14, section 3.1. It contains the road investment of the different bodies at the
regional level of the Bundesländer.
The regional capital stocks of road infrastructure in Germany and France were
determined from the regional investment series (French regions 1975-1992, Ger-
man Bundesländer) using the ‘Perpetual Inventory Method’ (PIM). Different pro-
cedures were used for both Germany and France. The problem in the case of
France was to determine the initial capital stock for each region for 1975. Thus,
the aggregated transport infrastructure stocks in France as given by the Feder-
ation Nationale des Travaux Publics (FNTP) have been allocated proportionally
to the individual regions in accordance with the investment proportion of the in-
dividual regions. The calculated value was then used as the initial stock for the
Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM). For the linear depreciation rate, we assumed
a value of 2.5 percent. As a control for the capital stocks of road infrastructure ar-
rived at by using this method, the sum over the individual regions was computed
and compared with the aggregated value reported by FNTP. It became apparent
that the deviation between the sums of the regional and the aggregated stock was
only between 1 and 2 percent.
In contrast to this method applied for France, with regards to Germany it is
possible to use a study carried out by the German Institute for Economic Research
(DIW), in which the regional capital stock of road infrastructure was estimated for
the West German federal states for the year 1970 (Bartholmai, 1973). In order to
update the initial stocks for 1970 over the period 1971-1995, the Perpetual Inven-
tory Method was used. The publication series ‘Verkehr in Zahlen’ (Transport in
figures) of the DIW also gives the aggregated stock of road infrastructure for the
period 1970-1995. Therefore it was possible to apply a restriction for the calcula-
tion of the regional stock. Contained within this restriction was the assumption
that the sum of the stocks in the regions equals the aggregated value for Germany
given by DIW.
Furthermore, the majority of regionally specific measures were obtained from
official statistics such as value added as a measure for output we use in the anal-
ysis. In the case of Germany, the majority of this data originates from the series
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of ‘National Accounts for the Bundesländer’ which is published by the Statistical
Office of Baden-Württemberg (‘Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg’).
Gross value added (for all areas at market prices) is taken from the publica-
tion ‘Entstehung des Bruttoinlandsprodukts in den Ländern der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland 1979-1996’ (‘The Origin of Gross National Product in the Federal
States of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1970-1996’), vol. 30, and is used as a
measure for the output Q of the federal states for the period 1979-1995.
For France, the measure for labour has been taken from the EUROSTAT data
base ‘New Cronos’, edition June 1999. The regional value added data at mar-
ket prices for the years 1980-1992 were drawn from the EUROSTAT publications
‘Regional and Statistical Yearbook, Series 1A, 1993, 1995.’ The values for 1979
and 1978 were extrapolated using the information of the development of gross
domestic product (GDP) for the years 1978 and 1979.
The data relating to the regional stock of private capital in France for the pe-
riod 1978-1991 were provided by Professor Remy Prud’Homme of the Univer-
sity of Paris. A description of these data can be found in Prud’Homme (1996).
The stocks for the year 1992 were computed by applying the Perpetual Inven-
tory Method from the stocks in 1991 by adding regional gross investment in 1992
for all industries taken from the ‘New Cronos’ data base and assuming a linear
depreciation rate of 10 percent.
Part III
Concluding Remarks
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The bottom line of this thesis is that throughout the essays evidence of a pos-
itive impact of infrastructure on private productivity is found. This evidence
holds also for different levels of aggregation studied in this thesis; whereas the
Essays 1, 3 and 5 are based on data at the regional level of the Bundesländer
and the French regions respectively, Essay 2 is based on data at the local level
of the German counties and Essay 4 is based on data at the local level of large
self-administrated German cities.
Also, different measures of public capital are used in the Essays. The analy-
sis of Essay 1 is based on a broad measure of public capital including transport
infrastructure, water and sewer systems, pipelines, etc. In Essay 2, infrastructure
is measured using indicators describing both human capital and transport infras-
tructure endowment at the local level. Essay 3 focuses only on transport infras-
tructure, whereas Essay 4 uses again a broad measure of public capital. Finally,
the analysis in Essay 5 is based on road infrastructure capital stocks in German
and French regions.
Moreover, the analyses of the infrastructure effects in the Essays are per-
formed for different economic sectors. Essays 1 and 4 perform the analysis for
the manufacturing sector, whereas Essay 2 conducts the analysis for several sec-
tors and Essays 3 and 5 conduct the analysis for the total economy including all
sectors.
Some caveats, however, are in point here. As stated in Essay 1, the existence
of positive effects of public capital on private production is a necessary, but not a
sufficient condition for drawing the conclusion that public investment should be
boosted in the future. To make such an inference, the costs of the public capital
provision have to be included in the analysis as well.
For instance an increase in public investment may only be possible if tax rev-
enues are also increased. This in turn can give rise to distortions bearing addi-
tional costs for the economy. Similarly, if higher public investment is financed
by higher governmental debt this may also imply other kinds of additional costs
e.g. higher interest rates on capital markets. In this respect, this thesis has fo-
cused only on the necessary condition for increasing the supply of public capital,
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i.e. the existence of significant and positive effects of public capital on private
production.
From a more theoretical point of view, the sufficient condition for increas-
ing public investment in the future is that the social net benefit—defined as the
sum of social gross benefits (consumer and producer surpluses, positive external-
ities e.g. spillover effects, etc.) minus the sum of social costs (costs of provision,
negative externalities e.g. environmental effects, etc.)—is positive. Consequently,
the appropriate instrument to conduct such an investigation is social cost-benefit
analysis.
In addition, a word of caution pertains in extrapolating these findings of posi-
tive effects of infrastructure in the past to the future. Even if infrastructure invest-
ment was productive in the past, it might not be productive in the future. While
building the first road to a remote region might be very productive, once a net-
work of roads is already established the addition of further roads might induce
no gains in private productivity.
With respect to the simultaneity between output and infrastructure invest-
ment, we find only little evidence in the Essays 3, 4 and 5 that output is a deter-
minant for infrastructure investment. Thus, in contrast to what is often claimed in
the literature, reverse causation running from output to infrastructure investment
appears—at least for the various samples studied here—not to be significant.
Finally, regarding the predominant politico-institutional determinants of in-
frastructure investment, we find that lobbying and political affiliation matter for
the regional allocation of infrastructure investment, whereas efficiency consider-
ations appear not to have an influence on the regional allocation of public invest-
ment. In conclusion, the observed allocation of regional infrastructure investment
may depart substantially from a socially optimal allocation.
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